Bernard Haykel: A Life Between the Text and the Gun

In 1984, a sixteen-year-old boy walked into a firefight in Tripoli, Lebanon. Bernard Haykel (b. 1968) survived by luck. His parents, a French-Lebanese surgeon raised in Guadeloupe and an American mother of Polish descent, had come to Lebanon on their honeymoon in 1967 and stayed. Nine years of civil war had taught the family what a confessional map looks like when it turns into a military one. The near miss settled the question. They sent their son to the United States to finish high school.

Haykel’s father spent the war in operating rooms, repairing what militias did to bodies. His son watched Sunni Islamist militants take over Tripoli’s streets and, at a distance, watched clerics take over a state in Iran in 1979. Most Western social science of that era treated religion as a dependent variable, a costume worn by class interest or anti-colonial grievance. A boy in Tripoli could see it functioning as an independent one. Theology decided which checkpoint you could pass, which militia held your neighborhood, which government claimed your obedience. Haykel later built a scholarly method on the premise that ideas of God organize armies, and that anyone who dismisses this is describing a different planet.

He grew up a polyglot among identities: Arabic, French, and English; Christian, Muslim, and Jewish milieus; Lebanese streets and American schools. He has said this formation left him permanently unsettled, and that he prefers it that way. Decades later, , he put the method in one line: “I think confusion is underrated.”

At Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service he studied international politics and considered diplomacy. At Oxford the plan dissolved. He took an M.A., an M.Phil., and a D.Phil. in Islamic and Middle Eastern studies, finishing the doctorate in 1998. Two teachers marked him. Wilferd Madelung (1930-2023), the great historian of early Islamic sects, drilled into him the discipline of the original text: read the Arabic, reconstruct the argument, place it in its century. The anthropologist Paul Dresch, who had lived among Yemeni tribes, taught the opposite discipline: a text means nothing until you know who reads it, who pays the reader, and whose cousin holds the rifle outside the mosque. Haykel fused the two. Texts without society produce fantasy. Society without texts produces a Middle East where nobody believes anything, which is a fantasy of another kind.

A Fulbright took him to Yemen in 1992 and 1993, and Yemen made him. Sanaa in those years still ran on manuscripts, tribal mediation, and scholars who traced their learning through chains of teachers going back centuries. Haykel worked in that world with the languages to read it and the patience to sit in it. His dissertation, published by Cambridge in 2003 as Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkani, centered on the Yemeni jurist Muhammad al-Shawkani (1759-1834).

Al-Shawkani came out of Zaydi Shiism, the school that had ruled highland Yemen through an imamate for a thousand years, and turned on its scholarly establishment. He championed ijtihad, the right of a qualified scholar to reason from Quran and hadith, and attacked taqlid, deference to the accumulated rulings of the legal schools. Haykel’s insight was to read this as a fight over power, without reducing it to one. A scholar who bypasses the school bypasses the men who run the school. Al-Shawkani’s method stripped authority from hereditary Zaydi elites and pushed Yemeni religious culture toward a Sunni, scripturalist orientation. Legal method redistributed social position. The book also broke the standard genealogy that traced Islamic revival to central Arabia or nineteenth-century Cairo. Yemen had its own revival, running on its own arguments.

The larger point traveled well beyond Yemen. Once a tradition licenses the individual reader to judge the inherited authorities, the license goes wherever readers go. It can produce a quietist purist, a parliamentary Islamist, or a man with a suicide belt. The method does not choose. Circumstances choose.

Haykel joined New York University in 1998 and earned tenure there. Princeton recruited him as full professor in 2007, into a department that Bernard Lewis (1916-2018) had helped make famous and that still prized philology, medieval sources, and command of languages. Haykel fit the tradition and cut against it. Like the old school, he insists that classical texts exert independent force on history. Against the grand civilizational narrative, he starts small: this community, this legal text, this prince, this tribe. He directed Princeton’s Institute for the Transregional Study of the Contemporary Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia from 2007 to 2023, ran its Near Eastern Studies program and its oil and energy project, and taught courses that moved from eighth-century jurisprudence to spot prices for crude.

His central subject became Salafism, the movement claiming to recover the practice of Islam’s first generations, the salaf. Haykel mapped its internal geography with a care that most journalism never manages. Quietist Salafis concentrate on creed and ritual and often preach obedience to rulers as a lesser evil than civil war. Activist Salafis contest elections. Jihadi-Salafis wage war on governments they deem apostate. Saudi Wahhabi clerics, who share much of the Salafi vocabulary, have spent decades condemning al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda has returned the compliment by marking them as court scholars of an infidel state. Keeping these distinctions straight protected Haykel from the two standard errors: treating every bearded literalist as a bomb in waiting, and treating jihadist theology as an invention with no roots in Islamic law. Militants select, simplify, and radicalize materials that the tradition contains. Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328) wrote with far more qualification than the men who wave his fatwas, and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) founded a movement whose Saudi heirs mostly defend the throne. The genealogy runs through selection, never through simple descent.

Haykel also declined the comfortable explanation that Saudi money built global Salafism. Money spread the books and built the mosques. Money cannot explain why a Birmingham engineer or a Cairo student finds certainty in them, or why so many Salafi militants turned their guns on Riyadh. He points instead to mass literacy, urbanization, collapsed scholarly hierarchies, and the modern conviction that a man can open the sources and judge for himself. Salafism claims the seventh century and depends on the twentieth: print, cassette, satellite, broadband.

After September 11, 2001, this expertise acquired a market. Haykel studied al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula through its sermons, legal rulings, and online magazines, and through the tribal politics that sheltered it. In a 2010 federal court declaration he stated that he regularly advised the CIA, the State Department, and branches of the armed forces. His standing counsel ran against the bureaucratic instinct to treat “al-Qaeda” as a corporation with a headquarters. In Yemen the label often covered marriage alliances, tribal protection rackets, local feuds, and the occasional manipulation by government officials who find jihadists useful. Doctrine mattered, and doctrine acted through kinship, patronage, and state failure.

Then came February 2015, and the scene that made him a public name. Graeme Wood (b. 1979) published “What ISIS Really Wants” in The Atlantic, and built the article’s spine from Haykel’s analysis. Wood reported that every academic he asked about the Islamic State’s ideology sent him to the same office in Princeton. Haykel told him that Muslims who declared the group un-Islamic held “a cotton-candy view of their own religion,” one that skipped what the tradition had historically and legally required. The Islamic State, he argued, read seventh-century norms of war with obsessive seriousness and carried medieval legal materials into the present.

The article detonated. Muslim scholars, pundits, and academics accused Haykel of handing the Islamic State the religious legitimacy it craved. Fred Clark, a progressive Christian blogger, wrote that Haykel’s language matched the script fundamentalists always use against non-fundamentalists. Within days Haykel gave an interview to ThinkProgress to draw his own lines. Asked whether Islamic texts necessitate a group like ISIS, he answered: “There is nothing predetermined in Islam that would lead to ISIS.” Muslims who condemned the group stood fully inside the tradition, he said, and calling them lesser Muslims was absurd. He also noted what Wood’s article had left in shadow: the Islamic State’s reading was ahistorical, a pretense that a millennium of Islamic legal development never happened.

His position, stated in full, satisfied nobody, which suggests he had described something real. The Islamic State argued from Islamic revelation, law, and history; a scholar who declared those arguments irrelevant because they were repellent had quit the scholarly enterprise. At the same time, the movement grew from the American invasion of Iraq, Sunni exclusion, the Syrian collapse, sectarian rule, and a generation of jobless young men. In January 2016 he carried both halves into a Senate hearing room and testified that the Islamic State pursued an “austere, intolerant, and muscular vision of Islam,” and that ignoring either its ideas or its circumstances failed the analysis. He added that the caliphate’s female morality police, demolition videos, and slick online propaganda had no precedent in the Prophet’s Arabia. The restoration of the past was itself a modern product.

With the literary scholar Robyn Creswell, Haykel opened a stranger door into the same house. Their 2015 New Yorker essay “Battle Lines” examined the verse that militants write in classical Arabic meters: elegies for dead fighters, odes to leaders, laments for prisoners, poems that began as tweets. They introduced readers to Ahlam al-Nasr, the young woman celebrated as the Poetess of the Islamic State. Analysts had ignored this material as decoration. Creswell and Haykel argued the opposite: the beheading videos address foreigners, while poetry offers a window onto the movement talking to itself. In verse, the militant acquires ancestors, brothers, a code of honor, and a death that means something. Doctrine recruits the mind. Poetry recruits the rest.

Saudi Arabia had been in his file since the 1990s, and it slowly moved to the center. He co-edited Saudi Arabia in Transition (2015) with Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, a volume that broke the kingdom into its parts: rival princes, clerical factions, merchant networks, restless women, tribes, technocrats, and a young population raised on satellite television and expecting more than the old bargain offered. The old bargain itself he described with clarity. The House of Saud held the sword. The heirs of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab held the pulpit, the courts, and the schools, and preached obedience to the dynasty in exchange. Unequal from the start, the arrangement still gave clerics real power over daily life. Oil paid for all of it and shaped the citizen’s relation to the state: subjects of patronage rather than taxpayers with claims.

Then Mohammed bin Salman (b. 1985) broke the bargain, and Haykel found himself closer to a subject than scholars usually get. He met the crown prince repeatedly and exchanged messages with him in Arabic over WhatsApp. He denies the title of adviser and says he offered blunt views when asked, including a detailed warning that Saudi Arabia could not defeat the Houthis by force. He supported major elements of the program: caging the religious police, moving women into public life and employment, cutting clerical power, diversifying an oil economy. He read the project itself with a colder eye than either its promoters or its critics. Mohammed bin Salman has not secularized the state. He has nationalized religious authority, placing the clerics inside boundaries the ruler draws. Saudi nationalism, entertainment, technology, and loyalty to the dynasty now compete with piety as sources of legitimacy. This explains a paradox that confuses outsiders: women drive and concerts play while clerics, feminists, princes, and businessmen sit in prison. The state relaxes social rules because it alone now decides which rules exist.

The murder of Jamal Khashoggi (1958-2018) in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018 turned Haykel’s access into his liability. Critics asked what a Princeton professor was doing on the crown prince’s phone. In an April 2019 interview with Isaac Chotiner of The New Yorker, Haykel condemned the killing, called the imprisonment and alleged torture of women activists inexcusable, said political prisoners should be charged or released, and defended his engagement, disclosing his contacts and his business interests in the region under questioning that was designed to draw blood. He kept one warning constant: destroying or destabilizing the Saudi state might repeat, at larger scale, the catastrophes he had studied in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen, and the one he had survived in Lebanon. His realism gives heavy weight to order and to the horror of collapse. His critics answer that such realism shades into apology for a man who dismembers journalists. The tension sits unresolved in his public record, and he seems to accept living with it.

On Yemen he never wavered. He called the Saudi war unwinnable from early on. The Houthis, in his account, grew from Zaydi history, tribal politics, and state failure; Iranian and Hezbollah support strengthened a movement that Yemen itself produced. Riyadh might have done better with its traditional tools, patronage and bargaining among tribes and notables, than with air power. He considers the Houthis authoritarian and radical, and he considers the conspiracy theory of their existence a recipe for bad strategy. Dresch’s training shows here. Firepower does not govern a society embedded in its own loyalties.

Honors accumulated: a Guggenheim Fellowship in 2010, a board seat at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington until December 2025, a senior fellowship at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the Nelson Mandela Chair in Afro-Asian Studies at Mahatma Gandhi University in Kerala in 2023, Luce Foundation support for research on Muslims in India, election to the American Academy of Sciences and Letters in 2024. As of 2026 he is completing The Realm: MBS and the Transformation of Saudi Arabia for Penguin Press, the book toward which thirty years of Arabian research has been converging: the story of a religiously legitimated oil monarchy remade into a nationalist, centralizing, socially liberalizing autocracy.

He is married to Navina Najat Haidar, curator of Islamic art at the Metropolitan Museum of Art and daughter of a former Indian foreign secretary. They met at Oxford. The marriage joins two approaches to the same civilization: he reads it through law, theology, and power; she reads it through miniature painting, architecture, and the museum case.

The through-line of Haykel’s work is a refusal that costs him something in every camp. He refuses to reduce jihadism to poverty or blowback, which angers those who want Islam held harmless. He refuses to read texts as machines that manufacture behavior, which angers those who want Islam indicted. He refuses to treat Saudi repression as disqualifying his engagement with Saudi power, which angers human-rights advocates, and he refuses to soften his judgment of the Yemen war, which cannot please Riyadh. The boy from Tripoli learned early that theology moves men and that states, when they fail, fail onto the bodies of surgeons’ patients. His scholarship holds both lessons at once and declines to let either one win.

Notes

Childhood, firefight, parents’ honeymoon, Madelung, and the “confusion is underrated” quote: Phil Zabriskie, “The Arab Spring, a Season Later,” Princeton Alumni Weekly.

Wood article, “cotton-candy view,” goatee description, Wood describes Haykel talking through a “Mephistophelian goatee,” a status detail you may want, “smack in the middle of the medieval tradition”: Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic, March 2015.

Haykel’s pushback, “nothing predetermined in Islam,” ahistorical reading, defense of Muslim critics of ISIS: Jack Jenkins, “What The Atlantic Left Out About ISIS According To Their Own Expert,” ThinkProgress, February 20, 2015.

Fred Clark‘s criticism, the fundamentalist-script charge: “Scholar Clarifies, Walks Back His Comments in Atlantic ISIS Essay,” Slacktivist, February 21, 2015.

Senate testimony, January 20, 2016, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, source of “austere, intolerant, and muscular” and the two-sided failure warning: Bernard Haykel testimony.

Jihadi poetry, Ahlam al-Nasr, poetry as the movement talking to itself: Robyn Creswell and Bernard Haykel, “Battle Lines,” The New Yorker, June 8, 2015.

Chotiner interview covering WhatsApp contact, denial of adviser role, Khashoggi, business interests, women activists: Isaac Chotiner, “A Middle Eastern Studies Professor Interprets Mohammed bin Salman,” The New Yorker, April 2019.

Career dates, institute directorship 2007-2023, Mandela Chair, Academy election, AGSIW board through December 2025: Wikipedia, Bernard Haykel.

FDD fellowship and The Realm (Penguin Press): Foundation for Defense of Democracies profile.

Recent Haykel commentary with Lebanon reflections, tennis beside the bombing image, his description of the Lebanese as resilient: Bloomberg weekend interview with Mishal Husain, 2026.

Extrapolations made without a link, which I judge self-evident: the surgeon father treating war wounded as a daily reality of Tripoli in the civil war; Sanaa in 1992-1993 as a manuscript and tribal-mediation culture, well documented generally, and consistent with Dresch‘s ethnography; the description of Oxford training and Princeton’s departmental character; the WhatsApp detail is sourced to the Chotiner interview.

The Convertible Scholar: Bernard Haykel and the Economy of Fields

Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) built his sociology on a simple wager: society is a set of fields, each field is a game, and each game has its own stakes, its own rules, and its own currency. The academic field pays in citations, chairs, and the recognition of peers. The journalistic field pays in visibility. The political field pays in influence and access. In “The Forms of Capital” (1986) and Homo Academicus (1984), Bourdieu argued that the interesting action happens at the borders, where agents convert one currency into another, and where each field polices the exchange rate. A field defends its autonomy by punishing members who import foreign capital, because foreign capital devalues the domestic kind. The physicist who wins arguments by press conference offends physics. The scholar who wins arguments by knowing a king offends scholarship.
Bernard Haykel plays in at least four fields at once, and his career is a long series of conversions among them.
The first field is the philological academy, and it is where he accumulated his founding stake. The currency there is austere: dead languages, manuscripts, chains of transmission, the capacity to read Muhammad al-Shawkani in eighteenth-century Yemeni script and situate him against Zaydi legal tradition. Oxford under Madelung is close to the autonomous pole of the scholarly field, the region where, in Bourdieu’s phrase from The Rules of Art (1992), the game runs on the loser-wins logic of art for art’s sake: the less your work serves any external master, the purer your prestige. A dissertation on a dead Yemeni jurist, published by Cambridge in 2003, is capital of maximum purity. Nobody at the State Department cared about al-Shawkani. That was the point. The academy consecrated Haykel precisely because his knowledge had no market.
Then the market arrived. September 11 repriced the entire field of Islamic studies overnight, and the repricing rewarded a specific portfolio: classical training plus contemporary fieldwork plus Gulf networks. Most scholars held one asset. Haykel held all three, because Dresch had taught him to treat tribes and texts as one subject. The 2010 court declaration in which he lists the CIA, the State Department, and the armed forces as regular clients records the first great conversion: philological capital exchanged for standing in the policy field. The rate was excellent. What Oxford had priced as erudition, Washington priced as intelligence.
Each subsequent conversion built on the last, and the chain is visible in the public record. Policy standing made him the man every academic sent Graeme Wood to see in 2015, which converted scholarly authority into journalistic celebrity, a currency the academy officially despises and unofficially envies. Celebrity plus Gulf expertise brought the WhatsApp channel to Mohammed bin Salman, which is capital in the rarest field of all, the court, where the currency is proximity to the person of the ruler. Court access then flowed back down the chain: a Penguin advance for The Realm, Bloomberg weekend interviews, Senate invitations, FDD fellowship, board seats. By the mid-2020s Haykel had become a kind of central banker of his own portfolio, moving value among four fields, each conversion increasing his total holdings.
Fields punish converters. The academic field in particular defines itself against the political and economic fields, and its members earn distinction by displaying independence from power. A professor who exchanges messages with a crown prince has moved toward what Bourdieu calls the heteronomous pole, the region of the field where external demand sets value, and the autonomous pole retaliates by questioning whether he remains a scholar at all. The retaliation does not require anyone to identify an error in his Arabic. It works through category: adviser, courtier, access journalist, lobbyist. Every one of those labels is an attempted demotion from one field to a lower-status one, and Haykel’s insistence that he is not an adviser, that he offered blunt views when asked, is a defense of his classification. In field terms he is claiming that the flow of value ran outward, scholar instructing prince, rather than inward, prince paying scholar.
Read this way, the April 2019 Chotiner interview is a border inspection. The New Yorker occupies a particular position in the journalistic field: it polices the boundary between the academy and power on behalf of the liberal public. Chotiner’s questions followed customs procedure. Do you advise him. Do you have business interests in the region. What did you say to him after the murder. Each question tested whether Haykel had smuggled undeclared capital across a border, whether court access or Gulf money had contaminated the scholarly goods he was presenting for entry. Haykel declared his holdings, condemned the killing, called the treatment of the women activists inexcusable, and defended the engagement itself. The inspection ended without a seizure and without an exoneration, which is the usual result. Border disputes in Bourdieu’s world do not resolve; they establish that a border exists and that this traveler will be searched again.
The Khashoggi murder itself was a field crisis in the precise sense. Before October 2018, access to MBS traded at a premium across all four of Haykel’s fields. The academy tolerated it as fieldwork, journalism paid for it as sourcing, the policy world prized it as channel, and the court dispensed it as favor. The killing collapsed the exchange rate in three of the four fields simultaneously. Saudi access became toxic capital, the kind that must be explained rather than displayed. Consultants resigned from Vision 2030 boards, conferences emptied, and the men who had flown to Riyadh for the Davos in the Desert suddenly discovered scheduling conflicts. Those exits were portfolio liquidations by holders trying to sell before the price fell further. Haykel held his position. In Bourdieu’s terms he bet on hysteresis working in his favor: that the crisis would pass, the asset would recover, and the scholars who had dumped their Saudi holdings at the bottom would have to buy back in at a loss, while the one analyst who kept the channel open through the winter would own it alone. The 2026 book, arriving as the definitive account of MBS by the one Western scholar with sustained access, is the payoff of that bet. Whether the bet compromised the analysis is exactly the question the academic field keeps asking, because the field’s business is asking it.
Wood’s article performed a conversion on Haykel’s behalf and without his full control: it took claims calibrated for the scholarly field, where “ISIS argues from Islamic legal materials” is a banality, and released them into the journalistic and political fields, where the same sentence functions as ammunition. Capital changes meaning when it crosses a border. The ThinkProgress interview days later was Haykel attempting to repatriate his own statements, reasserting the scholarly qualifications (“nothing predetermined in Islam,” the ahistoricism point) that the journalistic field had stripped in transit. His complaint that the piece was Wood’s argument and not his is a property claim: the capital was mine, the conversion was unauthorized. Bourdieu wrote in On Television (1996) that the journalistic field increasingly forces all other fields to trade on its terms, fast, binary, and personalized. Haykel learned the tariff schedule in one week of February 2015.
Agents who hold capital in two fields can do things pure natives of either field cannot. Haykel can tell a Senate committee about Ibn Taymiyyah because the academy certified his reading; he can tell a seminar about Saudi succession because the court showed him the interior. Each field grants him a monopoly rent in the other. The rent explains the resentment. Pure academics watch him collect returns on access they consider corrupt; pure policy operators watch him claim a scholarly immunity they cannot claim. The double agent is indispensable to both fields and trusted by neither, and the periodic inspections, Chotiner in 2019, the recurring adviser-or-not question, the reception awaiting The Realm, are the price of the rent.
Haykel’s dispositions were formed in a Tripoli where survival required reading multiple codes at once, Arabic and French, Christian and Muslim, militia and state, and where his family itself was a conversion, a French-Lebanese surgeon and an American wife who turned a honeymoon into a life. A childhood spent crossing lines produces an adult at ease on borders, and at ease with the suspicion that border-crossers attract. His self-description as a polyglot formed by multiple identities is a habitus report. The scholarly method he built, texts read through societies and societies read through texts, is the same disposition transposed into an epistemology: refuse to naturalize any single field’s view of the world. Bourdieu would note the fit between the disposition and the position. The man moves easily among fields because he never fully belonged to one, and he never fully belonged to one because he learned early that exclusive belonging is what gets people killed.
The human-rights critique of Haykel is, in field terms, a demand that the academic field enforce its autonomy: no conversions with murderous courts, whatever the analytic yield. His defense is a claim about the field’s actual product: the analysis of Saudi Arabia that the field exists to produce cannot be produced from the autonomous pole, because the object of study sits behind a door that only heteronomous capital opens. Both positions are coherent. They are also both self-interested, in the way Bourdieu insisted all position-takings are: the critics hold portfolios heavy in purity, Haykel holds a portfolio heavy in access, and each side’s principles track its assets. The illusio of the academic game, the shared belief that the stakes are real and worth fighting over, is what keeps the fight going, and the fight itself is what keeps the border marked.
The Realm will be judged twice, in two currencies. The journalistic and policy fields will price its access: what did he see, what did MBS say, what do we learn about the succession, the murders, the money. The academic field will price its autonomy: does the analysis survive subtraction of the access, would the argument stand if the WhatsApp channel had never existed, does the book criticize its subject at the points where criticism costs the author something. A book can clear one market and fail the other. The reviews that matter will be conversion audits, and Haykel has spent his career being audited, which may be why he waited thirty years to write it. He was accumulating enough capital in every field to survive the inspection at the border where all four of them meet.

Voice on WhatsApp: Bernard Haykel and Hirschman’s Triangle

Albert O. Hirschman (1915-1997) knew exit before he theorized it. He left Berlin in 1933 at seventeen, fought in Spain, and spent 1940 in Marseille smuggling refugees over the Pyrenees ahead of the Gestapo. The century’s great scholar of staying was a serial escaper. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970) begins with a small question, what customers do when a product deteriorates, and opens onto a large one: when an organization you belong to goes bad, do you leave, or do you stay and complain? Exit is the economist’s answer, silent and clean; the firm reads falling sales and corrects. Voice is the political answer, noisy and costly; the member protests from within. Loyalty is the hinge. It holds exit at bay long enough for voice to work, and it can also curdle into staying past all reason. Hirschman’s sharpest point is the seesaw: each option draws strength from the other. Voice bites only when the listener knows the speaker can leave. Exit teaches only when someone stays behind to translate it. And when exit gets too easy, the alert quit first and the organization deteriorates in peace, complained about by no one who matters.
The Saudi file of Bernard Haykel is a case study Hirschman never lived to write, because it puts all three corners of the triangle in one story and prices each one in blood, prison, or reputation.
Start with the deterioration. Through 2017 the Saudi reform story ran at a premium: the religious police caged, women entering the workforce, a young ruler talking economic transformation to Western investors. Then October 2018, a consulate in Istanbul, a bone saw. The quality of the product collapsed, and Hirschman predicts what happened next: the most quality-sensitive customers exited first. Consultants resigned from advisory boards. Speakers withdrew from the Riyadh investment conference within days. The exits were loud by design, exit performed as voice, a resignation letter written for the press. Hirschman would have recognized the hybrid and noted its weakness. A boycott stings only while it holds, and this one dissolved within two years; the money returned, the conferences refilled, and the regime learned that Western exit is a rental, priced in news cycles.
Haykel did not exit. He kept the WhatsApp channel open, kept visiting, kept writing, and finished a book. His public defense of this conduct is a nearly verbatim recitation of Hirschman’s case for voice. Ostracism, he argues in effect, teaches the ruler nothing; it removes the last unpaid critic from the room and leaves the counsel to courtiers and consultants on retainer. He says he told Mohammed bin Salman bluntly that the Yemen war could not be won. He condemned the Khashoggi killing, called the treatment of the imprisoned women activists inexcusable, and said prisoners should be charged or released, while declining to convert any of it into departure. Voice over exit, chosen deliberately, with the reasoning stated: influence requires presence.
Hirschman supplies the argument, and Hirschman supplies the objection. Voice, he insisted, draws its force from the credible threat of exit standing behind it. A customer who will buy the product no matter what is a customer the firm can ignore. So the question his framework puts to Haykel is exact: what does his exit threaten? If Haykel left, the court loses one interlocutor among the thousands petitioning for the crown prince’s time. Haykel loses his research object, his book’s foundation, his singular position as the Western scholar with the channel, thirty years of accumulated Arabian access. The asymmetry runs the wrong way. Exit costs the speaker nearly everything and the listener nearly nothing, and under those terms, Hirschman warns, voice degenerates. It softens itself to keep the channel open. It times its criticisms for private settings and its praise for public ones. It becomes counsel the ruler can consume as flattery in the form of candor, the most pleasant product an intellectual sells. Haykel’s critics rarely cite Hirschman, but this is their argument in his grammar: voice without an exit option is loyalty wearing voice’s clothes.
Loyalty is the corner Haykel refuses. He denies being an adviser and describes himself as a scholar who says blunt things when asked. Hirschman’s category does not require the member’s confession. Loyalty, in his scheme, is any attachment that delays exit past the point where a detached actor leaves, and it is measured in conduct. By that measure the record reads loyal: the warnings against destabilizing the kingdom, the argument that American pressure on the succession might repeat Iraq, the decision to hold through the post-Khashoggi winter when holding was expensive. Haykel might answer that the loyalty is to the object of study and to analytic access, to Saudi Arabia rather than to its ruler. Hirschman would find the distinction real and unstable, because in a state where one man has absorbed the institutions, loyalty to the country and access to the autocrat travel through the same door, and the doorkeeper knows it.
Now set the other biography beside his, because the triangle only shows its full geometry with two bodies in it. Jamal Khashoggi spent decades as the licensed voice of the Saudi system: editor, media adviser to Prince Turki al-Faisal (b. 1945), the insider who criticized within limits and understood the limits as the price of the room. In 2016 the government banned him from writing. Voice from within had reached its ceiling, and Hirschman’s scheme offered him the remaining corner: he exited, to Virginia, in 2017. Then he did the thing the scheme marks as most dangerous inside an authoritarian state. He combined the corners, exit plus voice, criticism published in the Washington Post from beyond the kingdom’s reach. Hirschman’s late essay on the collapse of East Germany, written after 1989, showed exit and voice fusing into a single force that brought down a state: the ones who fled and the ones who marched amplified each other. Authoritarian regimes understand this fusion as the existential threat, which is why they treat the exile who speaks as a traitor rather than an emigrant. Saudi Arabia did not close Khashoggi’s channel. It reached across the border, into a consulate, and closed him.
Put the two men on the triangle and the pricing becomes visible. Khashoggi was a member; Haykel is a customer. Hirschman drew the distinction himself: firms have customers, organizations and states have members, and the options carry different penalties for each. A customer who exits walks away; a member who exits commits a kind of secession, and a member who exits and keeps speaking commits, in the regime’s ledger, treason. Haykel’s voice risks his reputation in Princeton and Manhattan. Khashoggi’s voice cost him his life in Istanbul. The women who chose voice from inside, the activists who campaigned for the driving reform the regime then claimed as its own gift, paid in prison and, by credible accounts, torture. Within the Saudi system the menu reads: voice inside, prison; voice from exile, death; exit in silence, tolerated; loyalty, rewarded. The only actor who gets voice at survivable prices is the foreigner, because his membership was never on offer and his body sits outside the jurisdiction. Haykel’s position is possible because he cannot be a traitor. Voice is cheap for him in the currency where it is fatal for Saudis, and expensive for him only in the currency of standing, which is the currency his critics collect in.
This asymmetry cuts both ways, and an honest Hirschmanian account holds both edges. Against Haykel: counsel that risks nothing but reputation lacks the tragic weight of Khashoggi’s, and the regime knows the difference between a critic it must kill and a critic it can host. His voice is structurally safe, therefore structurally discountable. For Haykel: the safety is exactly what makes the voice sustainable. Khashoggi’s fusion of exit and voice was heroic and terminal; it produced a martyr and no policy. The activists’ inside voice produced prison sentences and a reform announced as royal generosity. If every channel that survives is a channel the regime permits, then the choice is between permitted voice and no voice, and Hirschman’s Nigerian railways stand behind Haykel’s answer. In that famous case, the availability of exit, trucks on the roads, let the railroads rot, because every shipper who cared about quality left and nobody influential remained to complain. Total exit does not punish the deteriorating organization; it anesthetizes it. A Riyadh emptied of independent scholars hears McKinsey, hears the sovereign fund’s bankers, hears the poets of the court. Haykel’s wager is that one unpaid voice in that room beats a clean conscience outside it.
The wager has a term structure, and this is where Hirschman presses hardest. Voice justifies itself by results. Loyalty justifies itself by faith that results will come. The line between them is temporal: at some point the member using voice must be able to say what evidence would move him to exit, or the voice has become loyalty and the analysis has become position. Haykel’s public record names the Yemen advice, the post-Khashoggi bluntness, the calls to charge or release prisoners. The record does not name the threshold, the act by the crown prince that would close the channel from Haykel’s side. Perhaps no such threshold exists; perhaps naming one is naive about how access works; perhaps a scholar’s obligation is to observe rather than to sanction. Hirschman’s framework does not settle the ethics. It only insists that an actor who cannot specify his exit price has, whatever he calls himself, already paid it.
The Realm will be the audit. A book on Mohammed bin Salman written from inside the channel is voice’s final product, and it will show what three decades of staying purchased: either an account that says in public, under the author’s name, the things blunt counsel says on WhatsApp, or an account calibrated to survive publication with the channel intact. Hirschman, who escaped four countries and spent his career defending the ones who stay, would read it the way he read everything, looking for the moment when loyalty stops being the condition of voice and starts being its replacement.

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Walker Connor (1926-2017)

In the summer of 1944, an eighteen-year-old from South Hadley, Massachusetts, enlisted in the United States Army and shipped out to the South Pacific. South Hadley was a paper-mill town on the Connecticut River, Catholic and working class in large parts, the kind of place where a boy grew up knowing which families were Irish, which were French Canadian, and which were Polish, and knowing that the distinctions carried weight. Walker Francis Connor spent the last stretch of the Second World War in a theater where Americans fought under one flag while the war itself proceeded as a contest of peoples who understood themselves as peoples. He came home, went to the University of Massachusetts at Amherst on the strength of his service, then to Georgetown, and finished a doctorate in political science in 1961. He spent the next five decades asking one question that his discipline believed it had already answered. What is a nation?

The discipline he entered had an answer, and the answer was a habit. Political scientists in the 1950s and 1960s used “nation” as a synonym for “state.” They spoke of international relations when they meant relations between governments. They called the United Nations by its name without noticing that almost none of its members were nations. They labeled the new countries of Africa and Asia “nation-states” the day the colonial flag came down. And they had a theory, confident and well funded, that explained where history was going. Modernization theory held that roads, schools, factories, newspapers, and radios might dissolve the old attachments of tribe and dialect and pull villagers into the common culture of the modern state. Karl Deutsch (1912-1992) had given the theory its scientific apparatus, measuring social mobilization and communication flows. The developmental economists supplied the money and the optimism. Ethnic identity was a residue. It might be melting.

Connor counted. For his 1972 article “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” in World Politics, he surveyed the 132 states in existence as of January 1, 1971, and found that only a small fraction of them, about a dozen, could be called ethnically homogeneous. Nearly a third contained a largest group that did not even form a majority. The “nation-state,” the basic unit of the field’s vocabulary, described almost nothing on the map. The article became one of the most cited in the study of nationalism, and its title posed the charge as a question. What governments called nation-building was state-building, and state-building, when it required a Breton child to stop speaking Breton or a Kurdish child to learn that he had always been a Turk, could be nation-destroying. The central authority saw integration. The minority saw erasure. Both were looking at the same school.

The deeper argument turned modernization theory against itself. The theorists assumed communication produced assimilation. Connor argued it could produce the opposite. A road connects the village to the capital, and now the villager can see how the capital lives. A school teaches literacy, and now there is a readership for the nationalist newspaper. A radio broadcasts in the state language, and the listener notices it is not his language. Urbanization throws a dispersed people together in the same tenements, where they discover each other. The tools of integration double as tools of mobilization. The question was never how much communication occurred. It was who spoke to whom, in whose language, under whose institutions, and who noticed what.

Connor had made a version of this case earlier. His 1967 World Politics essay “Self-Determination: The New Phase” appeared at the high tide of decolonization, when the transfer of sovereignty from European empires to new governments was celebrated as the fulfillment of national self-determination. Connor asked whose self had been determined. A colonial territory could become sovereign without becoming a nation. The borders were European borders. The peoples inside them had not been consulted about each other. Independence answered the imperial question and left the national question standing. The subsequent history of Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Burma, and dozens of other states did not embarrass the essay.

His most durable contribution may have been the least glamorous kind of intellectual work, the discipline of terms. His 1978 essay bore an exasperated title: “A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a…” The literature used its crucial words interchangeably, and Connor believed the confusion was not cosmetic. A state is a legal and territorial organization, with borders, institutions, and a claim to authority. A nation is a group of people who believe themselves ancestrally related. Nationalism is loyalty to the nation. Patriotism is loyalty to the state. The two loyalties can coincide. They do not have to. A Basque could be a passionate nationalist and a reluctant citizen of Spain. A government that mistook the second loyalty for the first, or mistook silence for consent, was reading its own press releases. Connor warned that a quiet minority might be quiet because it lacked organization, opportunity, or safety, and that forced assimilation, once national consciousness had spread, tended to confirm the nationalist’s claim that his people were in danger. The policy meant to end the identity advertised it.

He gave the field a word, ethnonationalism, and admitted the word was redundant. In his usage, nationalism already meant loyalty to an ancestrally imagined people. But “nationalism” had been stretched to cover state patriotism, protectionism, flag-waving of every kind, so he added the prefix to return the term to its object. The nation, in his definition, was a self-differentiating ethnic group. An ethnic group might persist for centuries as a fact visible to outsiders, a matter of language, religion, custom. It became a nation when a substantial share of its members grew conscious of themselves as one people and believed, whether or not the genealogists could confirm it, that they shared descent. The belief was the thing. Members of a nation are usually mongrels by any objective measure. The myth of common ancestry, and Connor used “myth” to mean a shared account of origins rather than a simple lie, did the political work.

Western Europe supplied his most awkward evidence, awkward for his opponents. Ethnic conflict was supposed to be a disease of the developing world. Britain, France, Spain, and Belgium were the finished products, the models the new states were supposed to become. Connor looked at the finished products and saw Scottish and Welsh nationalism, Breton and Corsican movements, Basques and Catalans, Flemings and Walloons. In 1975, scholars gathered at a conference on ethnic conflict in the Western world, and the recurring question from the floor was why these movements had appeared now. Connor’s answer was that most of them had been visible for years. The surprise in the room interested him as much as the movements did. The scholars had a theory that told them ethnonationalism could not survive in advanced industrial societies, so they had not seen it. Britain remained a state containing four national identities. Spain’s stability under Franco proved coercion, not consensus. France, the most successful centralizer in Europe, had built its unity in part by grinding down Occitan, Breton, and Alsatian over generations, which demonstrated Connor’s point rather than refuting it. Durability is not homogeneity. A multinational state can last for centuries on legitimacy, bargaining, habit, or force. Lasting is not the same as being one people.

The obvious question was why the belief in shared ancestry carried such power, and Connor’s answer, developed most fully in “Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond” (1993), embarrassed a discipline built on interests and institutions. He read the speeches of nationalist leaders across centuries and continents and noticed that the successful ones spoke a single dialect. Blood. Ancestors. Mothers and fathers. Brothers in arms. The motherland, the fatherland, the sacred soil where the forefathers lie. Scholars filed this language under rhetoric. Connor filed it under evidence. The leaders knew their audiences better than the analysts did. The family metaphor converts millions of strangers into figurative kin, and kinship is the one moral bond people honor without running a cost-benefit analysis first. A man does not calculate whether his brother is a good investment. Nationalism extends that intuition to the imagined national family, which is why men accept for the nation sacrifices no rational-choice model can price. Connor called the bond nonrational rather than irrational, and the distinction carried his argument. Irrational means foolish. Nonrational means operating outside calculation, the way love of family does. A theory of politics that admitted only interests might underestimate nationalism every time, and, he noted, it had.

This led him to attack what he called the economic fallacy. Nationalist movements were routinely explained by poverty, regional inequality, or competition for jobs. Connor pointed out that the wealthy regions rebelled too. Catalonia and the Basque Country were among the most industrialized parts of Spain. Flanders outproduced Wallonia. Quebec was not Bangladesh. Rich minorities resented subsidizing the poor center; poor minorities resented exploitation by the rich center; opposite conditions produced the same demand. Economics could tell you when grievance sharpened. It could not tell a man why he was a Basque. Class explained conflicts within the question. It never explained the question.

His first book took the argument into the empire that had staked everything on the opposite bet. The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, published by Princeton in 1984, ran past six hundred pages and examined how Marx (1818-1883), Engels, Lenin (1870-1924), Stalin (1878-1953), and their successors had understood the nation. Marxism held that class was real and nation was superstructure, a byproduct of capitalism that socialist development might dissolve. Lenin grasped the tactical value of national grievance and promised self-determination, and the state he founded then built a deep contradiction into its bones. The Soviet Union drew internal borders around nationalities, gave them republics, schools, official languages, historians, and administrative elites, and waited for the identities to wither as theory required. The identities did not wither. The republics gave them addresses. Connor’s argument, published five years before the Berlin Wall opened, was that communist rulers had confused the suppression of nationalist activity with the disappearance of national consciousness. In 1991 the Soviet Union came apart along the lines of its own republics, the borders it had drawn around identities it expected to outlive. Yugoslavia came apart with blood. The book acquired the reputation of prophecy, though Connor had predicted no date. He had described a load-bearing error and waited.

Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, also from Princeton, followed in 1994, collecting the essays of three decades into the clearest statement of his position. The book’s architecture was a course of correction: first fix the vocabulary, then dispel the illusion of homogeneity, then retire the economic explanation, then face the emotional core. He positioned himself between the field’s two camps and refused both. Against the primordialists, he accepted that mass national consciousness was largely modern, made possible by print, schooling, and mobilization. Against the constructivists, he denied that elites could invent a nation from nothing. Leaders can select symbols, curate history, and name enemies, but their appeals work only when they touch beliefs and memories people already find binding. Ernest Gellner (1925-1995) explained nationalism as a functional requirement of industrial society; Connor thought function could not explain fervor. Benedict Anderson (1936-2015) showed how print let strangers imagine a community; Connor pressed on what the strangers imagined, which was that they were relatives. Anthony D. Smith (1939-2016), closest to him in spirit, traced the ethnic pasts that supplied nations their symbols; Connor kept his eye on the present tense of the question, whether living people felt themselves one ancestral family now. In “When Is a Nation?” (1990) he added the corollary that a nation’s birthday is unknowable, since nationhood requires mass awareness and the masses leave thin records. And he noticed that the question is one the nation’s own members cannot hear. A nation experiences itself in mythic time, ancient regardless of the documents. The historian proves the flag is recent; the believer knows the people are old. Both are right about different things, which is why the proof changes nothing.

The limits of the work were the price of its edges. His definition of the nation was ethnic all the way down, which left the United States, Switzerland, and India as puzzles, political communities with emotional depth but no plausible myth of single descent. His likely reply, that loyalty to a constitution should be called patriotism rather than nationalism, defended the vocabulary while conceding the phenomenon. Critics also observed that he explained the intensity of the national bond better than its distribution, since not every Basque is a Basque nationalist and every person carries several identities whose rank shifts with circumstance. And his attention to the felt reality of kinship left underexamined the institutions, censuses, and schoolbooks through which the feeling gets manufactured and maintained. Yet the critics worked inside his distinctions. Anyone who wanted to argue about nations and states first had to separate them, and Connor had done the separating.

The career that produced this work never settled into the usual channels. Connor taught at Nasson College in Maine, then Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, SUNY Brockport, and Trinity College in Hartford, and held visiting appointments at Oxford, Cambridge, the London School of Economics, Harvard, Dartmouth, Pomona, Central European University, and the Institute of Political Science in Warsaw, among others, along with a fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a term as scholar-in-residence at the National Foreign Assessment Center, the analytic arm of the CIA, which had its own reasons to want a better theory of why multiethnic states crack. He spent his final institutional years at Middlebury College in Vermont, as Visiting Distinguished Professor and Scholar-in-Residence from 1998 to 2003 and then as a visiting scholar through the 2010-2011 academic year, teaching seminars and winter-term courses and running a faculty colloquium. He never held a chaired professorship at a research university. The field he helped found took institutional shape in the 1980s, with its journals and associations, a generation after his first articles, and in 2003 Daniele Conversi edited Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism, a volume of scholars across half a dozen disciplines engaging his work. The University of Nevada named him its Distinguished American Humanist for 1991-1992. The University of Vermont named him its Distinguished American Political Scientist in 1997.

In 1951 he had married Mary Lyon. She worked with him on the research and the writing for more than sixty years, an uncredited collaboration of the kind that sustained many careers of that generation, and when her health failed he became her caregiver. They raised three children, Peter, Joan, and Daniel. Mary died in 2014. Connor lived in Belmont, a village in the Green Mountains, in a house with a view he had earned. He loved jazz, antiques, art, travel, and college basketball. Colleagues remembered a correspondent of wit and generosity who read the manuscripts of strangers and wrote recommendation letters for the young, a warmth at odds with the austerity of the prose. He supported Doctors Without Borders. He died at home on February 28, 2017, at ninety.

The man who watched the Soviet Union confirm his book left one insight that governments keep relearning at expense. A state can build roads, print passports, staff schools, and declare its people one nation. None of it proves the people agree. Modernization can sharpen difference. Education can awaken memory. Repression can turn a dialect into a cause. And underneath the institutions runs the conviction that made Connor’s subject the most powerful form of human association in the modern world, the belief of millions of strangers that they are family, a belief that answers to no calculation, which is why the calculators keep getting it wrong.

In 2019, I did a series of videos on Connor’s book, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding.

Notes

Core facts, including Connor’s birth in South Hadley, his 1944 enlistment, service in the South Pacific, education at the University of Massachusetts, Georgetown doctorate in 1961, teaching appointments, Middlebury positions from 1998 to 2003 and through the 2010–11 academic year, and death on February 28, 2017, at age ninety:

Middlebury memorial: https://www.middlebury.edu/announcements/memoriam/2017/03/memoriam-walker-f-connor

The New York Times obituary, hosted by Legacy: https://www.legacy.com/us/obituaries/nytimes/name/walker-connor-obituary?id=20287641. It confirms his appointments at Nasson College, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, SUNY Brockport, and Trinity College, as well as his numerous visiting positions, work at the National Foreign Assessment Center and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, editorial-board memberships, awards, and residence in Belmont, Vermont.

The count of 132 states, using January 1, 1971, as the baseline, appears in footnote 2 of “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” in World Politics 24, no. 3 (1972): https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/nationbuilding-or-nationdestroying/777F7F9A644F44F1D7A87AEC81FB715E.

The commonly cited breakdown is that only 12 of the 132 states, or 9.1 percent, were essentially homogeneous, while in just under one-third the largest ethnic group constituted less than a majority. I used “about a dozen” and “nearly a third” to remain cautious.

Sources for scholarly assessments of Connor’s status as a founder of the field, the growing influence of his two major books, and his intellectual position in relation to Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Anthony D. Smith, and Karl Deutsch include:

The obituary in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13537113.2017.1311139

Daniele Conversi, “Introduction: Why a State Is Not a Nation, and Whether Economics Really Matters: Walker Connor 50 Years On,” Nations and Nationalism (2018): https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/nana.12441

“A Modernist Beyond Modernization Theory: Walker Connor and His Time,” Nationalities Papers: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/abs/modernist-beyond-modernization-theory-walker-connor-and-his-time/6F539BD7EB1450257AA76E49AD6D3D99

Conversi’s encyclopedia entry on Connor: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118663202.wberen289

Wikipedia, for his Fulbright chair at Queen’s University in Kingston and several other appointments.

The conference was the event that produced Milton J. Esman’s edited collection Ethnic Conflict in the Western World (Cornell University Press, 1977). Connor’s chapter, “Ethnonationalism in the First World,” reportedly recounts the episode.

Several passages are extrapolations rather than documented biographical facts. The South Hadley opening accurately describes a paper-mill town on the Connecticut River, but its references to Irish, French Canadian, and Polish families are reasonable inferences about western Massachusetts mill towns rather than facts established about Connor’s childhood. The description of the town as substantially Catholic and working class is likewise inferred from its social history, not from a source concerning Connor’s family.

Connor’s use of the GI Bill is an inference based on his 1944 enlistment and postwar attendance at the University of Massachusetts.

The phrases “a view he had earned” and the closing rhetorical passages are interpretive language rather than sourced claims.

The statement that Connor “never held a chaired professorship at a research university” is an inference from his recorded career path. His obituaries do not list such a chair.

Hero System

On Christmas night, 1991, the red flag came down the Kremlin flagpole and the state that had promised to outlive the nations of the earth stopped existing. In Belmont, Vermont, a village in the Green Mountains with one general store and a pond, a sixty-five-year-old political scientist without a chaired professorship had spent seven years explaining, in a six-hundred-page book most of his discipline had not read, why this might happen and why the rulers of that state could not see it coming. The empire dissolved along the borders of its own internal republics, the lines it had drawn around identities its theory said were dying. Walker Connor had been right, in print, since 1984, and in the articles since 1967. There was no prize for this. The field that could have given him one was only then coming into existence, in part because he had been right. So the question of that winter is the question Ernest Becker (1924-1974) spent his last decade asking. What does being right buy a man? What is the currency, and what is it convertible into, and how long does it hold its value after he is dead?
Becker’s answer, in The Denial of Death and Escape from Evil, runs as follows. Man is the only animal that knows it will die, and the knowledge is unbearable, and so every human society is at bottom a machine for making the knowledge bearable. The machine is the hero system: a shared structure of meaning inside which a person can perform acts that count, earn a standing that outlasts him, and feel himself a being of value in a world of value rather than a heap of matter with an expiration date. The hero system can be religious, national, scientific, commercial, familial, criminal. It works only while it is not seen as a hero system. Becker called the necessary blindness the vital lie. A man inside a working hero system does not experience himself as denying death. He experiences himself as doing his job, raising his sons, serving his people, getting the words right.
Connor is a rare kind of subject for this frame, because his life’s work was the anatomy of the largest hero system of the modern age, and he performed the anatomy from inside a smaller one he never named. The essay can therefore run on two levels at once, and it should, because the levels explain each other.
Take the findings first and restate them in Becker’s terms. Connor found that the nation is a group of strangers who believe they are ancestrally related, that the belief resists all evidence about actual descent, that nationalist leaders across every century and continent speak the language of blood, ancestors, and family, that members experience the nation in mythic time as ancient regardless of what historians prove about the recency of the flag, and that people accept death for the nation in ways no calculation of interest can price. He called the bond nonrational. Becker supplies the reason it has to be. The nation is an immortality project. It converts the terrifying arithmetic of one man’s seventy years into membership in a body that was here before him and continues after him. The ancestors are not decoration. They are the point. A nation is a contract among the dead, the living, and the unborn, and the contract’s hidden clause is that the living get to stop being afraid. This is why the family metaphor recurs from Bismarck to Ho Chi Minh, and why Connor found it everywhere he looked. The family is the first immortality vehicle any human knows, the primal evidence that something of you continues in bodies that are not yours. Nationalism scales that evidence up to millions. And it is why the bond cannot be audited. A hero system submitted to cost-benefit analysis is already dead. Connor spent fifty years telling his discipline that the analysts kept underestimating nationalism because they modeled men as interest-calculators. Becker would have said the analysts were doing something more desperate than miscalculating. They were protecting their own hero system, in which man is rational, history has a direction, and the men with the regression models stand at the front of it.
Now take Connor’s sacred words one at a time, because each of them is sacred elsewhere too, and means something else there, and the differences are the demonstration.
Begin with blood, the family, the ancestors. In the Granite Mountain vault outside Salt Lake City, Mormon genealogists keep microfilmed records of the human family running back centuries, because in their hero system the dead can be baptized and sealed to their descendants, and family is the literal architecture of eternity, an organization chart of heaven. For the foster child who aged out of the system at eighteen with his belongings in a trash bag, family is the machine that failed, and the sacred thing is the found kin, the friends who show up, and he might tell you blood is the least of it, and his hero system makes loyalty holy in proportion to its distance from biology. For the Bedouin who can recite his patriline for twelve generations, the recitation is the deed to everything: honor, water rights, the right to speak. For the startup founder who tells forty employees at the all-hands that we are a family here, family is a solvent for overtime, and everyone in the room knows it, and the word does its work anyway. For the Serbian conscript on a hillside above Vukovar in the autumn of 1991, the ancestors are a summons, six hundred years of them, and the summons overrides everything his own short life might prefer. Same word. Five heavens. Connor’s contribution was to see that the fifth case, the deadly one, runs on the same fuel as the first four, the human refusal to be a discrete organism with a stop date, and that the nationalist version is the most powerful because it requires no vault, no recitation, no equity package. It requires only the belief, available to every peasant, that the strangers are kin.
Take the second sacred word, precision, the exact term, because this was Connor’s own. His most famous title is a complaint about vocabulary: “A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a…” He built a career on the insistence that nation and state are different things, that nationalism and patriotism are different loyalties, and that a field using its crucial words interchangeably cannot think. Consider what precision means across hero systems. For the Talmudist, precision is devotion; the difference between two near-synonyms in a verse can carry a law, and God is in the distinction, and a career spent on the meaning of a single word is a career spent well. For the hospital pharmacist, precision is the wall between the ordinary day and the dead child, a decimal point as a moral event. For the jazz musician, and Connor loved jazz, precision is nothing like the metronome; it is time-feel, the note placed a shade behind the beat, exactness in the service of swing, and a player who is merely accurate is the worst thing you can be, which is stiff. For the artillery officer, precision is other people’s death arriving where intended. For the diplomat, precision is often the enemy, and the sacred skill is the phrase both sides can sign because it means two things. Connor’s precision belonged to the Talmudist’s family with one difference. His God was not in the text. His faith, and it should be called that, held that the world has joints and that words can be made to cut at them, and that a man who gets the words right has done something permanent no matter where he teaches. This is the hero system of the scholar stripped to its minimum, and it is worth noticing how well suited it was to his position. A man at Nasson College and SUNY Brockport could not compete in the currencies of the center, the grants, the graduate students, the Cambridge chair. Conceptual precision is the one scholarly currency that requires no institution. It can be minted alone, at a kitchen table, with a wife checking the references. Becker teaches that a man’s hero system tends to be the one his terrain makes possible. The periphery made Connor a purist the way the desert makes anchorites.
The third sacred word is evidence, and here a scene carries the argument. In 1975, scholars of comparative politics gathered to discuss ethnic conflict in the Western world, and the question that kept coming from the floor, in the accounts Connor gave of it, was some version of: why now? Why has Scotland erupted now, why Brittany now, why the Basques now? And Connor’s answer, delivered by a man who had been publishing on this for eight years, was that there was no now. Most of the movements were decades old. The Basques had not changed. The audience had. Inside modernization theory, which was not merely a research program, the data had been invisible. It should be said plainly what modernization theory was, in Becker’s terms, for the generation that held it. It was the hero system of postwar American social science: the faith that development runs one direction, that communication integrates, that the parochial attachments melt under literacy and asphalt, and that the American present is the global future, with the political scientist as the cartographer of salvation. A Ford Foundation grant was not just money. It was a role in the redemption of the underdeveloped world. Inside that system, a persistent Breton nationalist was not evidence. He was noise, a lag, a residue scheduled for dissolution, and the scheduling was the theory. Connor’s counting, twelve homogeneous states out of 132, was the kind of act Becker says a hero system cannot forgive, because it does not attack a finding, it attacks the immortality project of the people holding the findings. This is why being right early earned Connor so little for so long. The scholars at that conference were not fools and were not liars. They were believers, and the vital lie was doing what it is for.
The Marxist-Leninist case, the subject of his 1984 book, gives the same collision at imperial scale, and adds a refinement, because there the sacred word is history. For the Leninist, history is a court with a verdict already written: class is real, nation is costume, and the future has been assigned. For the nationalist inside the Soviet system, history is the ancestors, the graves, the mythic continuity that makes a Lithuanian a Lithuanian regardless of what the textbook says. For the professional historian, history is chronology and documents, and he can prove the national costume was stitched recently. Connor saw that the three do not share a subject. The Soviet state ran one immortality project, the classless future, while administering the raw material of another, the national pasts, and it institutionalized the second to manage it, drawing republics around peoples it expected to outlive. When the first project lost its believers, the second was standing there with borders, anthems, and educated elites, fully provisioned. Becker’s law covers this: a state can suppress a hero system’s activity and cannot suppress the need it answers, and when the official channel to immortality silts up, the traffic reroutes. Seventy years of scientific atheism and socialist schooling produced, on the far side, processions carrying icons and flags. The need had never gone anywhere. Only the vehicle had been impounded.
Connor’s case tests Becker at Becker’s weakest joint. Becker held that the hero system works only unexamined, that the vital lie dies of exposure. Connor spent half a century exposing the national lie, in the neutral sense he insisted on, the myth of common ancestry believed by populations that are demonstrably mixed. He published the anatomy in the leading journals. The field absorbed it, taught it, made it canonical. And nationalism, over those same fifty years, did not weaken by a gram. The Soviet successor states, the Yugoslav wars, the devolution of Britain, the return of national politics across the rich world after Connor’s death, all of it proceeded as if the anatomy had never been published. The resolution is that Becker’s law holds at the level of the person inside the system and fails at the level of the library. Proving to a believer that his flag is recent does nothing, because, as Connor saw, the historian’s chronology and the believer’s mythic time run on different planes, and the belief was never a factual error to be corrected. It is a need with a vehicle. You can total the vehicle. The need walks away from the crash and finds another. Connor’s work is therefore best read as a confirmation of Becker that Becker himself might not have predicted: the diagnosis of the illusion, distributed at scale, leaves the illusion intact, because the illusion is not made of information.
Connor’s immortality project had four foundations. The first was the work, the distinctions themselves, nation from state, nationalism from patriotism, built to outlast him the way a stonecutter’s joints outlast the stonecutter, and they have; nobody in the field can argue about nations without using his separations, including the people who reject his conclusions, which is the deepest form of citation. The second was the field, nationalism studies, which took institutional shape in the 1980s with journals and associations, a generation after his first articles, so that the man without the chair became a founder, and the 2003 Conversi volume performed the canonization in the standard rite of the scholarly hero system, the festschrift, which is a funeral a man gets to attend. The third was the mail. Connor built his church by correspondence, decades of letters to young scholars on other continents, comments on manuscripts, recommendation letters remembered for their humor, an apostolic succession run through the post office of a Vermont village, and in Becker’s terms this was heroism perfectly scaled to its terrain, the periphery scholar’s answer to the seminar he did not run. The fourth was Mary. They married in 1951, she worked inside the books for sixty years without a title page, and when her health went he put down the work and nursed her until she died in 2014, and Becker, who wrote that the romantic solution makes the beloved into the divine, might have noted that Connor’s version was the undeluded kind, service rather than worship, the immortality of two people woven into one production so tightly that the credits cannot be separated, which may be the point of the arrangement.
He died at home in the mountains in the winter of 2017, at ninety, three years after her. Set the two heavens side by side and the essay can close. The nationalist’s heaven is mythic time, the unbroken people, the ancestors at your back and the unborn ahead, and it asks of the believer only that he never look at the stitching. The scholar’s heaven is the footnote, the distinction still in use in arguments conducted by people not yet born, and it asks the opposite, that he look at everyone’s stitching forever, on the wager that one or two of his own seams were sewn straight. Connor knew the first heaven was made of myth, said so for fifty years in the plainest terms his discipline would print, and never once talked as if the knowledge licensed contempt for the believers, because he understood, before Becker gave him the vocabulary he never used, that the believers were doing what men do with the fear, and that he was too, at a kitchen table, with the references checked, getting the words right.

Pierre Bourdieu

Nasson College closed in 1983. The campus in Springvale, Maine, went through bankruptcy, and the buildings were sold off piecemeal, and today the institution where Walker Connor began his teaching career exists as a set of court records and an alumni association without a college. Hold that fact against another. In the same postwar years, the Center for International Studies at MIT ran on Ford Foundation and CIA money, the Social Science Research Council’s Committee on Comparative Politics, under Gabriel Almond (1911-2002) and later Lucian Pye (1921-2008), set the research agenda for a generation, and Princeton University Press published the committee’s sequence on political development in uniform volumes, a series with the confidence of an encyclopedia. One side of the discipline had contracts, graduate students, and a client in Washington. The other side had Springvale. Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) built a sociology for reading exactly this kind of asymmetry, and Connor’s career may be the cleanest American case of it, a forty-year experiment in what a man can and cannot do in a scholarly field when he holds the wrong positions and the right arguments.
Bourdieu’s terms first, briefly. A field is a game with stakes its players believe in. Positions in the field are defined by holdings of capital, and capital comes in kinds: economic, social, cultural, and the symbolic capital of recognition, which in a scientific field means the authority to say what counts as knowledge. Position shapes strategy. Players rich in the field’s capital defend the orthodoxy that made their holdings valuable. Newcomers with good inheritances play succession, extending the orthodoxy in approved increments toward the chairs. Players at the margin face different odds, and for them heresy can be the rational wager, because subversion, redefining what the game is about, is the only move that might revalue their holdings. And a field has a degree of autonomy, measured by its power to refract outside demands into its own terms. A field that takes its questions from its funders has surrendered the measure.
Postwar American comparative politics was a heteronomous field wearing the costume of an autonomous one. The state needed a science of the new countries, needed to know how Nigeria and Indonesia might be kept stable and pro-Western, and the foundations translated the need into research programs, and the programs produced modernization theory, which taught that development runs one direction and that communication, literacy, and asphalt dissolve parochial identity into the culture of the state. The vocabulary tells the story of the clientele. “Nation-building” was an administrator’s word. It named a service the field offered its patron: instructions for manufacturing loyalty. The word assumed the product could be manufactured, and the assumption was the orthodoxy, and the orthodoxy was load-bearing, holding up not a theory but a revenue model. In Bourdieu’s economy of symbolic goods, the doxa of a field is whatever must remain unquestioned for the field’s capital to hold its value. Ask whether nations can be built by governments, and the Princeton series becomes a shelf of consulting reports for a procedure that does not work.
Connor asked. Look at what he held when he asked. A Georgetown doctorate, 1961, respectable and peripheral, a Jesuit school without a placement machine, no Cambridge network, no committee patron, a first job at a college that no longer exists, then Rensselaer, then SUNY Brockport, then Trinity in Hartford. In the field’s terms he was capital-poor in every kind except one. He could not run a research shop, could not place students, could not repay patronage. What he could do was mint the one scholarly currency that requires no institution behind it, the exact distinction, and he minted at a kitchen table with his wife checking references, a domestic mode of production in Bourdieu’s sense, the unwaged labor of Mary Connor subsidizing an output the field priced as one man’s. And he placed the coinage in the center’s own vault. “Self-Determination: The New Phase” ran in World Politics in 1967, and “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” ran there in 1972, and World Politics was the orthodoxy’s house journal. This is a move Bourdieu’s model predicts and prizes: the heretic must be consecrated somewhere or the heresy is noise, so he spends his small capital buying space in the temple. The 1972 article counted the world, twelve homogeneous states out of 132, and told the committee that its central term named a process observed almost nowhere, that the “nation-state” was a fiction covering the map, and that the tools of integration were operating, in case after case, as tools of mobilization. The article was cited immediately and for decades. Citation is the field’s cheapest coin. The chairs stayed where they were.
A department chair is not a prize for being right. It is an investment in the field’s reproduction. The professor holding it will train the graduate students, and the students must be placed, and they can be placed only if their vocabulary is the vocabulary the hiring departments trade in. Now run the calculation from inside a hiring meeting, and the scene can be built from the logic, because the logic is what the meeting is. It is 1974, a research department with a development line to fill, and the file on the table shows two World Politics articles of unusual force. The senior man who built his career on political integration turns the pages and says the work is sharp and the work is narrow, one idea pressed hard, where is the theory of development, and a colleague says the students need training in the survey methods and this man does none of that, and someone asks what he might teach at the graduate level, and someone answers, a seminar against the field, and there is mild laughter, and the file closes. No conspiracy occurred. Every judgment was locally reasonable. That is Bourdieu’s point about how fields defend themselves: the orthodoxy does not need to censor the heretic when it can simply find him, in perfect good faith, not a fit. Hiring Connor meant endowing the negation of the enterprise the department sold. Fields do not buy their own short position.
Bourdieu found in the French academy two currencies circulating at once, academic power, the control of committees, appointments, and reproduction, and intellectual prestige, the recognition of peers and readers, and found the two held by different men and often inversely. Connor became an American illustration drawn with a ruler. The prestige accumulated, visiting appointments at Oxford, Cambridge, the LSE, Harvard, Dartmouth, Warsaw, the Wilson Center, a Fulbright chair in Canada, and the power never came, because the visiting circuit is exactly how a field honors a man it will not let govern. The visitor gets the lectern and the dinner. He gets no vote on the curriculum, no students of his own, no line to fill. The circuit converts a dangerous position into a decoration. And one appointment on his list shows the structure by exception. The National Foreign Assessment Center, the CIA’s analytic arm, brought him in as scholar-in-residence, and the exception is legible in field terms: intelligence is a market where being wrong carries a price, so it buys predictive accuracy without asking whether the seller is orthodox. An analyst who spent 1979 reading Connor on the Soviet nationalities was not defending a paradigm. She had accounts to reconcile, Soviet censuses that kept finding Uzbeks where the theory expected Soviet men, and Connor priced the anomaly correctly. The academy’s autonomy had become, on this question, the freedom to stay wrong longer than the government could afford to.
The value of any capital depends on the state of the field, and when the state changes faster than dispositions do, the players caught holding the old currency suffer hysteresis, the lag of a habitus trained for a game that has ended. Between 1989 and 1991 the empirical world executed a margin call on modernization theory. The Soviet Union, seventy years of literacy campaigns, industrialization, internal migration, and unified schooling, the most sustained nation-building program ever run, came apart along the administrative borders of its nationalities, precisely the fault lines the orthodoxy had scheduled for dissolution and precisely the ones Connor’s 1984 book, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, six hundred pages from Princeton, had mapped. The crash revalued every portfolio in the field at once. Twenty years of Connor’s holdings, illiquid, cited but unconvertible, repriced in a single news cycle. The scholars who had asked, at the 1975 conference on ethnic conflict in the Western world, why the Basques and Scots were erupting “now,” were asking the same question in 1991 about Lithuanians and Croats, and this time the man who had answered it since 1967 was not correcting the field’s surprise. He was the obvious thing to read about it.
But a repriced heretic in an old field is still a heretic, and the more instructive move is the one that followed, because it is the move Bourdieu’s model names as the subversion strategy carried to completion. When you cannot win the game, you change the stakes, and when you cannot change the stakes, you found the game next door. Nationalism studies condensed into a field in the years around the crash, the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism at the LSE in 1990, the journal Nations and Nationalism in 1995, syllabi, conferences, a canon. A new field must perform its autonomy by declaring founders, since founders are the proof that the field has its own past and is not a province of some older empire, and the founding generation is recruited, as a rule, from the heretics of the adjacent fields, the men whose capital the old game refused to honor. In political science Connor’s distinctions had been an attack. In nationalism studies the same distinctions were infrastructure. Nation against state, nationalism against patriotism, ethnic group against nation: every seminar in the new field opened by teaching his separations, including the seminars that went on to reject his conclusions, and there is no deeper consecration in a scholarly field than becoming the thing students must learn before they are permitted to disagree. The identical asset, moved across a field boundary, converted from heterodox capital to founding capital. Bourdieu might have enjoyed the purity of it: the value was never in the coin, it was in the game the coin was spent inside.
The rite came in 2003. Daniele Conversi edited Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism, contributors across political science, sociology, history, anthropology, and linguistics, the festschrift, which is the scholarly field’s sacrament of consecration, the moment the community certifies that a man’s name has become a position on its map. Watch the editor’s task as a scene in the sociology of the ritual. Assembling a festschrift means soliciting essays from the consecrated to consecrate, and every acceptance is a position-taking, a scholar filing his claim of descent, and the table of contents becomes a genealogy the new field writes for itself, with Connor at the trunk. Then run the arithmetic that the ritual politely omits. The tribute volume appeared from Routledge when its subject was seventy-seven years old and held the title Distinguished Visiting Professor at Middlebury College, an undergraduate college in Vermont, his base since 1998. The new field could issue symbolic capital in any quantity. It could not issue the other kind retroactively. No festschrift converts into the graduate students never trained, the school of doctoral descendants never founded, the forty years of committee votes never cast. Connor built his succession through the mail instead, decades of letters and manuscript comments and recommendation letters remembered for their humor, an invisible college run from a village post office, which is what the apostolic function looks like when a man has prestige without an apparatus.
So answer the question the career poses, why the prophet had no chair, and answer it without psychology, because the field answers it structurally. He had no chair because chairs are instruments of reproduction and his work was an instrument of rupture. Because the field that should have hired him was heteronomous, its agenda mortgaged to patrons who were buying nation-building, and he had proven the product defective. Because his capital was of the kind that peers can honor and committees cannot spend. Because he was right too early, and in a field, early is a solvency problem: the market can stay orthodox longer than a heretic can stay employable, and the empirical world does not always schedule its confirmations inside a career. And because, when the confirmation came, the rational structure of fields did what it does, not repenting but rerouting, chartering a new game next door where the old heresy could be honored as a founding, at an age when honor was the only currency left to pay him in.
One coda, and it belongs to Bourdieu’s late reflexive turn, the demand that the sociology of fields be aimed at one’s own position. Connor never read his situation in these terms in print, and yet his scholarship contains the homology, exact and unremarked. His life’s argument held that a state can build every apparatus of integration, borders, schools, passports, anthems, and still fail to make the people inside feel themselves one nation, because the apparatus and the belief run on different planes. His career demonstrated the same theorem with the terms exchanged: a discipline can withhold every apparatus, the chair, the students, the line, and fail to prevent the recognition, because in a scholarly field the apparatus and the authority also run, in the end and after long delay, on different planes. The state cannot manufacture the nation. The department cannot, forever, unmake the knowledge. He proved the first proposition with thirty years of evidence. He was the second proposition, tested on his own body, from Springvale to the festschrift, and both propositions reduce to a single line that could stand over the field theory of his case: institutions command everything except the thing they exist to command.

Prematurity in Discovery

Between 1972 and 1989 political scientists cited “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” and changed nothing. The article ran in World Politics, the house journal of the field it attacked, and it became one of the most cited pieces in the study of political development, and the study of political development proceeded as before. Graduate students read it. It appeared on syllabi and in footnotes. The development economists kept their escalator, the one that carried traditional men up into modern nations, and the article that said the escalator sometimes ran the other way sat in the literature without touching the machinery. The finding was in print. It was not in the field’s mind. A discipline can hold a fact in its hand for two decades and never once let the fact into the room where it thinks.
Gunther Stent (1924-2008) gave this condition a name in the same year Connor supplied its best social-science example. Stent was a molecular biologist at Berkeley, a man who had watched the birth of the double helix from close range, and in December 1972 he published an essay in Scientific American on why some correct discoveries arrive dead. He called them premature. His definition was exact and it was not the loose one people reach for when they say a thinker was ahead of his time. A discovery is premature, Stent wrote, when its implications cannot be connected by a series of simple logical steps to the canonical, generally accepted knowledge of its day. The trouble is not that the finding is wrong, or unfashionable, or poorly argued, or resisted by jealous men. The trouble is structural. There is no path. The accepted knowledge offers no chain of small accepted moves that reaches the new result, and so the result, however solid, has nowhere to attach. It floats. It gets cited the way a strange coin gets passed around a table, examined, and pocketed by no one, because no till in the room is built to take it.
Stent’s own case was Oswald Avery (1877-1955). In 1944 Avery and two colleagues at the Rockefeller Institute showed that the substance carrying heredity in pneumococcus was DNA, not protein. They published in a first-rank journal. Biologists knew the paper. And the paper lay near-inert for close to a decade, because the canon held that DNA was a monotonous molecule, four bases in dull repetition, the tetranucleotide picture associated with Phoebus Levene (1869-1940), a molecule too simple to carry the information of life. Proteins were the complex ones, so genes had to be protein. There was no accepted route from “DNA transforms the bacterium” to “genes are made of DNA,” because every accepted step said DNA could not hold enough. The result was correct and unconnectable at once. The steps came later. Erwin Chargaff (1905-2002) broke the tetranucleotide picture by finding the bases in unequal ratios. Hershey and Chase in 1952 traced heredity to the DNA of a virus. Watson and Crick in 1953 showed a structure that could carry information. Only then did Avery become connectable, and once connectable he became obvious, and once obvious his nine years in the cold read as a curiosity rather than a scandal. Gregor Mendel (1822-1884) is the older instance, thirty-four years between his paper and its rediscovery, unconnectable to a biology that had no concept of the discrete hereditary particle his numbers required.
Connor is the same structure moved into political science, and he fits Stent’s definition more cleanly than most laboratory cases, because the canon he faced was not a single wrong belief but an interlocking system that turned his finding into a thing the field could not reach.
Name the canon. Modernization theory rested on a picture of development as a single ascent. Traditional societies were parochial, their loyalties fixed to village, clan, tribe, and dialect. Modern societies were national and integrated. The passage from one to the other ran one direction, powered by the forces Karl Deutsch had measured, social mobilization and communication, the roads and schools and newspapers and radios that pulled men out of the local world and into the wide culture of the state. Ethnicity in this picture was primordial, a residue of the traditional stage, and residues dissolve. The dependent variable everyone cared about was integration, and integration was assumed to be where the escalator went. Every accepted proposition in the system pointed the same way. More communication, more integration. More schooling, more common identity. More development, less ethnicity.
Now set Connor’s finding against that. He said the same forces could produce the opposite result. A road connects the village to the capital and lets the villager see how differently the capital lives. A school teaches the literacy that creates a readership for the minority’s own newspaper. A state broadcast in the state language tells the listener his language is not the state’s. The tools of integration double as tools of mobilization, and modernization, rather than dissolving ethnic identity, can manufacture ethnonational consciousness where none had reached the surface before. He counted the world to prove the canon described almost nothing on the map, twelve homogeneous states out of 132.
Read that against Stent and the prematurity is exact. To connect Connor’s result to the canon a scholar needed a picture in which one process yields opposite outcomes according to conditions. The canon had no such picture and no place to put one. Its architecture was the one-way escalator, and Connor was reporting passengers walking down it, and there was no accepted step, none, that led from “modernization” to “stronger Basque nationalism,” because every accepted step led away from that conclusion by construction. The finding could be filed and could not be used. A field cannot metabolize a result that contradicts the premise required to state the result in the field’s own terms. So it did what fields do with the unconnectable. It cited the coin and pocketed nothing.
Here Connor departs from Avery, and the departure is the part of his case that teaches something Stent’s laboratory examples cannot. Avery escaped prematurity because the connecting steps got built inside his discipline. Chargaff, Hershey and Chase, Watson and Crick supplied the bridge, and the bridge was theoretical and experimental work done by biologists in laboratories. Connor got no bridge of that kind. The event that ended his prematurity was not an advance in political science. It was the collapse of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991, and the breakup of Yugoslavia behind it, the most sustained nation-building program in history coming apart along the internal borders of its nationalities, the fault lines the canon had scheduled for dissolution and Connor’s 1984 book had mapped. History ran the experiment the field never ran. The world supplied the missing step.
This places Connor at a joint Stent’s cases do not reach, the joint where prematurity meets the paradigm crash Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) described. Two routes lead out of the premature state. In the first, someone builds the connecting bridge and the finding attaches to a canon that still stands, which is Avery. In the second, the canon itself falls, and the finding is not so much connected as freed, because the thing it could not be connected to has stopped existing. Connor took the second route. He did not become reachable because political science constructed a path to him. He became reachable because the escalator broke in public, on television, in a single news cycle that repriced every claim in the field at once, and in the rubble his distinctions were the materials lying closest to hand.
In Stent’s biology the connecting steps come from inside, from experiments a discipline can schedule and fund and run. In the study of nations the crucial experiment was run by reality, on reality’s timetable, and no scholar could hasten it. A social science whose decisive tests are performed by history is a science condemned to wait, and waiting outlasts careers. Connor published the finding at forty-one and forty-six. The confirmation arrived when he was sixty-three and sixty-five. Twenty years passed between the correct result and the event that made it legible, and nothing a good man could do at his kitchen table could close that gap, because the gap was not made of missing arguments. It was made of missing history, and history is not a variable the researcher controls.
Stent paired prematurity with a second idea, uniqueness, and it sharpens the reading. He argued that scientific discoveries are not unique. If Watson and Crick had not found the helix in 1953, someone finds it within a year or two, because the discovery sits in the logic of the field and the field is closing on it. Artistic works are unique. No one else writes the Ninth Symphony if Beethoven does not. The test tells you which kind of thing a finding is: could another have made it, and soon. Connor’s finding passes as science, not art, and the proof arrived in 1983, when the insight surfaced in force. Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism, and the Hobsbawm and Ranger volume The Invention of Tradition all appeared that single year, a cluster too tight for coincidence, the field arriving at the station as the canon that had blocked the platform began to give way. The insight was discoverable and got discovered many times over. Connor was earliest, by fifteen years, and earliest is the position that falls into the prematurity gap. The 1983 authors reached the same country as the gap was closing and were heard. Connor reached it while it was sealed and was filed. Same territory, different arrival times, and the arrival time set the reception.
The premature discoverer pays twice, and the second payment is the crueler one. The first is neglect while the canon holds. The second comes after the canon falls, when the finding turns obvious and re-derivable, and the man’s priority reads as a footnote rather than a rescue, because absorbed knowledge always looks as though it was always known. Connor escaped the second punishment more than most, and the escape was a field accident rather than a Stent effect. Nationalism studies condensed into a discipline just as his prematurity ended, and a new field needs founders, and it reached back and named him one, which is why his distinctions are taught before students are permitted to disagree with them. The prematurity ended in the journals. The credit followed, late, by a separate route.
A correct social science finding can lie fully published and fully inert for two decades because the field has no path to it, and while it lies there governments keep acting on the canon that made the path impossible. Modernization theory was not an academic ornament. It was a policy science with clients, and its clients ran nation-building programs on the assumption Connor had counted out of existence in 1972. The Soviet collapse ended the prematurity inside the discipline. It did not end it inside the state. In 2003 the United States launched a project in Iraq under the name nation-building, on the premise that a people could be manufactured by building the apparatus of a state, roads and schools and a constitution and an army, the premise Connor had falsified before the men running the project were born. So the frame closes on a distinction Stent’s biology never had to draw. A finding can leave the premature state in the library and remain premature in the cabinet room, because absorption into a field and absorption into a government are separate events with separate clocks, and the second clock, the one that spends lives and money, runs slower than the first. Connor got his footnote. The policy got its escalator. The two were reading different literatures, and the gap between them is where the cost fell.

Notes

Stent framework: Gunther Stent, “Prematurity and Uniqueness in Scientific Discovery,” Scientific American 227:6 (December 1972), 84-93; expanded in Stent’s later collections and revisited in Ernest B. Hook, ed., Prematurity in Scientific Discovery: On Resistance and Neglect (University of California Press, 2002), which is the volume to cite if you want the concept’s critics, several of whom argue that sociological resistance rather than logical unconnectability explains most neglect cases. That debate is relevant to Connor, since the Bourdieu reading, interest-based resistance, and the Stent reading, structural unconnectability, are rival explanations of the same twenty-year gap; this essay takes the Stent side deliberately, but the honest position is that both operated.

Avery-MacLeod-McCarty (1944), the Levene tetranucleotide hypothesis, Chargaff‘s ratios (c. 1950), Hershey-Chase (1952), Watson-Crick (April 1953): standard molecular biology history, all in any account of the period and in Stent’s own essay, which uses Avery as its lead case. Mendel‘s 1866 paper and 1900 rediscovery: also in Stent.

Connor’s chronology and the 132/12 count as sourced in the prior essays: World Politics 1967 and 1972, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?”; The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton, 1984).

The 1983 cluster: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities; Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; Eric Hobsbawm (1917-2012) and Terence Ranger (1929-2015), eds., The Invention of Tradition, all Verso/Cambridge/Blackwell 1983. Anthony Smith‘s contribution spread across 1971-1986.

Claims that are mine, flagged: the central argument that Connor exited prematurity by the second route, canon collapse, the Stent/Kuhn overlap, rather than the first, a connecting bridge built inside the discipline, is my synthesis, not in Stent or Connor. The distinction between absorption-into-a-field and absorption-into-a-government, and the Iraq 2003 close, are mine; the factual claim that the 2003 project used the language and premise of nation-building is accurate and easy to source, the phrase saturated the policy debate of 2003-2007, but the reading of it as persistent prematurity in the policy sphere is the essay’s original contribution. The Iraq turn is the sharpest public-interest hook in the piece and also the most contestable, since a critic can say the Iraq planners had reasons beyond modernization theory.

Convenient Beliefs

In 1975 a room of scholars met to discuss ethnic conflict in the Western world, and the question that kept rising from the floor was why now. Why had the Scots stirred now, the Bretons now, the Basques now, the Québécois now. The men asking were serious men, comparativists with grants and standing, and the question was sincere. Walker Connor sat among them having published on these movements since 1967, and what he saw was not a puzzle about the movements. It was a puzzle about the room. The movements were old. The Basques had not appeared that year or the year before. What had changed was the seeing, and Connor understood that the surprise in the room was the finding. A whole field of trained observers had failed to see a thing that had been in front of them for decades, and they had failed together, in the same direction, for the same reason. Stephen Turner (b. 1951) gives that reason a name and a structure, and the name is the convenient belief.
Turner’s account runs against the older word for this, ideology, which in its inherited Marxist sense, needs a deceiving class and a deceived one, false consciousness imposed from above to serve interests below the surface. The convenient belief needs none of that. Nobody lies. The believer believes. A convenient belief is one a man holds because holding it serves his situation, because the belief lets him coordinate with others who hold it, because his institution runs on its being treated as settled, and because the cost of giving it up falls on him and on everything he has built. Its convenience explains its grip. The belief is shielded from testing not by censorship but by the structure of who would pay for the test. And the deepest work a convenient belief does is perception. It shapes what counts as a fact worth noticing, so that contrary evidence arrives already sorted into the bin marked anomaly, residue, noise, not yet. The 1975 room is that sorting caught in the act.
Modernization theory held that development runs one direction, that traditional societies are parochial and modern societies are national and integrated, and that the passage from the first to the second is powered by communication, literacy, and mobility, the roads and schools and broadcasts that pull men out of the village and into the wide culture of the state. Ethnic attachment in this picture is primordial, a feature of the traditional stage, and the traditional stage is what development dissolves. The picture had a term of art for its endpoint, the nation-state, and the term smuggled in the conclusion, since it named as one thing the state and the nation that development would supposedly fuse.
Turner’s question is for whom was this picture convenient, and in what different way for each, because convenience is relative to position, and a belief that serves four constituencies in four ways is a belief with four sets of hands holding it down.
The research ran on money from the great foundations and the development agencies, Ford and the rest, and behind them a government that needed a science of the new countries, needed to know how Nigeria and Indonesia and the dozens of fresh sovereignties might be kept stable and pointed West. The convenience here is direct and requires no cynicism to describe. An agency exists to develop. A theory that says development produces integrated, loyal, modern nations tells the agency that its work builds nations, that the escalator it funds carries passengers up. Fund the study of ethnic persistence and you have funded a report that your product does not do what your charter says it does. The agency did not suppress such reports. It did something quieter and more effective. It did not commission them, and it staffed its programs with men trained inside the theory, so that the anomaly had no salaried observer whose job was to see it. The belief was convenient to the funder because it made the funder’s existence coherent, and money flows toward coherence the way water finds the grade.
Modernization theory described a single road to the modern, and the modern at the end of the road looked like the United States, integrated, industrial, its ethnic pasts melted into a common citizenship, e pluribus unum rendered as social science. The theory flattered the model by making it the destination of history. This convenience ran deep in the American case, because the country carried its own version of the belief at home, the melting pot, the faith that the immigrant’s grandchildren would be simply Americans, and a scholar raised inside that faith found it natural to project the same dissolution onto Yorubas and Kurds. The convenience was that the theory let American social science read the world as a delayed America. To hold it was to stand at the front of the human story with the map in hand. To drop it was to become one case among many, and no story about oneself is harder to drop than the one that puts you at the front.
The postcolonial governments needed the nation-state to be true, and needed it as a matter of survival. A ruler in Lagos or Rangoon or Baghdad governed a territory the departing empire had drawn, containing peoples who had not chosen each other, and his legitimacy rested on the claim that this territory was a nation and he its national leader. Modernization theory handed him that claim as science. It told him that the ethnic divisions under his authority were residues on the way out, that his schools and his radio and his official language were dissolving them, that the work of making one people out of many was proceeding on schedule and history was on his side. The belief was convenient to him because the alternative belief, Connor’s, was a description of his state as a holding pen of nations any one of which might secede. No ruler adopts by choice the theory that predicts his country’s dismemberment. So the new governments held the convenient belief with the grip of men holding a rope over a drop, and they held it in a second, harder way, because forced assimilation, the burning of the minority’s schoolbooks and the banning of its language, was policy justified by the theory, nation-building at the point of a pen, and Connor’s finding was that the policy tended to produce the resistance it meant to prevent. The inconvenient belief was not only unflattering to the ruler. It convicted his conduct.
The fourth holder was the whole postwar order of states, and its house was the United Nations, whose name is the belief. The international system after 1945 organized itself around the sovereign equality of nation-states and the principle of national self-determination, and both required that the state and the nation be, or be becoming, one thing. Connor had gone at this directly in 1967, in “Self-Determination: The New Phase,” asking whose self had been determined when a colonial territory became a sovereign government, and answering that a state could receive independence while the nations inside it stayed subordinate, so that decolonization answered the imperial question and left the national one standing. The order could not easily absorb that, because its founding grammar treated the transfer of sovereignty as the fulfillment of self-determination. To concede Connor’s point was to concede that the system had mistaken state-making for nation-making across half the globe and had seated in its general assembly a great many states that were not the nations they claimed to be. The convenient belief kept the grammar intact. It let the order treat each new flag as a people come into its own, and the alternative was a permanent question mark over the legitimacy of the map.
Four holders, four conveniences, one belief, and now return to the room, because the room shows the last and subtlest thing the frame describes, the belief working on the eyes. The men at the 1975 conference were not paid propagandists for any of the four holders. They were scholars, and most of them would have resented the suggestion that money or nation or empire moved their judgment. Turner’s point is that it need not move their judgment to move their perception. They had been trained inside a picture that placed ethnic persistence in the past tense. When the Basques and the Scots refused the past tense, the trained eye did not register a refutation. It registered a timing problem, a why now, because within the picture ethnonationalism in an advanced society could not be a standing condition, only a late flare of something on its way out. The question why now is the convenient belief defending itself in real time. It takes a permanent feature of the landscape and converts it into a sudden event demanding a special cause, and by demanding a special cause it protects the general theory, which would have to fall if the feature were seen as permanent. Connor’s answer, that there was no now, that the movements were decades old and the novelty lay in the observers, was not a correction the room could easily hear, because to hear it was to admit that the picture had been editing the evidence for twenty years. A convenient belief is never harder to dislodge than at the moment its holders are earnestly puzzled by the thing it hides.
This is the location of Connor’s whole career. He held the inconvenient belief in a field organized around the convenient one, and he paid the standard tariff. The tariff was not suppression. His articles ran in World Politics, the field’s own journal, and got cited for decades. The tariff was inertness. A finding convenient to no one and inconvenient to four powerful constituencies gets read and shelved, honored in the footnote and ignored in the machinery, because absorbing it would cost the funders their coherence, the American self-image its place at the front, the new governments their legitimating science, and the international order its grammar. No one had to conspire to keep Connor peripheral. Each holder had only to keep finding, in good faith, that his own house had no room for the inconvenient guest. And the career shows the shape of the man such a position requires. Connor had to be a certain kind of scholar to hold the belief nobody wanted, the kind who took his pleasure in the exact distinction rather than in the grant or the seat at the policy table, because the exact distinction was the one reward available to a man whose findings the paying customers could not use. His purism was suited to his heresy. A man who needed the room’s approval could not have said what Connor said in 1975, because saying it made the room uncomfortable in a way no single paper’s merit could offset.
Convenient beliefs do not fall to argument. Turner is clear that the test of such a belief comes when the situation that made it convenient changes, when holding it stops paying, and modernization theory met that test between 1989 and 1991. The Soviet Union, seventy years of the most sustained nation-building any state had attempted, literacy campaigns and industrialization and a single school system and the deliberate mixing of populations, came apart along the internal borders of its nationalities, the fault lines the convenient belief had scheduled for dissolution and Connor’s 1984 book had mapped. Yugoslavia followed with blood. What changed was not the argument. Connor’s argument had stood, complete and published, for twenty years. What changed was the convenience. A belief that flattered the American model and legitimated the new states and underwrote the order’s grammar stopped being convenient the moment the largest nation-building project on earth demonstrated its opposite on the evening news. The evidence had always been available. Connor had counted it in 1972, twelve homogeneous states out of 132. The counting had not moved the field, because you cannot count a convenient belief out of a discipline while the belief is still paying its holders. Only when the payment stopped did the field turn, at last, to the man who had been right while it was expensive to be right.
The public interest sits in that last line, and it is not a comfortable place to leave the reader, which is the point of leaving him there. The lesson of Connor read through this frame is that a field of honest, trained, intelligent people can hold a false picture for a generation, not because they are bought and not because they are stupid, but because the picture is convenient to the institutions they serve and to the story they tell about themselves, and because convenience shapes not merely what they conclude but what they are able to see. The correction, when it came, came from the world, on the world’s timetable, at a cost paid in the countries that took the convenient belief as a license to build nations by force. And the frame offers no reassurance that the lesson has been learned, because the same order still runs on the same grammar, still seats states as nations, still funds the science its charters require, and the next convenient belief is already being held somewhere by serious men with grants, invisible to them for the same reason, waiting for the situation to change and make the evidence, which is present now, at last worth seeing. Connor’s career is the measure of what that delay costs. He is the man who saw early and was shelved for it, and the shelving was not a failure of the field’s intelligence. It was the field’s intelligence working normally, on a belief it could not afford to test, in a world where the bill for the test comes due somewhere other than the seminar room.

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Benedict Anderson and the Nation as Imagination

Cambridge, November 1956. Students from India and Ceylon marched through the streets to protest the Anglo-French attack on Egypt. A crowd of English undergraduates, big men from the boat clubs and rugby fields, fell on them and started swinging. Benedict Anderson, twenty years old, a scholarship boy reading classics at King’s College, came upon the scene and tried to pull the attackers off. Someone knocked his glasses from his face. When it was over, the men who had done the beating stood in the street and sang “God Save the Queen.”

Anderson wrote in his memoir that nothing before had made him so angry. The scene held everything he later spent a career trying to understand: empire in its dying years, the racial line running through a university town, and the power of a national song to sanctify violence in the minds of comfortable young men. He had watched an anthem turn a mob into a congregation.

Benedict Richard O’Gorman Anderson (1936-2015) became the most influential theorist of nationalism of the late twentieth century. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1983) gave the social sciences a phrase that escaped its author and now circulates everywhere, applied to fan bases, diasporas, and online forums. The phrase traveled because the insight underneath it answered a question most political theory had dodged. Why do millions of strangers who will never meet feel themselves to be one people, and why will they kill and die for that feeling?

Anderson’s answer came out of a life that never sat still inside one country. He was born on August 26, 1936, in Kunming, China, where his Irish father worked for the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, a hybrid institution staffed by Europeans collecting duties for the Chinese state. His mother was English. The Japanese war drove the family out of China in 1941. They meant to reach Ireland, but German submarines made the Atlantic crossing too dangerous, so they waited out the war in California. After 1945 the family settled in Ireland. Anderson kept Irish citizenship all his life.

The itinerary produced a boy who belonged nowhere in particular and could see everywhere from a slight angle. He later described himself as an English boy in California, a Protestant in Catholic Ireland, and a scholarship student among the sons of wealth at Eton. Each move taught the same lesson. Customs that feel like nature from inside a society look like costume from outside it. His comparative method began as a childhood condition before it became a scholarly practice.

At Eton he lived among boys being groomed to run what remained of the empire, and he beat them at their own curriculum. He had started Latin at nine and Greek at twelve. He added French, German, Russian, and Spanish, and later taught himself Dutch, Indonesian, Javanese, Thai, and Tagalog. The classical training left permanent marks. It taught him that words carry histories, that translation loses and distorts, and that grammar can encode rank. Decades later, when he analyzed the speech levels of Javanese, in which a speaker must place himself above or below his listener with nearly every sentence, he worked with habits of philological attention first drilled into him over Greek particles.

He took a first in classics at King’s College, Cambridge, in 1957, with no plan for what came next. A school friend headed into the Foreign Service had accepted a post as a teaching assistant in the government department at Cornell University and could not take it. He offered Anderson the slot. Anderson crossed the Atlantic to fill a job arranged over a personal connection, knowing nothing about American political science and less about Southeast Asia.

At Cornell he met George McTurnan Kahin (1918-2000), who changed the direction of his life. Kahin had written Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (1952), the founding American study of the Indonesian independence struggle, and had paid for his sympathies during the McCarthy years, when the State Department pulled his passport. He ran Cornell’s Southeast Asia Program on a demanding creed. A scholar earned the right to write about a country by learning its languages, reading its newspapers and novels, and listening to people who held no office. Kahin pointed Anderson toward Indonesia, a republic barely a decade out from under Dutch rule, crowded with parties, sects, generals, and revolutionary expectations.

Anderson went to Jakarta at the end of 1961 and stayed through 1964, the high years of Sukarno (1901-1970) and his politics of permanent mobilization. He learned Indonesian well enough to pass, then went deeper into Javanese. His dissertation, finished in 1967 and published as Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (1972), told the story of the Indonesian revolution through the pemuda, the politicized young men whose formation under the Japanese occupation shaped the fight against the returning Dutch. The book moved between ministries and street fighters, between official speeches and shifts in slang. Anderson treated changes in vocabulary and forms of address as political events, evidence of a generation remaking authority in its own image.

He also went where political scientists did not go. He sat through night-long performances of wayang, the Javanese shadow-puppet theater that stages local adaptations of the Mahabharata and Ramayana. His early monograph Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese (1965) read the puppet stage as a political education. Wayang refuses the Western sorting of heroes from villains. Refined princes commit crimes. Clowns speak truth. Power and virtue travel separately. Anderson argued that Javanese audiences brought these expectations to living politicians, and that a figure like Sukarno performed within a repertoire his audiences already knew, the way an American politician might work within the conventions of the sermon or the sales pitch.

The essay that grew from this immersion, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture,” later collected in Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (1990), reconstructed a conception of power foreign to Western political science. In this tradition power is a substance rather than a relation, finite in quantity, concentrated in persons, and legible through signs: composure, fertility of the land, order in the realm, a ruler’s command of himself. Anderson did not claim every Javanese peasant held this metaphysics. He claimed the grammar survived beneath the vocabulary of the modern republic, shaping what audiences expected power to look like.

Then came the catastrophe that split his life in two. On the night of September 30, 1965, junior officers kidnapped and killed six senior Indonesian generals. Major General Suharto (1921-2008) crushed the movement within days, then used it to destroy the Indonesian Communist Party and push Sukarno aside. The army and its civilian allies killed on the order of half a million people, perhaps more. It stands among the great massacres of the century, and for decades it went nearly unexamined in the West because the victims were communists and the killers were allies.

Through the winter that followed, Anderson, Ruth McVey (b. 1930), and Frederick Bunnell worked in Ithaca from radio monitoring transcripts, Indonesian newspapers, and army publications, trying to reconstruct what had happened. The analysis they finished in January 1966 argued that the September 30 movement grew out of conflicts inside the army, and that the Communist Party had been made a scapegoat. They circulated the study in confidence, afraid publication might get Indonesian friends killed. It leaked anyway, reaching The Washington Post within months, and entered history as the Cornell Paper. Anderson and McVey published it in 1971 without substantial revision as A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia.

The paper attacked the founding myth of Suharto’s New Order, which rested on the army as savior of the nation from a communist plot. Anderson compounded the offense in person. He attended the show trial of Sudisman, the general secretary of the destroyed Communist Party, and later translated the condemned man’s final address to the court. In 1972 the regime barred him from Indonesia. The ban lasted twenty-seven years.

Exile made the book that made his name. Shut out of Indonesian fieldwork, Anderson learned Thai and turned to Thailand after its dictatorship fell in 1973, and he began thinking comparatively about the force that had organized his whole field of study without ever being explained by it. The late 1970s sharpened the question. Vietnam invaded Cambodia. China invaded Vietnam. Three states claiming Marxist internationalism went to war along national lines. The socialist tradition had treated nationalism as a mask for class interest or a residue awaiting dissolution, and the wars in Indochina exposed the poverty of that account. Anderson liked to say he had Suharto to thank for Imagined Communities.

The book defines the nation as an imagined political community, imagined as limited and sovereign. Imagined, because no member of even the smallest nation will ever know more than a fraction of his fellow members, yet each carries an image of their communion. Limited, because every nation ends at a border beyond which other nations live; no nation dreams of enrolling all mankind. Sovereign, because nations were born as dynastic and divine legitimacy decayed, and the sovereign state became the emblem of their freedom. A community, because whatever the inequalities within it, the nation presents itself as a horizontal comradeship, and it is this fraternity that makes it possible for millions to die for it.

Readers seized on “imagined” and heard “fake.” Anderson meant the opposite. All communities larger than a village of face-to-face acquaintance are imagined, including churches, classes, and civilizations. Money is imagined. Law is imagined. The question is never whether a community is invented but how. Communities are to be distinguished, he wrote, “by the style in which they are imagined.”

The engine of the national style, in his account, was print capitalism. Printing alone changed little; printing married to the market changed everything. Publishers hunting larger audiences exhausted the thin Latin-reading elite and turned to the vernaculars. Commerce, without any nationalist intention, began standardizing languages, elevating some dialects and burying others. Readers of the new print languages became aware of hundreds of thousands of others reading as they read, invisible and unknown, yet somehow together. The languages that later felt like the eternal voice of the nation were the residue of sales strategies, administrative convenience, and accident.

Two print commodities taught readers a new experience of time. The newspaper juxtaposes an election, a murder, a shipping notice, and a distant war on one dated page, connected by nothing except the calendar, and so trains its reader to imagine a society of simultaneous events moving together through what Walter Benjamin called homogeneous, empty time. Anderson, borrowing an image from Hegel, described the morning paper as modern man’s substitute for morning prayers, each reader performing the rite in private while certain that unknown thousands perform it with him. The novel does the same work by other means. It follows characters who never meet but who share one social world and one clock, and so rehearses the reader in imagining the life of a nation.

Anderson also broke with the assumption that nationalism was born in Europe and shipped outward. He gave priority to the Americas. Creole elites in the Spanish colonies and British North America, men of European descent born in the New World, found their careers blocked at the top by peninsular officials and their imaginations bounded by the administrative units they served. Colonial newspapers and the pilgrimages of colonial careers taught them to imagine Peru, Venezuela, Mexico, and the thirteen colonies as communities. The republics they founded became models. The nation proved modular, available for piracy, adapted in turn by European linguistic movements, by dynasts practicing official nationalism from above, and by the anticolonial movements of Asia and Africa.

The revised 1991 edition added a chapter that has shaped colonial studies ever since, on the census, the map, and the museum. The census sorted fluid populations into hard boxes of race and religion, and the boxes outlived the counters. The map turned frontier zones and layered sovereignties into colored shapes with sharp edges, and the shape, reprinted on schoolroom walls and stamps, became a logo a child could recognize and love. The museum arranged ruins into a lineage, letting the colonial state pose as guardian of an ancient civilization and letting the nationalists who followed claim the same stones as ancestors. The state did not merely count, chart, and curate what existed. It manufactured the categories through which its subjects came to see themselves.

The chapter of Imagined Communities that Anderson himself thought most misunderstood concerns love. Theorists comfortable explaining national hatred stumble over national love, yet the love is the harder fact. People experience nationality as fate rather than choice, like family, and fatality purifies attachment; there is no merit in loving what one could not have refused, and so no suspicion of interest. The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, void of any nameable person yet saturated with national meaning, marks the place where nationalism does the work religion once did, turning anonymous death into continuity. Liberalism and Marxism speak of progress and interest and fall silent before mortality. The nation speaks of the dead and the unborn. That, Anderson argued, is why men die for it.

The theory drew serious fire, and Anderson engaged it. Partha Chatterjee (b. 1947) asked the sharpest question: if Europe and the Americas had already scripted the nation as a modular form, what was left for the colonized to imagine except a derivative? Chatterjee argued that anticolonial nationalists in Bengal and elsewhere built an inner spiritual domain, in family, religion, and language, before they ever captured the outer machinery of the state, and that this inner sovereignty was their own creation, not a European loan. Ethnosymbolists such as Anthony Smith argued that nations are built from older ethnic myths and memories that constrain the invention, and that Anderson underweighted the inheritance. Others noted that print cannot conscript armies or explain why reading publics should demand sovereignty, and that schools, railways, and barracks deserve more of the story. Feminist scholars observed that the horizontal fraternity was a fraternity, with women cast as the nation’s mothers and emblems rather than its comrades. Anderson conceded ground on some fronts and held it on others. The criticisms narrowed the theory’s claims without displacing its vocabulary. Forty years on, the argument over nations is still conducted in his terms.

His brother sharpened him from the other side of the Atlantic. Perry Anderson (b. 1938), two years younger, became the commanding intellect of New Left Review and the historian of European absolutism and Western Marxism. The brothers shared politics and a contempt for national complacency, and diverged in everything else. Perry built systems from the European archive. Benedict collected jokes, stamps, cemetery inscriptions, cartoons, and grammar books from the tropics, and distrusted any theory that had never left its own language. The division of labor served them both. Perry read and argued over drafts of Benedict’s work on nationalism, and readers of the two can watch one family conduct a forty-year seminar on power.

Students at Cornell knew a different Anderson from the one in the footnotes. He taught by interrogation, pressed his students into hard languages, and turned his seminar into a place where a first-year graduate student was expected to attack Imagined Communities to its author’s face and defend the attack. He helped sustain the journal Indonesia, which published the young and the heterodox alongside the established. In his memoir he passed on an Indonesian proverb as a warning to the profession: the frog under the coconut shell, who sits in the dark and takes the shell for the sky. Area studies, he thought, saved him from the shell, and monolingual theory built shells by the thousand.

The ban had one more effect. It pushed him toward the Philippines, and the Philippines pushed his theory outward. He learned Tagalog and Spanish well enough to live inside the world of José Rizal (1861-1896), the novelist the Spanish shot and the Filipinos made a national saint. From Rizal’s novel Noli Me Tangere he took the phrase that named his 1998 collection, The Spectre of Comparisons. Rizal’s hero, looking at the botanical gardens of Manila, cannot stop seeing the gardens of Europe behind them, and the doubled vision poisons the innocence of home. Anderson knew the demon personally. China, California, Ireland, England, Java, Bangkok, and Manila had left him unable to see any country as simply itself, and he turned the affliction into a method.

Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination (2005) completed the turn. The book follows Rizal, the folklorist Isabelo de los Reyes, and the propagandist Mariano Ponce through a late nineteenth century wired together by telegraph cables, steamships, and the international press, where Filipino exiles in Madrid and Paris read anarchist papers, corresponded with Cuban rebels, and coordinated sedition by post. The nation, the book showed, was born global. The men who invented Filipino nationalism did it abroad, in other people’s languages, inside international networks of radicals and readers. Nationalism and cosmopolitanism, supposed opposites, arrived on the same boats.

Translation ran through all of it as practice and as principle. Anderson translated Indonesian, Thai, and Tagalog writers, championed Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1925-2006) while Suharto held him in the Buru prison camp, recovered the multilingual Indonesian Chinese journalist Kwee Thiam Tjing from oblivion, and in his last years promoted the novelist Eka Kurniawan (b. 1975) to Anglophone readers. Translation kept him honest. A man who has fought a Javanese sentence into English does not assume that “power” or “freedom” mean the same thing everywhere, and Anderson held that the struggle was the best inoculation against bad theory.

Suharto fell in May 1998. The following year Anderson came back. In a packed hall in Jakarta he stood before an audience of students and activists, most of them born after his expulsion, many of them raised on smuggled photocopies of his banned work, and addressed them in fluent Indonesian on the future of Indonesian nationalism. He did not flatter them. He told them their nationalism had been stolen by the state and dared them to take it back on behalf of the poor. The lecture circulated across the archipelago. The country that had locked him out for twenty-seven years now claimed him.

He retired from Cornell in 2002 as Aaron L. Binenkorb Professor of International Studies Emeritus and split his years between upstate New York and Southeast Asia, keeping an apartment life in Bangkok, writing on Thai politics and Buddhist asceticism, Filipino novels, and the fate of the left. The memoir he wrote first for Japanese readers, A Life Beyond Boundaries (2016), defends the slow disciplines, language above all, against an academy that rewards fast theory produced at a distance.

On December 10, 2015, he lectured on anarchism and nationalism at the University of Indonesia outside Jakarta, then traveled east through Java with Indonesian friends, revisiting the landscapes of his fieldwork half a century before. On the night of December 12 he went to sleep in a hotel in Batu, in the highlands of East Java, and did not wake. He was seventy-nine. His friends carried his ashes out onto the Java Sea and scattered them, at his wish, in the waters off the country that had formed him, banished him, and taken him back.

The obituaries called him the theorist of the imagined community, and the phrase will outlive every correction filed against it. His deeper legacy is a stance. Anderson refused both available pieties about nations, the nationalist’s claim that they are ancient organisms and the debunker’s claim that they are elite frauds. Nations are constructions that became real, he argued, because people live, remember, love, and die inside them, and a construction people die for demands understanding, not a sneer. He gave the study of nationalism its method as well: learn the language, read the newspapers and the novels, sit through the puppet play, distrust any theory that has never been homesick. Once another country has made your own look strange, no nation can ever again seem self-evident. Anderson lived that condition from Kunming onward and turned it into the sharpest eye his field has had.

Notes

The Suez scene comes from A Life Beyond Boundaries (Verso, 2016), where Anderson describes trying to stop English “hearties” from attacking Indian and Ceylonese demonstrators, having his glasses knocked off, and hearing the attackers sing the national anthem. He says the incident angered him as nothing had before. Verify his wording: Verso. Several obituaries retell the incident, including The Guardian’s obituary of December 15, 2015: Benedict Anderson obituary.

The “frogs under the coconut shell” proverb also comes from the memoir, where Anderson applies it to parochial scholars.

For the Sudisman material, Anderson attended the trial in Jakarta and translated the final speech, which Cornell’s Modern Indonesia Project published as Sudisman’s Analysis of Responsibility, translated by Anderson, in 1975. The trial took place in 1967, and the formal ban on Anderson’s return to Indonesia came in 1972. I kept the sequence loose in the text, but confirm the dates through Cornell eCommons and the Cornell Chronicle obituary: “Benedict Anderson, ‘Imagined Communities’ author, dies”.

The 1999 Jakarta lecture was “Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future,” delivered after his return and published in Indonesia No. 67 in April 1999. My characterization that he told the audience their nationalism had been captured by the state and challenged them to reclaim it on behalf of the poor tracks the published text, but read it before retaining the sentence that he “dared them”: Cornell’s Indonesia archive. Search for “Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future.” The detail that audience members had grown up reading photocopies of his banned work appears in Indonesian press coverage of the visit and in tributes after his death.

The death sequence is as follows. Anderson delivered his final lecture at the University of Indonesia in Depok on December 10, 2015, speaking about anarchism and nationalism. He died in his sleep in Batu, East Java, during the night of December 12–13. His ashes were later scattered in the Java Sea. The lecture and his death are covered in The New York Times obituary of December 14, 2015: “Benedict Anderson, Scholar Who Saw Nations as ‘Imagined,’ Dies at 79”. The scattering of his ashes at sea appears in later tributes, including Perry Anderson’s memorial in New Left Review 97 (2016) and an essay in Jacobin. Confirm the evidence before retaining the claim that this was done “at his wish.”

The detail that the State Department withdrew George McTurnan Kahin’s passport during the McCarthy years appears in Kahin’s obituaries and Cornell records: “George McTurnan Kahin dies at 82”.

The quoted fragment “by the style in which they are imagined” comes from Chapter 1 of Imagined Communities. The Hegel-derived image of newspaper reading as a modern morning prayer and Walter Benjamin’s phrase “homogeneous, empty time” appear in Chapters 1 and 2. The quip that Anderson had Suharto “to thank” appears in the memoir and in interviews. I paraphrased it rather than quoting it.

The extrapolations for which I did not supply links, but which I judge safe, concern the character of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, the social texture of Eton and Cornell’s Southeast Asia Program, the description of wayang performance, and the reading of José Rizal’s botanical-garden passage, which appears in Chapter 1 of The Spectre of Comparisons.

The Exile’s Hero System: Benedict Anderson and the Denial of Death

Ernest Becker (1924-1974) lay in a Vancouver hospital ward in February 1974 with cancer through his body and a tape recorder running. Sam Keen (b. 1931) had flown up for Psychology Today to conduct the last interview. Becker told him the timing had a certain rightness to it. Keen had caught him, he said, “in extremis,” at the moment when everything he had written about death faced its test. He talked for hours, lucid, wry, dying in character. Two months after his death The Denial of Death won the Pulitzer Prize. The committee handed a dead man the reward his book said all men chase: a name that outlasts the body.

Becker’s argument fits in a paragraph and takes a lifetime to absorb. Man is the animal that knows it will die and cannot live with the knowledge. Culture exists to manage the terror. Every society is a shared drama of significance, a structure of roles and ranks through which a man can feel himself an object of primary value in a universe of meaning, a contributor to something that does not rot. Becker called this structure a hero system. “Society itself is a codified hero system,” he wrote. The businessman building a firm, the mother raising sons, the monk mortifying his flesh, the professor compiling footnotes: each performs heroism as his culture defines it, and each performance is a bid for immortality by other means. The systems differ. The hunger under them does not.

Nine years after Becker died, a political scientist banned from Indonesia published a book whose emotional center is a tomb. Benedict Anderson never cites Becker in Imagined Communities, and there is no evidence he needed him. He had reached the same nerve from the other side of the world. His question was the one that had embarrassed liberal and Marxist theory alike: why do men die for nations, communities of strangers they will never meet? His answer was that the nation had inherited religion’s oldest job. Where liberalism speaks of interests and Marxism of classes, the nation speaks of the dead and the unborn. It converts the accident of birth into destiny and the fatality of death into continuity. Its purest shrine is the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, empty of any nameable man and saturated with immortal meaning. Anderson found Becker’s engine in the archive, without the psychoanalysis, and described its national model more concretely than Becker ever managed.

Becker’s rule admits no exemptions. The analyst of hero systems has one. The man who explains why others chase immortality is chasing it in the explanation. So the question this essay asks is the one Anderson’s admirers skip. What was his?

Start with what he counted as heroism. In Anderson’s cosmology a man earned significance by crossing. He began Latin at nine and Greek at twelve, added French, German, Russian, and Spanish as a schoolboy, taught himself Dutch for the colonial archive, mastered Indonesian in his twenties, Javanese after that, Thai in his forties when Indonesia locked him out, Tagalog and Spanish past fifty for the sake of a novelist executed in 1896. Each language was an entry fee paid to another world, and the payment had to hurt. Quick acquisition earned nothing in his system. The years of humiliation, the misplaced honorific in Javanese that insults a host, the joke that dies in translation, these were the ordeals that certified the crossing, the way lost toes certify the mountaineer.

The system had its saints. José Rizal, who wrote the Philippines into existence in Spanish and took a firing squad for it. Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who composed novels aloud to fellow prisoners on Buru island when the camp denied him paper. Kwee Thiam Tjing, the Indonesian Chinese journalist who wrote in a mongrel prose of Malay, Javanese, Dutch, and Hokkien, and whom the national canon forgot because he fit no national box. Anderson translated the dead and the silenced back into circulation, and here his hero system shows its distinctive engineering. Becker says every man seeks a self that persists beyond the body. Anderson’s heroic act was to confer that persistence on others. Translation, in his drama, was a raising of the dead.

The system had its coward. Anderson passed on an Indonesian proverb as a professional curse: the frog under the coconut shell, who sits in the dark and takes the shell for the sky. The monoglot theorist, the desk Orientalist, the professor who processes the world through English and calls the residue universal, this figure held the place in Anderson’s moral universe that the coward holds in a warrior’s and the apostate holds in a believer’s. The judgment looks like method. Underneath, it is theology. The frog is damned because he refused the ordeal on which the whole economy of significance runs.

And the system had its wound. In 1972 Suharto’s regime barred Anderson from Indonesia, and the ban ran twenty-seven years. Measure the same event inside two hero systems and watch the meaning change. Inside the academic career system, the one that counts grants, access, and cited work, the ban was a catastrophe: a fieldwork scholar severed from his field at thirty-five. Inside Anderson’s system it was a decoration. The regime that murdered half a million people had certified that his sentences told the truth at a price. He wore the ban the way an old soldier wears a scar, and he liked to say he had Suharto to thank for Imagined Communities. The joke carried the system’s accounting: exile was the tuition, the book was the degree.

Hold that word, exile, up to the light and turn it. Becker’s framework predicts what happens: the word will refuse to mean one thing, because meaning is minted inside a hero system and the coin does not convert at par.

To the old man on Calle Ocho in Miami, exile means vigil. He left Cuba in 1961 with a law degree that became a parking receipt, and his heroism consists of refusal. He has not gone back, he will not go back while they hold it, and the deferral is the badge. His drama assigns significance to waiting, and a man who returned to Havana for a beach holiday would be, inside that drama, a small traitor to the dead.

To the Tibetan monk in Dharamsala, exile means custody. The civilization lives in his memory and his ritual hands, and his heroic task is to carry it uncorrupted until the mountains open. Time works differently in his system; a half century is an episode.

To the oil-company manager in a Singapore tower, exile is a word he uses at dinner parties for a posting that came with a housing allowance and school fees. His hero system is the corporation’s, heroism is the number at year’s end, and the distance from home is hardship pay, already priced.

Anderson’s exile matched none of these. It was consecration. The banished witness outranks the accredited insider, and the twenty-seven years were the proof of witness. Four men, one word, four currencies.

Run the same experiment on language, the most sacred term in his lexicon. In the spring of any year, at the Missionary Training Center in Provo, Utah, a nineteen-year-old from Idaho sits in a fluorescent classroom learning Tagalog, the same tongue Anderson took up in his fifties. The boy gets nine weeks. His teachers are returned missionaries barely older than he is, the vocabulary lists run to baptism and repentance, and the pace is brutal because the language is an instrument of salvation, to be spent like ammunition over two years in Manila and then, mostly, let go. Inside his hero system, the Church’s, the language has served its purpose if a family enters the water. Fluency for its own sake would be a vanity.

Anderson’s Tagalog obeyed opposite laws. Slow, literary, historical, acquired to read a dead novelist in the original and to hear what Spanish had done to the islands, it was an end and a sacrament. Neither man is confused. The missionary is right inside his drama and Anderson inside his. The word language names two different heroic acts.

Add the grandmother in Astoria whose grandchildren answer her Greek in English. For her the language is blood, and each English answer is a small funeral, because her hero system is the family line and the line is losing its tongue. Add the strategy consultant for whom languages are a line on slide forty, dead weight next to English, an interpreter a cost center; his heroism lives in the closed deal, and Anderson’s decades over Javanese would strike him, if he thought about it at all, as a hobby that got out of hand. Add the Hebrew revivalist, heir of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda (1858-1922), for whom the heroic act was forcing a liturgical language to carry groceries and quarrels, resurrection performed on the tongue of an entire people. Five hero systems, five languages called language.

The word death splits the same way, and here the stakes rise, because death is what every hero system exists to manage. Anderson’s account says men die for the nation because the nation promises that dying joins them to the unbroken procession of the dead and the unborn. The combat literature complicates him from below. Interviewers have worked over soldiers since the 1940s, from the Wehrmacht studies of 1948 through every American war since, and the sentence that keeps coming back is some version of the same one: I didn’t do it for the flag, I did it for the guys next to me. At the moment of fire the immortality vehicle shrinks to the squad. The nation supplies the war, the training, the tomb afterward; the dying gets done inside a brotherhood of eight. Becker might reply that the squad is a hero system in miniature, the smallest community a man can disappear into, and that the flag and the fire team are nested vessels for the same terror.

Set beside the rifleman the software engineer in San Francisco who has signed the cryonics paperwork and gives ten percent to longevity research. Inside his hero system death has no dignity to exchange. It is a bug, an engineering failure his generation might be the last to suffer, and the idea of dying for something reads to him as a category error, the way burning money honors no one. And set beside him the Confucian eldest son in Taipei, sweeping the family graves at Qingming, for whom death is a change of address within the lineage. He will be fed and remembered as he feeds and remembers, and his immortality runs through sons performing rites, an arrangement Anderson’s nation partly copied and scaled to millions. The soldier, the engineer, the son, and Anderson’s citizen at the Tomb are strangers to one another across the same six letters.

This is the point the hero-system essays keep circling and this one should land on directly. There is no neutral floor under these words. Sacrifice, exile, language, death, each takes its meaning from the drama a man is starring in, and the dramas are plural, simultaneous, and mutually illegible at the core. Anderson knew this better than almost anyone alive, because his life’s work was a study of how one drama, the national one, builds its meanings and gets strangers to die inside them. What he could not do, because no one can, was resign from drama as such.

Watch his final act with Becker’s eyes. In 1999, Suharto gone, the visa granted, Anderson walked into a packed Jakarta hall and lectured in Indonesian to students who had grown up on photocopies of his banned pages. Hero systems rarely pay out while the hero lives; his did. The occasion has a name in older vocabularies: the return of the exile, the vindication scene, the beatification. He told the students their nationalism had been stolen by the state and challenged them to take it back for the poor, which is to say he performed his heroism one more time, the outsider telling the inside its truth.

Sixteen years later he lectured on anarchism and nationalism outside Jakarta, traveled east through Java past the landscapes of his fieldwork, went to sleep in a hill town called Batu, and did not wake. Indonesians mourned him as Om Ben, Uncle Ben, a kinship term extended to a foreigner, and his friends carried his ashes onto the Java Sea and gave them to the water. Consider what the machinery did with him. The country that expelled him absorbed him. Strangers grieved in a language he had crossed into by decades of labor. The theorist of imagined communities finished as a minor immortal inside one, his death assigned a place in another nation’s story, mourned by thousands who felt they knew a man they had never met. The process he had anatomized, the one that turns anonymous death into collective continuity, processed him without irony and without asking.

Becker held that a hero system works only while it stays invisible to the man inside it, a vital lie the psyche protects. Anderson stands as a partial exception, which is the most anyone gets. Exile handed him the outside view of every national drama including the ones that raised him, and he built comparison into a discipline for catching communities in the act of imagining. He saw further into the machinery than the machinery usually permits. Then he chose his seat in it anyway, played the crossing hero for sixty years, took the wound, banked the vindication, and let the sea off Java close over what was left. The choice was not a failure of his theory. It was the theory’s last demonstration. A man can learn what the dramas are made of. He still has to be in one to die well.

Bodies in Rooms: Benedict Anderson, Randall Collins, and the Ritual Theory Hidden Inside Print

Go back to the Cambridge street in November 1956 and watch it again, this time counting ingredients. Bodies assembled in one place: the marchers from India and Ceylon, the English athletes who fell on them, the bystanders pulled in. A boundary marking who belongs: drawn in the oldest way, by skin, and enforced with fists. A single focus of attention: the beating, which no one on that street could look away from. A shared mood: rage on one side, fear on the other, each feeding the other. Then, when the marchers were down and the work was done, the men who did it stood together and sang the national anthem, voices finding one rhythm, and walked away taller than they came.

A sociologist in California later spent a career explaining what happened in that street. Randall Collins (b. 1941) built his theory of interaction ritual chains from Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) by way of Erving Goffman (1922-1982), and its core claims fit in a page. When human bodies gather with a barrier against outsiders, a mutual focus of attention, and a shared mood, the participants entrain, rhythm catching rhythm in voice and gesture and glance, and the entrainment generates what Durkheim called collective effervescence. The effervescence pays out in four currencies: solidarity in the group, emotional energy in the individual, moral standards that make violation of the group feel like sacrilege, and sacred objects. A flag, a phrase, a face, a book absorbs the charge of the assembly and holds it, a battery for group feeling. The battery drains. Symbols keep their power only as long as fresh assemblies recharge them, and social life is a chain of such assemblies, each person carrying charge from the last gathering into the next. After September 11, Collins counted flags on American houses and watched national solidarity spike and then decay over roughly three months as the assemblies thinned. For Collins the macro world of nations and institutions has no separate existence. It is chains of situations, bodies in rooms, all the way up.

The men in the Cambridge street ran a complete interaction ritual. The beating gave the focus, the anthem gave the entrainment, the singing charged the flag inside each singer, and every man left with more emotional energy than he brought. Collins would add one refinement Anderson might have appreciated: rituals also forge their victims. The twenty-year-old with the smashed glasses walked away charged in the opposite direction, loaded with an anger he said exceeded anything he had felt, and that counter-charge ran a sixty-year chain of its own.

Here is the friction, and it is real. Imagined Communities stands as the great anti-Collins theory of nationalism. Anderson’s nation is sustained by print: by novels and newspapers consumed alone, by millions of readers imagining one another rather than meeting. His famous image makes the solitude explicit. The newspaper reader performs his morning ceremony, Anderson writes, “in the lair of the skull,” aware of unseen thousands performing it with him but sharing a room with none of them. Simultaneity in the theory is imagined, calendrical, a matter of shared clock time rather than shared breath. Collins’s framework issues a blunt verdict on this picture. Solitary media consumption is a weak ritual at best. No co-presence, no feedback, no entrainment, minimal charge. A community sustained only by private reading might resemble a mailing list. It might not field an army. If Anderson is right about how nations live, Collins’s micro-sociology has a hole in it. If Collins is right about where solidarity comes from, the print theory of nationalism explains the wrong layer.

The argument of this essay is that Anderson’s own evidence sides with Collins, and that Anderson half knew it. A ritual theory runs through his work from the first monograph to the last lecture, unnamed, doing the load-bearing work while print gets the credit. Read his best scenes with Collins’s checklist in hand and the pattern comes up page after page.

Start where Anderson started, in the dark in Java. Wayang is not reading. A performance begins in the evening and runs to dawn, a village or a neighborhood gathered on both sides of a lit screen, the dalang working the puppets and voicing every character for nine hours while the gamelan keeps the pulse underneath. Every Collins ingredient sits in the scene at maximum strength. Bodies packed together through the night. A boundary of language and repertoire that no outsider can cross, as Anderson the fieldworker learned by the years it cost him to cross it. One glowing focus of attention. A mood that the dalang tunes for hours, comedy against dread, and a rhythmic engine underneath entraining hundreds of nervous systems at once. Anderson read wayang as a political vocabulary, a stock of characters through which Javanese audiences judged refinement, power, and rule, and the reading holds. But a vocabulary is a set of symbols, and Collins’s question is where symbols get their voltage. Arjuna could serve Sukarno as a template because ten thousand nights of gamelan and shared darkness had charged Arjuna in Javanese bodies. Sukarno drew on a battery that assemblies had been filling for centuries. Anderson described the battery and skipped the charging.

Take the newspaper next, on Anderson’s own terms. His metaphor for the morning paper was already ritual: a mass ceremony, the secular heir of morning prayer, an image he borrowed from Hegel. Collins would point out what the borrowing conceals. Prayer, in the world the image comes from, was collective. The congregation stood and knelt and responded in one rhythm, and that rhythm, on Durkheim’s account, was where God’s felt reality came from. A man reading alone performs a ceremony from which the congregation has been subtracted, and Collins’s theory says the subtraction costs almost everything. But watch what newspapers did in the world rather than in the theory. They were read aloud in cafés to the illiterate. They were argued over in barbershops, warung, union halls, officers’ messes. Every edition scheduled ten thousand small assemblies by giving scattered talkers the same object of attention on the same morning. Print did not replace the gathering. Print synchronized the gatherings and stocked them. The genius of print capitalism, restated in Collins’s terms, was the mass production of mutual focus, the one ritual ingredient that had never scaled before. The other ingredients, bodies and barriers and mood, remained as local as they had been in the village, and there the charging went on.

The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier makes the cleanest test. Anderson placed it at the emotional center of nationalism, the empty tomb saturated with national meaning, and asked what kind of community could make such an object. Collins would ask a prior question: on which days does the tomb work? Stand at a cenotaph on an ordinary Tuesday and it is stone traffic passes. Stand there on the November morning when the crowd assembles, the veterans hold their line, the bugle sounds, and an entire country goes silent for two minutes, millions of bodies synchronized in the one act a nation can perform in perfect unison, doing nothing together at the same instant. That is the recharge. The tomb holds meaning between Novembers the way a flag holds it between wars, on charge banked by assembled bodies. Anderson explained what the tomb means. Collins explains when.

Then there is the passage where Anderson catches the engine in his hands and sets it down. Late in Imagined Communities, discussing patriotism, he pauses over the experience of singing national anthems, strangers voicing the same words to the same melody at the same moment, and coins a word for it: unisonance. The experience struck him as the physical realization of the imagined community, the one occasion when the community of strangers stops being imagined and becomes audible, each singer hearing the others inside his own voice. The passage runs a paragraph and leads nowhere in the book’s architecture. It is a stray observation in a theory of print. In Collins’s architecture it is the whole building. Entrainment of voices in co-presence is the paradigm interaction ritual, the strongest known generator of solidarity, the thing the Cambridge mob reached for the moment its violence needed sanctifying. Anderson touched the mechanism his own theory lacked, named it, marveled at it, and returned to his newspapers. The smuggled ritual theory surfaces in that paragraph and nowhere gets its name.

The pattern extends past the books into the life, which offers a private laboratory for Collins’s claims. The Cornell Paper was not produced by print circulation. Three scholars worked for months in closed rooms in an Ithaca winter, radio transcripts and clippings spread between them, sworn to confidentiality because Indonesian lives hung on it. Collins’s checklist again, at high intensity: co-presence, a hard barrier against outsiders, ferocious mutual focus, a shared mood of urgency and dread. Secrecy, in ritual terms, is barrier raised to maximum, and it charges whatever sits inside the circle. The document that emerged carried that charge for decades, a sacred object of the field, photocopied and passed hand to hand in Indonesia like contraband scripture, which in Collins’s terms is what it was. And the Cornell seminar around Anderson ran as a textbook ritual chain. The weekly assembly, the master presiding, the initiates required to attack the master’s book to his face, the charge each student carried out of the room into a career. Ask his students what they took from him and they describe an energy, which is Collins’s own unit of account.

The Jakarta hall in 1999 closes the chain. For twenty-seven years the banned pages had circulated in Indonesia as photocopies, symbols holding charge between rituals, batteries passed among students who gathered in private to read them, and the gathering, ritually speaking, did as much as the reading. Then the exile walked onto the stage, the hall packed past capacity, every eye on one man, one mood in the room, and spoke to them in their language. Print had carried his name across the ban. Only the assembly could do what happened next, and everyone who was there talks about the room, the crowd, the feeling, before they talk about the argument. The lecture then went out in print and seeded the next round of gatherings. Ritual charges the symbol, print carries the symbol, the next assembly recharges it. That circuit, run for two centuries at the scale of millions, is a nation.

Honesty requires the concession that saves Anderson. Collins explains voltage and cannot explain perimeter. Rituals generate intense solidarity in rooms, and nothing in the micro-sociology says why the chain of rooms stops at the Rhine or the Timor Sea, why the strangers a Frenchman is prepared to die among number sixty million and speak French. Anderson explains the perimeter. Print capitalism drew the outer boundary of who could share a focus object, which dialects got welded into one reading public, which populations came to see themselves inside one calendar and one map. Print set the size of the congregation. Assembly supplied the heat. Extension without intensity gives a postal district. Intensity without extension gives a village. The nation required both, and each theorist held one half while writing as if he held the whole.

So the correction to Imagined Communities is friendly and structural. The nation is an interaction ritual chain running on mass-produced focus objects, imagined in the intervals and embodied at the nodes, and the imagining draws down charge that only bodies in rooms put in. Anderson’s material knew this even where his theory declined to. His career began in a street where singing sanctified a beating, passed through nine-hour nights in front of a lit screen, and ended in front of assembled Indonesians who had waited twenty-seven years to be in a room with him. When he died among them, the mourning was not conducted by newspaper. People gathered, in Jakarta and Ithaca and Bangkok, and did what gathered people do for their dead. The man who taught everyone that nations are imagined spent his life, scene by scene, demonstrating where the imagination gets its power. You have to stand together to sing.

The Scholarship Boy’s Portfolio: Benedict Anderson in Bourdieu’s Mirror

Two boys, born six years apart at opposite ends of the world, learned the same trick. Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002), son of a postman turned café keeper in a Béarn village where people spoke Gascon, won his way to the École Normale Supérieure and mastered the language of the Parisian elite more completely than the elite’s own children. Benedict Anderson, son of a customs official, born in China, parked in California, raised partly in Ireland, took a scholarship to Eton and beat the sons of the empire at Latin and Greek, the code their class had invented to mark itself. Bourdieu turned his double vision into a sociology: the outsider inside sees the game as a game, because nothing in his body lets him mistake it for nature. He called his condition a cleft habitus and said it hurt and paid. Anderson never used the term. He lived it, and he spent a career doing to nations what Bourdieu did to French taste, showing the natural to be built. What neither man could fully do is the thing this essay attempts: turn the instrument on Anderson.

The toolkit in brief. Bourdieu pictures social life as a set of fields, each a game with its own stakes, its own currency, its own rules for who counts. Players hold capital in several forms: money, credentials, languages, manners, connections, reputation. Capital converts across fields at varying exchange rates, and the deepest strategies are conversions, moving holdings from a market where they are cheap to one where they are dear. Every field euphemizes its interests; the academic field runs on the belief, sincere and useful at once, that its players seek truth rather than position, and Bourdieu’s wager was that the two pursuits are the same actions described at different altitudes. In the fields of art and scholarship, he added, the ordinary economy runs backward. He described the artistic field as “the economic world reversed”: short-run sacrifice buys long-run standing, and he who loses wins.

Now run Anderson’s career through the machine.

His first holding was classical philology, the purest form of incorporated capital the British elite could issue: begun at nine, compounded daily for a decade, impossible to buy late or fast. By 1957 that asset was depreciating in its home market. The empire that had used Greek verse composition to sort its administrators was liquidating, and a classics first from King’s pointed toward schoolmastering or the civil service of a shrinking state. Anderson executed, half by accident, the conversion of his life. He carried the philological habitus, the trained ear for register and rank inside a sentence, the patience for grammars, across the Atlantic into a field that was almost brand new.

American area studies in 1958 was a bull market. The Cold War state and the Ford Foundation were pouring money into knowledge of Asia; the National Defense Education Act had just made exotic languages a national security expenditure; and the field was so young that a talented entrant faced no incumbents. George Kahin’s Cornell program held near-monopoly authority over the study of Indonesia and needed exactly what Anderson carried: a linguistic engine that could be pointed at Indonesian and Javanese and run for years without seizing. The Eton and Cambridge titles paid a premium on arrival, since mid-century American academia priced British polish above par. Within a decade the depreciating classical portfolio had been converted into commanding stock in a growth field. None of this was cynical, and that is Bourdieu’s point, the one his readers keep missing. The player’s investment in the game, the illusio, is sincere. Anderson loved the languages. The love and the strategy were one motion.

The Cornell Paper is where the reversed economy shows its logic. In January 1966 Anderson held a junior scholar’s standard ambitions and a field site that his career required. The paper he wrote with Ruth McVey attacked the founding narrative of the regime that controlled access to that site, and it crossed a second orthodoxy at home, the Cold War political science that served the American state and had little appetite for hearing that Washington’s new ally had built its throne on scapegoats and mass graves. The heresy was priced quickly. Indonesia banned him in 1972, severing a fieldwork scholar from his field at thirty-five, a sanction that in the normal economy reads as ruin.

In the reversed economy it was the purchase of a lifetime. The ban certified the one quality the scholarly field values above productivity: disinterestedness. Here was proof, stamped by a dictatorship, that Anderson’s sentences obeyed no career logic, since they had cost him the dearest asset he held. Symbolic capital, in Bourdieu’s account, is capital whose origin in interest has been successfully forgotten, and nothing launders interest like visible sacrifice. For twenty-seven years Anderson held a credential no rival could acquire without matching the payment: the banished witness, the man Suharto feared. When Imagined Communities appeared, its authority arrived pre-charged. Losing Indonesia won him the world.

The family completes the portfolio. Perry Anderson had built, at New Left Review and its imprint Verso, one of the few consecrating apparatuses the Anglophone left possessed, a machine for deciding which books counted. The brothers had divided the intellectual field between them with the neatness of a cartel that never needed a meeting: Perry took Europe, theory, the long structural view; Benedict took Asia, the vernacular, the archive of the particular. Proximate positions compete and adjacent ones reinforce, and the Anderson brothers were adjacent everywhere and proximate nowhere. Imagined Communities grew out of arguments inside the family firm, above all the debate with Tom Nairn (1932-2023) over nationalism running through the Review, and it was published by Verso, refereed and amplified by the very apparatus his brother had spent two decades building. The book’s ideas earned their standing. The distribution network that carried them was social capital of the oldest kind, a brother.

The book’s timing was a market read of genius, conscious or not. It appeared in 1983, as Marxism’s intellectual credit collapsed, offering the post-Marxist left a way to keep its subject and change its tools: nationalism explained through print, time, and imagination rather than class, materialist enough to feel continuous, culturalist enough to feel new. Fields reward the position-taking that resolves the field’s current crisis, and Anderson’s resolved the biggest one on the left’s board.

So far the analysis flatters its subject; sacrifice, conversion, timing, all can be read as virtue rewarded. The frame earns its keep at the next turn.

Consider the entry fee Anderson set for his field. A scholar earned the right to speak about a country, in his repeated formulation, by years inside its languages, and the man who theorized from English alone was the frog under the coconut shell. Read as morality, the demand is austere and self-denying. Read as field strategy, it is a barrier to entry, and a nearly perfect one. Language capital of the kind Anderson held cannot be bought, delegated, or acquired in less than years; it shelters early investors absolutely; and every rise in the requirement raised the value of his own holdings while thinning future competition. The fast-moving rivals it excluded, the rational-choice modelers and grand theorists colonizing political science, were exactly the players whose capital threatened his. Bourdieu’s rule holds without exception: the qualities a field’s incumbents praise as virtue are the qualities the incumbents happen to possess, and the praise is sincere, which is what makes it work. Anderson moralized his moat. The stamps, the puppets, the cemetery inscriptions did parallel work as distinction, marking a sensibility that theory-fashion could neither anticipate nor imitate, the connoisseur’s refusal of the game that scores inside the game.

And then the field played its joke on him. Of everything Anderson produced, the item that conquered the academy was the one commodity in his shop that required no languages at all. “Imagined community” travels friction-free. A sociologist of online fandom, a marketing scholar, a literary theorist who has never opened a grammar can cite it, apply it, build a career on it, and tens of thousands have. The concept he minted from decades of Javanese and Thai and Tagalog became the monoglot’s favorite tool, the coconut shell’s best-loved decoration. His last decades read, in this light, as boundary-work by a man watching his product circulate stripped of its entry fee: the corrections, the complaints about promiscuous use of the phrase, the memoir written to re-attach the price tag, to insist that the book had come from somewhere, from languages and years and a ban. The field consecrated him on terms opposite to his teaching, and he spent his emeritus years contesting the terms of his own consecration.

Bourdieu would recognize every move, having made most of them himself, the provincial who conquered Paris and then wrote Homo Academicus to expose the game he had won. And Bourdieu supplies the caution the essay owes its subject. Field analysis explains positions and cannot price stakes. The Cornell Paper was heresy that purchased consecration, and it was also three people in a room trying to establish who organized a massacre, weighing publication against the lives of named friends. The half million dead were not chips. Nor was the moat merely a moat. The era’s most consequential monoglots sat in the Pentagon, quantifying a country none of them could speak to, and Vietnam is what their expertise built. The language requirement protected Anderson’s position, and it also guarded a truth with a body count: knowledge of other people’s countries produced without their languages tends to be wrong, and wrong at scale kills. Bourdieu never claimed that interest falsifies belief. His claim was harder, that the two are inseparable, that a man defends the truth and his position in one gesture and cannot, from inside, tell the gestures apart. Anderson’s whole method rested on the same insight applied to nations. It applies to scholarship boys, both of them, all the way down.

The Tribe and the Newspaper: Anderson, Mearsheimer, and the Question of What Nations Are Made Of

In the winter of 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia, and in February 1979 China invaded Vietnam to punish it. Three states ruled by communist parties, three governments professing an ideology that named the workers of the world as the real community, went to war along national lines, and Benedict Anderson opened Imagined Communities with the spectacle. The wars were the prompt for the book. Marxism had predicted nationalism’s death for a century and now Marxist armies were killing each other under national flags, and Anderson drew the conclusion his tradition had refused: nationalism was the strongest political force alive, and the left had built its house without studying the ground.

Twenty-five years later an American realist watched a different universalism repeat the experiment. The United States after 1989 set out to remake the world in liberalism’s image, wars included, on the premise that people everywhere were rights-bearing individuals waiting for delivery from their circumstances. John J. Mearsheimer (b. 1947), West Point graduate, Air Force officer, then for four decades the University of Chicago’s resident scourge of liberal foreign policy, watched the project break on Iraq and Afghanistan, where the deliverees turned out to be members of nations, sects, and tribes that fought the deliverance. The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018) is his autopsy, and its deepest chapter is anthropology rather than strategy. “We are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives,” he writes. Individualism is secondary. People are born into groups that shape their identities before reason wakes, they develop fierce attachments to those groups, and they sometimes die for them. Of the three sources of human preferences, innate sentiment, socialization, and reason, reason ranks last. Survival drives the arrangement: the individual lives through the group that protects him, so loyalty to the group is not a sentiment layered over self-interest. It is self-interest, in the only form the species has ever reliably practiced. Nationalism, on this account, is the political expression of standing human equipment, and liberalism keeps losing to it because a theory of atoms keeps meeting a world of tribes.

So the two men agree on the phenomenon and its power, and each earned the agreement the same way, watching a universalist creed he knew from inside get its teeth broken. They even agree on the boundary. Anderson’s definition builds it in: the nation is imagined as limited, and no nation dreams of becoming “coterminous with mankind.” The boundedness that liberal universalism treats as a defect to be overcome, both men treat as constitutive. Almost nobody has put them in one room, because the disciplines keep them apart, constructivist Southeast Asianists in one wing, realists in another. Put them in the room and the fight starts immediately, and it is a fight worth having, because the question under it is what nations are made of.

Mearsheimer’s nation is old. The tribe scaled up. Humans have lived in survival groups since before they were fully human, the disposition to bond with insiders and fear outsiders is written in the body, and the nation is the form the disposition takes when the group grows to millions and acquires a state. Anderson’s nation is young. It has a birth certificate, late eighteenth century, and a list of preconditions: print capitalism to weld dialects into reading publics, the novel and the newspaper to teach millions the experience of moving together through calendar time, the decay of sacred languages and divine kingship to clear the ground. Before those conditions, no nations, whatever groups there were. The disagreement is total on its face. One theory says the fuel is ancient. The other says the vessel is modern. The question Anderson’s admirers should sit with, because it is the harder one for them, is this: what if Mearsheimer’s anthropology is right?

Grant it, and watch what it explains that Anderson cannot. The voltage, first. Anderson’s machinery builds communities of shared reading and shared time, but shared reading is cheap. Print capitalism also built the community of stamp collectors, the readers of detective fiction, the subscribers to gardening weeklies, publics in every formal respect resembling his national one, simultaneous, anonymous, bounded by language, and no philatelist has ever charged a machine gun for the community of collectors. Something separates the nation from every other print community, and Anderson knew it, which is why his book keeps reaching past print toward kinship, fatality, and death. Mearsheimer supplies what the reaching gropes for. The nation commands sacrifice because it has captured the survival circuitry, the ancient wiring that binds the individual to the group that protects him, and no hobby public ever plugs into that socket. Second, the recurrence. Anderson’s theory ties the nation to a media environment, and media environments keep changing. Print gave way to radio, radio to television, television to a networked medium that shreds shared attention into fragments, and the nation has survived every transition, including the current one that was supposed to dissolve borders into a global conversation. A form tied to its founding technology should weaken when the technology goes. Standing equipment does not. Third, the record of failed obituaries. Marxists predicted nationalism’s death, then liberals did, and Mearsheimer’s anthropology explains the serial failure in one sentence: both creeds theorized man as something he has never been, a reasoning atom, and the group keeps reasserting itself because the group is what man is.

Anderson’s life, read through this anthropology, confirms rather than refutes it, which stings. Here was the most deracinated of scholars, the perpetual crosser, Irish passport, Chinese birthplace, American employer, a man who chose his attachments with a freedom almost no one has. And what did the freedom produce? Serial embeddedness. He left the tribes of his birth and was adopted by others, the Cornell program with its initiations and its house journal, and above all Indonesia, which banned him like a traitor, readmitted him like a son, named him Om Ben, and took his ashes into its sea. The great individualist of the passport queue never spent a season outside a group. If reason were the master faculty, Anderson is where it should have shown itself, and what his reason chose, every time, was another belonging. Mearsheimer’s chapter could enter him as Exhibit A: even the exception transfers; no one exits.

That is the case for the prosecution, and it is strong. Now the defense, because Mearsheimer’s anthropology, granted in full, stops one step short of everything Anderson explains.

Groupness underdetermines the group. Say the body demands belonging and the group secures survival: nothing in that wiring names the nation as the beneficiary. The family satisfies it. The clan, the village, the sect, the guild, the dynasty’s subjects, the umma, the class, all satisfy it, and for most of human history they did, while the nation did not exist as a claimant. A Javanese man in 1700 was a Muslim, a subject of Mataram, a member of a village and a lineage, and the survival circuitry ran through all of it without once producing an Indonesian. Two centuries later his descendants died for Indonesia, a community assembled out of three hundred ethnic groups, seven hundred languages, and a colonial bookkeeping unit, in the name of a national language that in 1900 was the mother tongue of almost no one. The wiring did not change between 1700 and 1945. The channels changed, and the channels are Anderson’s subject: the presses, the schools, the maps, the census categories, the administrative pilgrimages that took the loyalty the body always offers and redirected it toward a container that had to be built first. Mearsheimer explains why the loyalty exists and cannot say why it landed there. His anthropology predicts that men will die for their group and goes silent when the groups nest and conflict, when Java competes with Islam competes with Indonesia for the same man’s death. Deciding that competition is what Anderson’s machinery does all day.

The immigrant nations press the point. A strictly tribal anthropology, read as blood, predicts that national boundaries track descent. Argentina and the United States built nations out of arriving strangers at industrial scale, absorbing Sicilians and Poles and Lebanese into national communities their grandparents had never imagined, and the solvent was Anderson’s, language and print and schooling, the manufactured memory of a shared past most members’ ancestors did not share. Mearsheimer can answer that the group redefined its membership rules, which is true and concedes the case: rules that can be redefined by newspapers and naturalization ceremonies are conventions riding on the wiring, and the conventions are where the action is.

Then there is the fault line neither man can paper over, the relation of nationalism to hatred. Anderson built a firewall between them. Nationalism, he argued, thinks in historical destinies, racism in eternal contaminations, and he traced racism’s pedigree to class ideologies of breeding rather than to the nation. His nation is defined by what it loves. Mearsheimer’s anthropology tilts the other way without saying so: if the group bond is survival equipment, then fear of the outside is not a corruption of the bond. It is the bond’s other face, selected by the same dangers, and the firewall between loving the inside and dreading the outside is a hope rather than a structure. The twentieth century’s ledger lets both men cite it. Civic nations absorbed millions peaceably, as Anderson’s firewall predicts. Nation-building also ran on expulsion and massacre often enough, from Anatolia to Punjab to the Drina, to suggest the firewall fails exactly when the survival circuitry believes what it was built to believe, that the neighboring group is a threat. Anderson watched the largest massacre of his lifetime performed by his adopted country on its own citizens, neighbors killing neighbors sorted by a category, and his framework filed it under the politics of the army rather than the anthropology of the group. A Mearsheimerian reading of 1965 is grimmer and simpler: the machinery of belonging, pointed inward.

Death divides them last. Mearsheimer’s man dies for the nation because the nation is the survival vehicle and sometimes the vehicle demands a payment; the logic is protective, and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is group memory doing maintenance for the next war. Anderson’s man dies for the nation because the nation answers death, converting his single extinction into a place in the procession of the dead and the unborn; the logic is religious, and the tomb is a theology in stone. Danger against oblivion. The soldier’s letters home have always contained both, and neither theorist can evict the other from that archive.

So render the verdict the essay promised. If Mearsheimer’s anthropology is right, and the record of failed obituaries argues it is, Anderson survives, demoted and deepened at once. Demoted, because Imagined Communities becomes the history of one container rather than the theory of the force, a magnificent account of how the ancient loyalty was rerouted into its modern channel. Deepened, because the observation his critics found softest, that nations are loved, gains a floor under it: the love is not a print effect, it is the oldest equipment the species owns, which is why the internet has not dissolved it and the next medium will not either. And Mearsheimer, granted his anthropology, still needs Anderson the day he asks why the equipment serves Indonesia rather than Java, France rather than Christendom, the nation rather than the thousand other groups on offer. The body brings the loyalty. History appoints the recipient. One man studied the demand and the other studied the supply, and the discipline that keeps them in separate wings has spent forty years discussing halves.

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Anthony D. Smith: The Student Who Kept the Question and Rejected the Answer

On the evening of October 24, 1995, two men faced each other at the University of Warwick. The older man, Ernest Gellner (1925-1995), had fled Prague as a boy ahead of the Nazis, fought his way back into Europe with the Czech armored brigade, and built a reputation as the most feared polemicist in British social science. The younger man, Anthony D. Smith (1939-2016), had been his doctoral student at the London School of Economics a quarter century before. Smith had grown up in London during the war his teacher fought in. More than eighty members of his extended family died in the Holocaust. Both men had spent their lives on the same question. What is a nation, and where does it come from?

Smith spoke first. His paper carried a modest title, “Nations and their Pasts.” His argument was not modest. The reigning theory of nationalism, the theory his own teacher had built, explained the machinery of nations but not their content. It could tell you how a modern state stamped a common culture onto a population through schools, bureaucracies, and armies. It could not tell you why Serbs died for Kosovo, why Jews prayed toward Jerusalem for two thousand years without a state, or why some national projects caught fire while others, backed by the same machinery, never moved anyone to sacrifice.

Gellner rose to reply. He opened with warmth. He said he took pride in the career of his former student, who had become the leading specialist in the field. Then he reached for one of the strangest analogies in the history of social theory. His paper was titled “Do Nations Have Navels?” Victorian creationists had argued about whether Adam possessed a navel. He had no mother, so he needed none. But a God creating a functioning man might well have supplied one anyway, along with fossils in the rocks and rings in the trees, a fake past built into a new creation. Nations were the same, Gellner argued. Some had ethnic navels and some did not, and either way the navel did no explanatory work. Modernity created nations. The apparent umbilical cords to the ancient past were decoration.

The audience understood what it was watching: a field’s founding argument staged as a family drama, the teacher defending creation, the student defending inheritance. Neither man knew how little time remained. Gellner died less than two weeks later, on November 5, 1995. The Warwick debate became his last public statement on nationalism and the clearest single expression of what Smith had spent his career building against, and out of.

Smith was born in London on September 23, 1939, days after Britain declared war on Germany, into a Jewish family of modest means. His father, a Londoner without formal education, built himself into a businessman. His mother, Harriet, came from a middle-class German Jewish family in Wiesbaden. Both parents had roots in Poland. The discovery, later in life, that more than eighty relatives had been murdered in the Holocaust gave his subject a private weight. For most English academics of his generation, nationality was an administrative fact or a political embarrassment. For Smith it was a matter of survival and annihilation. A people could persist for millennia without a state. A people could also be hunted across a continent because of a name.

Near the end of his life he said that two public events shaped his intellectual course more than any others: the Second World War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first showed what national and racial ideology could destroy. The second showed what seventy years of official internationalism could not: the loyalties that surfaced intact when the Soviet state fell apart, as if they had been waiting under the ice.

His training was unusual for a sociologist. He read classics and philosophy at Oxford, which left him at ease among Athenians, Israelites, and medieval kingdoms in a discipline whose horizon rarely extended past the industrial revolution. He studied at the College of Europe in Bruges, then came to the LSE for postgraduate work in sociology. His supervisor was Gellner. The dissertation became his first book, Theories of Nationalism, in 1971, a survey and classification of a field that barely knew it was a field.

He taught at York, spent nine years at Reading, and joined the LSE sociology department in 1980, becoming professor in 1988 and later moving through the European Institute to the Department of Government. Along the way he did something almost no established professor does. He took a second doctorate, in art history, completed in 1987, on the revival of patriotic painting and sculpture in eighteenth-century Britain and France. Colleagues might have read it as a hobby. It was a long bet that paid off twenty-five years later.

By the early 1980s Smith had turned against the framework he was trained in. Gellner’s modernism held that industrial society required interchangeable workers, standardized language, and mass literacy, and that the modern state manufactured a common high culture to meet those needs, then dressed the product in ancient costume. In Gellner’s formulation, nationalism created nations, not the reverse. Smith accepted much of this. Nationalism as an ideology and a mass movement was modern. Elites selected, revised, and sometimes invented traditions. What the theory could not do, he came to believe, was explain content. Why this language and not that one. Why this memory and not another. Why populations embraced some identities and shrugged at others that arrived with equal institutional force. Modernism explained the engine and said nothing about the fuel.

His answer became ethnosymbolism, laid out most fully in The Ethnic Origins of Nations in 1986. He offered it as a perspective and a research program rather than a predictive law. Its central concept was the ethnie: a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, elements of common culture, an association with a historic territory, and some measure of solidarity. An ethnie was not a nation. It might lack citizenship, a common economy, standardized law, a public culture. It was the quarry from which nations were cut. Not every ethnie became a nation. Most dissolved, divided, or were absorbed. But when modern nationalists set out to build a nation, they reached for what already lay in the ground.

He distinguished lateral from vertical ethnies. Lateral communities were thin and wide: aristocracies, dynasties, higher clergy, whose culture spread across territory but not down through the classes. England, France, Spain, and Sweden grew from lateral cores extended downward through bureaucratic incorporation. Vertical, or demotic, communities ran deep: bound by religion, guarded at the boundaries, solidarity crossing class lines. These awaited intellectuals who standardized the vernacular, recovered the history, and turned sacred tradition into a political program. He borrowed from Ramon d’Abadal the term mythomoteur for the governing myth that gave a community its sense of direction, a story of election, conquest, martyrdom, exile, or promised return. The story did not need to be true by the standards of a history department. It needed to bind past suffering to future purpose.

The working image for his method is archaeology. Modernists cast nationalist intellectuals as novelists or architects, inventing continuity. Smith’s intellectuals dig. They excavate old law codes, sacred texts, ruined kingdoms, folk songs, and battle memories. They select, misdate, and romanticize what they find. But they cannot excavate what was never buried. The strata constrain the story. A nation, in his account, was constructed the way a cathedral is constructed, which does not make it fake. It makes it built, from inherited materials, by people with purposes, on a site that was already there.

He did not build alone. He credited John Armstrong (1922-2010), whose Nations before Nationalism appeared in 1982, as a constant inspiration. Armstrong, drawing on the anthropologist Fredrik Barth (1928-2016), tracked myth-symbol complexes across centuries and stressed the boundaries that groups maintain against outsiders. Smith attended more to what lay inside the boundaries: the names, memories, and sacred attachments. With John Hutchinson he turned the shared position into a school, though he ran the school with an open door.

Jewish history sat at the center of his thinking, usually just beneath the surface, sometimes on it. Jews had lived for nearly two millennia without sovereignty, scattered across states and languages, and had remained a people through law, text, ritual calendar, memories of exile, and attachment to a land most of them never saw. The case broke every theory that made the state or the factory the foundation of durable identity. Smith did not claim Jewish identity was unchanging. He claimed that sacred tradition and collective memory could carry identity across the wreckage of political institutions, a fortress built of texts.

In Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity, published in 2003, he generalized the insight. Nations imagined themselves in forms inherited from religion: covenant, election, mission, collective trial. Fallen soldiers became martyrs. Battlefields became holy ground. National holidays kept the structure of religious festivals after the theology drained away. A revolution served as a creation story, a constitution as a covenant, founders as prophets, war memorials as shrines. Secular nations kept the liturgy and changed the object of worship. He applied the argument to the conflict he could not avoid, between Israelis and Palestinians, two communities whose political claims rested on suffering, sacred history, and one land. He doubted that rational negotiation alone could dissolve such identities. They might be reconciled. They could not be erased, because each formed part of a community’s understanding of itself.

His definitions organized the field even for those who rejected his theory. Nationalism, for Smith, was an ideology and movement holding that humanity divides into nations, that each nation has a distinct character and history, and that nations deserve autonomy, unity, and identity. Autonomy might fall short of statehood: federalism, cultural self-government, control of schools and language. A nation was a territorialized community of shared myths, memories, and symbols, expressed in a public culture of flags, anthems, monuments, laws, and coins, with common rights and duties. He sharpened the old contrast, associated earlier with Hans Kohn (1891-1971), between civic-territorial and ethnic-genealogical nationalism, then spent years warning against its misuse. Real nations mixed both. France and Britain had citizenship and courts; they also had a dominant language, a canonical history, and a favored ethnic core wearing the neutral clothes of the state. The distinction was a tool, not a sorting of virtuous nations from dangerous ones.

He was equally unimpressed by the announcement, fashionable in the 1990s, that globalization was dissolving the nation. In Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era he argued that cosmopolitan identities remained thin. International bodies could commission flags and anthems; they could not commission the dead. He watched the European Union with interest and doubt. It was an elite construction without shared memories or popular participation, and symbols made in committee stayed weak. He did not call a European identity impossible. He called it unearned, so far.

The criticism of his work was serious and he took it that way. Modernists charged that he read modern identities backward, that medieval peasants held local, dynastic, and religious loyalties which only hindsight assembles into national ancestors. Umut Özkırımlı argued that a territory holds many pasts, and the availability of material does not explain which past wins; selection, and the power behind selection, does the work Smith attributed to resonance. Others said he slighted coercion: the schools, censuses, armies, and borders that do not merely spread an identity but impose one and crush the alternatives. And there was a standing danger that his vocabulary of ancestry, ethnic cores, and continuity might be borrowed by nationalists seeking a scholarly seal for claims of eternal nationhood. Smith resisted primordialism all his life and stressed change, selection, and reinterpretation. Critics answered that the line between a qualified ethnic inheritance and a popular faith in ancient essence is hard to hold, and not every reader holds it. His defenders replied that ethnosymbolism answered a question power could not: why some identities survive the collapse of the states that enforced them, and why some official projects, with every instrument of coercion behind them, die unloved.

After 1987 the art history surfaced. The Nation Made Real: Art and National Identity in Western Europe, 1600-1850, published in 2013, asked how a community of millions of strangers, spread across generations, becomes visible. Painters and sculptors did it: landscapes, history scenes, allegories, the dying hero, Britannia on the coin. He refused to reduce this to state propaganda. Artists, patrons, academies, and audiences were engaged in a common search for authenticity, and Neoclassicism and Romanticism supplied the visual grammar of golden ages and noble ancestors. The nation was not only argued in books. It was seen in paint, heard in music, walked past in bronze. His last project, with the music historian Matthew Riley, followed the argument into sound. Nation and Classical Music: From Handel to Copland asked how folk melodies, hymns, and evocations of landscape let listeners feel a nation without a single word of argument.

What he built institutionally may outlast the theory. With his doctoral students he founded the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism and served as its first president. He founded and edited the journal Nations and Nationalism. Walker Connor (1926-2017) called the LSE under Smith the Mecca of nationalism studies, and Smith’s students took chairs across Europe and North America. He ran the association and the journal as forums, not as organs of his school; modernists published there, attacked him there, and were welcome there. In the late 1980s, during the Thatcher-era fights over British higher education, he founded the Council for Academic Autonomy to resist political control of research. The scholarship and the committee work expressed one conviction. Traditions, intellectual or national, need institutions to carry them, and institutions need defending.

He gave younger scholars advice that doubled as self-description: learn the major debates, connect your archive to the large questions, and try to understand the nationalism of other peoples from inside. A scholar who can feel only the absurdity of another community’s flag will never understand why men die for it. This was not indulgence. He knew what nationalism had done to his own family, and he rejected the claim that nationalism as such produces genocide. Most nationalist movements kill no one. War, state power, and racial ideology have to arrive before the category of the authentic people becomes a list of people to remove.

He retired in 2004 and then the hospitals began. For a decade illness kept him in and out of wards, and through it he edited the journal, supervised projects, supported his successor John Breuilly (b. 1946), and finished books. He was married to Diane and had a son; students remembered the hospitality of the house and the attention he paid them. He died in London on July 19, 2016, at seventy-six. The music book appeared four months later, so that his last published word concerned how people come to feel a community they can never see whole or personally know.

His lasting lesson resists both camps. Proving that a nation was constructed settles nothing, because every durable institution is constructed. The questions that count concern the materials, the limits the builders faced, and the reason some constructions become objects of loyalty and sacrifice while others stand empty. Gellner asked whether nations have navels and answered that it made no difference. Smith spent forty years showing where the difference lay: in the memories a people cannot choose, the dead they cannot replace, and the land they cannot argue themselves out of wanting. The field he organized still runs on the disagreement between teacher and student, staged one October evening at Warwick, twelve days before it became permanent.

Notes

The Warwick debate texts, Smith‘s “Nations and their Pasts” and Gellner‘s “Do Nations Have Navels?”, were delivered October 24, 1995, and published in Nations and Nationalism 2 (3), 1996. A course page confirms the pairing and an archived LSE link: University of Warwick course page. A summary of Gellner’s reply, including his stated pride in Smith and the Adam’s navel analogy, is here: Scribd. Smith’s own reflection, “Memory and Modernity,” is at Wiley Online Library.

Biographical details, birth September 23, 1939, London; lower-middle-class Jewish family; father a self-made businessman; mother from Wiesbaden; Polish roots; more than eighty relatives lost in the Holocaust; death July 19, 2016, after roughly ten years of illness; the completed music manuscript, are confirmed in Siniša Malešević‘s memorial: “In Memoriam: Anthony D. Smith, 1939-2016”.

The ASEN memorial confirms the Connor “Mecca” remark, the founding of ASEN and Nations and Nationalism, the Gellner lecture series, his retirement from the Government department in 2004, his support of Breuilly, and that he left a wife and young son. John Hutchinson’s obituary in Nations and Nationalism 22 (4). The LSE condolence page.

Career sequence, Oxford classics, College of Europe, LSE under Gellner, York, Reading, LSE 1980, professor 1988, European Institute 1996, Government 2002, retirement 2004: Wikipedia, Anthony D. Smith.

Two items are reasonable extrapolations rather than sourced facts. First, Gellner’s wartime biography, flight from Prague, Czech armored brigade, is standard in accounts of his life. Second, the attribution of “mythomoteur” to Ramon d’Abadal i de Vinyals, which Smith credits in The Ethnic Origins of Nations. The scene-setting at Warwick, what the audience understood, neither man knowing the time remaining, is dramatization built on the documented facts of the debate and the death dates.

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Ernest Gellner

Ernest Gellner (1925-1995) died at the Prague airport on Sunday, November 5, 1995. He had just flown back from a meeting of the Central European University Senate in Budapest, and the heart attack struck him a month and four days short of his seventieth birthday. The location fit the life. Prague was the city that formed him and the city that expelled him. He spent fifty years explaining, from London and Cambridge, why the twentieth century had done what it did to cities like Prague, and then he came back to teach in one of the buildings the century had left standing. He was, at the end, a professor of nationalism dying in transit between two capitals of the old Habsburg world whose collapse had made his subject.

He was born in Paris on December 9, 1925, and raised in Prague. His father, Rudolf Gellner, practiced law. His parents were secular Jews from German-speaking backgrounds who gave their loyalty to the democratic Czechoslovak Republic founded after the First World War. The family lived in Dejvice, a modern middle-class district of wide streets and functionalist apartment blocks, away from the old Jewish quarter with its synagogues and legends. The apartment held two languages. Ernest spoke German with his parents and Czech with his sister. He went to a Czech primary school, then to the Prague English Grammar School, which added a third language and pointed him west.

Consider what a boy in that apartment learned before he learned any theory. He was Jewish by descent but not by practice. He was Czech at school and in the street. He was German at the dinner table. He was becoming English in the classroom. Around him, interwar Prague sorted itself into Czech, German, Jewish, Russian, Ukrainian, liberal, socialist, nationalist, and Zionist camps, each with its own newspapers, cafés, and grievances. A nationalist says nationality is an inheritance, old as the hills, waiting to be awakened. The boy in Dejvice could watch nationality being assembled, revised, and enforced in real time. People around him changed languages and loyalties, and paid prices for the changes. No one had to explain to him that identity was constructed. He had the construction site outside his window.

He loved the Czech material anyway. He knew some thirty Bohemian folk songs and played them on the harmonica. Decades later he recalled an old Czech friend accusing him of playing them with too much feeling, of “crying into the mouth-organ.” Gellner kept the story and repeated it, because it answered a question critics put to him all his life. How could a man write so coldly about nationalism? His answer: he was not immune. He felt the pull of the songs. He distrusted the political claims made in their name. A theory of nationalism written by a man with no national feeling would be like a theory of religion written by a man who had never felt awe. Gellner wrote from inside the spell, against the spell.

The Germans marched into Prague in March 1939. The Gellners fled across Europe, a dangerous passage, and reached Britain. Ernest finished school at St Albans County School for Boys and won an open scholarship to Balliol College, Oxford, entering in 1943 to read Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. He stayed one year. Then the refugee put on a uniform. He joined the Czechoslovak Armoured Brigade as a private and served in the siege of Dunkirk, where the brigade spent months containing the German garrison that held the port after the Allied armies had swept past it. It was a strange assignment, a Czech brigade besieging a French city for a British-led coalition, and it suited a man whose nationality was already a committee decision.

In May 1945 the brigade rolled home. Gellner, still in uniform, began attending lectures at the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University, where Jan Patočka (1907-1977) and others taught. What he saw in liberated Prague repelled him. The Sudeten Germans, three million people, were being driven out of Bohemia with their suitcases, and few Czechs objected. The Communist Party grew, and the Soviet Union stood behind it. The soldier who had come back to help rebuild the republic of his childhood concluded that the republic was already lost. He returned to Britain. He would say later that he might have stayed had the country’s direction been different. The sequence deserves attention. Before Gellner completed his university education he had witnessed the destruction of a democracy, racial persecution, exile, war, the expulsion of a national minority, and the beginning of a communist takeover. His hostility to historicism, to organic nationalism, and to closed systems of thought came from experience first and from argument second. The arguments came at Oxford, where he took a first in PPE. He read David Hume (1711-1776), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), Max Weber (1864-1920), and Karl Popper (1902-1994). Popper’s case against historicism and for the open society marked him most, though Gellner thought Popper had said too little about the social conditions that make criticism possible. An open mind needs an open society, and open societies do not fall from the sky.

After a short spell teaching moral philosophy at Edinburgh, Gellner joined the London School of Economics in 1949, entering a sociology department under Morris Ginsberg (1889-1970) while continuing to work in philosophy. The LSE fit him. Oxford ran on manners, tutorials, and the shared assumptions of men who had known each other since school. The LSE had been built by Fabians and stocked by émigrés, and its corridors held economists, anthropologists, and political theorists who argued across disciplinary lines and owed the British establishment nothing. Gellner later wrote about the school with affection as a place where an outsider could attack orthodoxy without first acquiring the accent.

The attack came in 1959. Words and Things assaulted the ordinary-language philosophy then ruling Oxford, the school associated with the later Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), J. L. Austin (1911-1960), and Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976). That school treated the great questions of philosophy as confusions produced by the misuse of words. The philosopher’s job was to map the rules of ordinary speech, not to build theories about mind, knowledge, or reality. Gellner replied that ordinary language is no neutral storehouse of wisdom. It is a deposit left by particular institutions, hierarchies, and habits. To make everyday speech the court of appeal is to hand inherited social arrangements a veto over criticism. He also read the movement sociologically. It was, he argued, a professional circle whose method protected its prestige, and which treated every criticism of the method as proof that the critic had not understood the method.

What followed made his name, and the scene is worth reconstructing from more than one chair. Ryle sat as editor of Mind, the discipline’s leading journal, and a review copy of the book arrived on his desk. He returned it to the publisher, Victor Gollancz Ltd, with a note declining to review it, on the ground that abusiveness disqualifies a book from treatment as a contribution to an academic subject. From Ryle’s side of the desk this was a defense of standards. The book mocked identifiable Oxford teachers. From Russell’s side it looked like a cartel protecting itself. Russell had written the foreword, agreed with the book’s case, and had spent years watching Oxford treat his own tradition of logical analysis as obsolete. He revealed Ryle’s editorial decision in a letter to The Times, and the storm of public correspondence that followed established Gellner’s reputation as a controversial figure inside and outside the academy. The Times ran a leading article, and the correspondence continued for a month. Picture the third point of view, the common reader of The Times over breakfast in November 1959, learning that the professors were fighting about whether philosophy had become a word game, and that the game’s referee had refused to let the challenger onto the field. The refusal sold the book better than any review.

The episode fixed Gellner’s style. He liked sharp distinctions, compressed models, ridicule, and open combat. He believed academic politeness often served as camouflage for guild solidarity. The style made his prose a pleasure and made him enemies, and it sometimes led him to state an opponent’s position in its least defensible form. Wittgenstein became the standing target, though Gellner’s quarrel with him grew into something larger than a philosophical disagreement, and its final form waited until the last book of his life.

The 1950s also turned him toward anthropology. Philosophy done without attention to social structure had come to seem to him like chemistry done without laboratories. At the LSE he absorbed the tradition of Bronisław Malinowski (1884-1942) and Raymond Firth (1901-2002). In 1954 he went climbing in the High Atlas of Morocco with an LSE party and became interested in the Berber communities of the mountains. Here is the scene that separates Gellner from the run of philosophers: a Balliol first, a rising LSE lecturer, spending eight field trips over the following years in stone villages above the tree line, watching shepherds, litigants, and holy men, taking notes on who mediated which feud. He completed a doctorate under Firth and Paul Stirling (1920-1998), published as Saints of the Atlas in 1969.

The book asked how order survives where no state enforces it. Gellner described a segmentary system. Clans and lineages feud at one level and combine at a higher level against outside threats, like an accordion opening and closing. Outside the ordinary rivalries stood hereditary saints, holy lineages whose religious standing let them arbitrate disputes, guarantee sanctuaries, and supply a thin but real order without a bureaucracy or an army. The method here became his method everywhere. Do not stop at what people say they believe. Ask what work the belief performs. The saint is an object of devotion and also a structural position in a political system, and the two facts explain each other. Later critics said the segmentary model tidied up a messier Moroccan history and underrated states, markets, and colonial power. The criticism has force. The book still made him a real anthropologist rather than a philosopher raiding other people’s fieldnotes.

His constructive theory arrived in Thought and Change (1964), the book John A. Hall (b. 1949) identifies as the seedbed of nearly everything Gellner wrote afterward. Gellner rejected the old evolutionary story in which history climbs from superstition toward reason. Most of history climbs nowhere. Civilizations rise, stall, and vanish. But the fusion of systematic science with sustained economic growth was a real break, a rare episode that changed what human life could be. He called his view neo-episodic. Modernity is not the fulfillment of a moral plan. It is an exceptional event with structural requirements, and the requirements explain modern politics. Industrial society needs constant innovation, occupational mobility, technical training, mass literacy, and communication among strangers. A man can no longer live on the inherited knowledge of his village, guild, or parish. He needs a generic education that lets him retrain and move. And governments in such a society face a new test. Dynasty, religion, and conquest no longer legitimate. Growth legitimates. Gellner later wrote that modern states serve two sovereign masters, economic growth and ethnic congruence.

Ethnic congruence brings us to the theory that made him famous. Gellner defined nationalism as the political principle that the national unit and the political unit should coincide. Every culturally defined people should have its own political roof, or every state should have one culture under its roof. Then he reversed nationalism’s story about itself. Nationalists say ancient nations awaken and demand expression. Gellner answered that nationalism engenders nations, and not the other way round. The nation is not conjured from nothing. Movements work with real languages, memories, and symbols. But the materials must be selected, standardized, and distributed, and the distributing takes dictionaries, schools, newspapers, examinations, and bureaucracies. A peasant dialect becomes a national high culture the way ore becomes steel, through industrial processing.

Why did this happen when it happened? Agrarian empires ran on cultural difference. A literate elite spoke one language at court while peasants spoke twenty dialects in the fields, and no ruler cared to make the plowman talk like the chancellor. Social position was inherited and mobility was rare. Industrial society broke the arrangement. Work now required literacy and communication with strangers and institutions. A shared standardized culture became an economic asset, and only one institution could produce it at scale. The state school system sits at the center of Gellner’s theory. Families reproduce local cultures. Only states can fund universal standardized schooling, and so the schoolteacher displaced the priest as the crucial agent of cultural reproduction. Nationalism ignites where cultural boundaries block mobility, where a man educated in the wrong language finds the good jobs closed to him.

Gellner told the story through two invented countries, Ruritania and Megalomania. Megalomania is a big empire with an established high culture in its offices and universities. Ruritanians are peasants inside the empire speaking related dialects that no one has standardized. Under agrarian conditions the difference costs little. Peasants farm, elites govern, and neither expects to share the other’s culture. Industrialization raises the stakes. Ruritanians enter a labor market where command of the official culture decides advancement, and their difference becomes disadvantage and humiliation. A young Ruritanian intelligentsia, educated enough to expect careers and marked enough to be denied them, codifies the language, collects the folklore, writes the national poetry, and reinterprets the peasantry as a nation. They demand a state that will school and govern in Ruritanian. What looks like the awakening of an ancient nation is the conversion of a rural culture into a standardized one fit for modern institutions. The model also explains why intellectuals lead these movements. They hold the grievance and the skills, and the same skills that turn dialects into languages turn resentments into programs.

The theory became one of the central modernist accounts of nationalism, alongside the work of Benedict Anderson (1936-2015) and Eric Hobsbawm (1917-2012), and it drew the criticism that important theories draw. Anthony D. Smith (1939-2016), Gellner’s own former student, argued that he underrated the older ethnic cores, the myths, memories, and sacred centers that nationalists inherit rather than invent. A movement can reshape inherited material, but it cannot fabricate whatever identity it pleases, and people do not die for a labor-market convenience. Others noted that some nationalisms preceded heavy industry, that states standardized culture for war and taxation as much as for factories, and that Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, and India show industrial modernity coexisting with several languages under one roof. Gellner knew most of the exceptions. His taste for spare models made the theory look more deterministic than his full body of work was, and he admitted the taste. In a 1990 interview he conceded that he loved “neat, crisp, models,” pursued them, and grew uncomfortable without one. The theory also carries a moral shadow. If modern states press toward cultural homogeneity, minorities face a short menu: assimilate, emigrate, secede, or be destroyed. Gellner endorsed none of these outcomes. His family had lived one of them. His theory explains pressure, not destiny. Modern institutions make cultural inequality politically explosive. They do not dictate the response.

His Moroccan work grew into a general account of Islam in Muslim Society (1981), built with tools borrowed from Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), Hume, Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), and Weber. Gellner distinguished the scriptural Islam of the cities, with its literacy, law, and doctrinal rigor, from the saint-centered religion of tribe and countryside, with its shrines, mediators, and local sacred practice. Reform movements rise periodically from the scriptural side and condemn the popular side as corruption. This internal tension, he argued, gave Islam a rare capacity to pass through modernization intact. In the West, modernity presented itself as an alternative to religion. In Islam, a reformer could attack the saints and the shrines as backwardness while presenting purified, literate, universal Islam as both authentic and modern. Modernization could strengthen scriptural religion rather than dissolve it. The argument anticipated the failure of simple secularization theory, and it drew its own strong critique. Sami Zubaida (b. 1937) asked whether a coherent entity called Muslim society exists at all, and charged Gellner with generalizing North African patterns across a civilization while neglecting states, classes, parties, and colonial history. Hall treats Zubaida’s question as the most serious objection to the model.

Beneath the sociology ran a philosophy of knowledge, worked out in Legitimation of Belief (1975) and defended late in Reason and Culture (1992) and Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (1992). Gellner granted the relativist’s premise. Every system of thought, including empiricism and rationalism, grows from a particular social world. He refused the relativist’s conclusion. Modern science explains, predicts, and manipulates nature as no rival system can, and its social origins cancel none of that. A socially produced method can discover truths that outrun the society that produced it. He called himself, with a grin, a humble adherent of Enlightenment Rationalist Fundamentalism, the joke conceding that his defense of reason could look like a militant faith while refusing to pretend neutrality between open inquiry and doctrines sealed against criticism. He held no illusions about foundations. Certainty is unavailable, and every framework rests on questionable assumptions. But the absence of certainty does not make laboratory and revelation equals. And reason, he insisted, is socially fragile. It survives only inside institutions that protect criticism, reward discovery, and keep intellectual authority separate from political and religious rank.

The same test, does the system permit its own refutation, drove The Psychoanalytic Movement (1985). Gellner argued that psychoanalysis had built defenses that no evidence could breach. If the patient accepts the interpretation, the interpretation is confirmed. If the patient resists, the resistance confirms it too. Failure gets absorbed as material. He then did something more interesting than debunking. He asked why the movement of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) had conquered the educated classes, and answered that it supplied secular societies with what churches had supplied before: an account of guilt, suffering, and desire, a rite of confession, a promise of transformation, and a priesthood with interpretive authority. Psychoanalysis was modernity attempting its own re-enchantment. He read postmodernism the same way. Yes, knowledge connects to institutions and power. No, that does not make science one narrative among others, because the airplanes fly and the vaccines work, and a theory of knowledge that cannot register the difference is an evasion. He added a political point that cuts hard today. Relativism looks tolerant from a distance, but if every tradition owns its own truth, the dissident inside a tradition has no ground to stand on. The doctrine that flatters cultures abandons individuals.

His largest historical canvas came in Plough, Sword and Book (1988), which sorted human history by three powers: production, coercion, and cognition. Hunter-gatherers accumulate little. Agrarian societies produce a surplus that feeds kings, warriors, priests, and scribes, and in them high culture belongs to clerical elites and marks them off from the peasants who feed everyone. Industrial society fuses the book to the plough. Knowledge becomes productive, education becomes an economic necessity, and high culture spreads from the clerisy to the population. The sword does not retire; the balance shifts. The book rebuilt historical materialism with Weberian parts, granting production its weight while refusing to derive coercion and belief from property relations, and refusing Marxism’s promised destination.

Inside the argument sat his darkest insight about liberal society, the doctrine of universal Danegeld. Medieval kings paid tribute to keep the Vikings off. Modern governments, Gellner argued, pay everyone, through rising consumption, services, and opportunity. Growth funds a standing social bribe that makes violent redistribution unattractive, and this, more than moral consensus, keeps the peace of wealthy societies. The corollary follows like a bill. A legitimacy purchased with growth is mortgaged to growth. Stop the cornucopia for long and governments reach for older instruments of cohesion, nationalism, conformity, coercion, and the manufacture of internal enemies. Gellner did not reduce freedom to prosperity. He counted law, pluralism, and impersonal institutions as real achievements. He said their material conditions go unmentioned in liberal theory, and he mentioned them.

Communism occupied him to the end, as an intellectual error and a historical fact. State and Society in Soviet Thought (1988) examined Soviet social theory from inside and asked whether communist societies might liberalize once industrialized. He did not predict the speed of the collapse. His theory told him something better than a date: that a multinational empire administratively divided into national republics had built its own exits, and that when the center weakened, the republics and their standardized national cultures stood ready as successor states. He feared the sequel might repeat the expulsions and massacres of his youth. Yugoslavia proved the fear partly right.

Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (1994) gave his answer to the question the collapse reopened: what social arrangements make freedom possible? Not merely the existence of groups outside the state; guilds, clans, and churches stand outside the state and can smother a man as thoroughly as any ministry. The test is whether associations remain limited. Gellner’s modular man can join a firm, a party, a congregation, and a club, cooperate with strangers, and leave any of them without losing his identity, the way modular furniture recombines without breaking. A society of such men can sustain intermediate institutions strong enough to check the state and loose enough to release their members. Pure atomized individualism leaves the citizen naked before power. Total community reproduces the tribe. Liberty lives in the narrow band between.

In 1984 he left the LSE after thirty-five years to become William Wyse Professor of Social Anthropology at Cambridge and a fellow of King’s College. The Cambridge years poured out books: The Psychoanalytic Movement, The Concept of Kinship, State and Society in Soviet Thought, Plough, Sword and Book, Reason and Culture, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion, Encounters with Nationalism, Conditions of Liberty, and Anthropology and Politics. Then came the return no one could have scripted. In 1993 he moved to Prague to direct the new Centre for the Study of Nationalism at the Central European University, funded by George Soros (b. 1930) to study nationalism in the post-communist lands. Hold the frame for a moment. A Jewish boy flees Prague in 1939 ahead of the Germans. A Czech soldier leaves Prague in 1945 ahead of the communists. An English professor comes back in 1993, past the empty synagogues and the renamed streets, to direct an institute studying the force that had emptied the city of the Germans and the Jews who once shared it with the Czechs. The Prague he returned to was homogeneous as the Prague of his childhood never was. That same year Czechoslovakia itself split in two, peacefully, and Gellner preferred the velvet divorce to coerced unity while distrusting the small-nation smugness that could follow it.

He died two years later, on November 5, 1995, after the flight from Budapest. He left his wife, Susan, and four children, David, Sarah, Deborah, and Ben. Two books followed him out: Nationalism (1997) and Language and Solitude: Wittgenstein, Malinowski and the Habsburg Dilemma (1998), the second closing the quarrel he had opened in 1959.

Language and Solitude reads Wittgenstein and Malinowski as two answers to one Habsburg problem. Gellner set out two visions of knowledge. The atomic, individualist, universalist vision imagines a solitary mind dissolving inherited associations, testing elements, and building truth that stands above any community. The organic, communal vision replies that men think in languages and traditions they did not make, that meaning lives inside a way of life, that culture makes the world a home. In the Habsburg Empire the choice was political before it was academic. Universalism offered the individual escape from his inherited group and threatened to dissolve every cultural world in the empire. Organic nationalism protected the cultural worlds and caged the individuals inside them, then set the cages at war. Wittgenstein, on Gellner’s reading, lived both extremes: the Tractatus as austere atomism, the later philosophy of language games and forms of life as the organic vision refined, teaching philosophers to accept the rules embedded in a form of life rather than judge them from outside. Gellner thought this licensed cultural self-validation, the sealed system again, now with a Cambridge pedigree. He did not call Wittgenstein a nationalist. He called him a symptom, the longing for a bounded meaningful world in a century that had burned the bounded worlds down. Malinowski showed the way out. Men cannot think without culture, and cultures can still be observed, compared, and explained. Knowledge is socially organized without being socially imprisoned. Gellner claimed both truths and surrendered neither, and the position joins his first book to his last.

What kind of man conducted this fifty-year campaign? An insider-outsider in every register. Attached to Czech culture, opposed to Czech nationalism. Jewish by descent, religious in nothing. A pillar of British academic life who never joined the British establishment. An anthropologist who argued like a philosopher and a philosopher who checked arguments against fieldwork. Colleagues remembered the wit, the energy, the informality, and the pleasure he took in a fight, and students remembered generosity that the polemics concealed from strangers. He built exaggerated models on purpose, believing a clear model that can be refuted teaches more than a description too qualified to fail. In politics he was a liberal social democrat with a short list of enemies: communism, romantic nationalism, religious absolutism, postmodern relativism, and the fantasy of a presocial individual. His liberalism had no sentiment in it. Freedom is not what remains when government withdraws. It is a late, expensive achievement built from economic specialization, modular identities, legal restraint, and impersonal rules, and it can be unbuilt.

His faults were the shadows of his virtues. The neat models flattened rich histories. The nationalism theory explains the pressure toward national politics better than it explains why this identity catches fire and that one dies. Muslim Society generalized a region into a civilization. His confidence in growth never confronted the environmental bill. And the polemical gift that made him readable sometimes made him unfair. But he stated his claims sharply enough to be refuted, and his critics could locate his errors because he had not hidden them in qualifications. That is a scholarly virtue rarer than accuracy.

Hall published the major study, Ernest Gellner: An Intellectual Biography, in 2010, and a 2022 collection, Ernest Gellner’s Legacy and Social Theory Today, carried his ideas into current debates on populism, postcolonialism, and climate. The Prague center he founded remains a foundational institution of nationalism studies. His deepest subject was the price of modernity. Scientific civilization delivered knowledge, wealth, mobility, and freedom, and it also demolished settled worlds, standardized cultures, manufactured nations, and chained legitimacy to the growth chart. He defended it because the alternatives were poorer, crueler, and more closed. He never confused that defense with a promise that modernity would make men rooted, secure, or happy. He had watched what it made of Prague.

Notes

Death at Prague airport, November 5, 1995, returning from the CEU Senate meeting in Budapest, heart attack, one month short of seventy: Czech Sociological Review memorial, Wikipedia, Ernest Gellner, and the THES obituary hosted at LSE. Note a small conflict: some sources say he died at the airport, others say at his flat after returning. I used the airport version.

Dejvice apartment scene, languages by room, harmonica, thirty folk songs, “crying into the mouth-organ”: all from your source document. The Dejvice architectural details, wide streets and functionalist blocks, are self-evident characteristics of the district. The quote appears in Hall’s biography and in Gellner’s own late writing; Hall’s book is the citable source: John A. Hall, Ernest Gellner: An Intellectual Biography (Verso, 2010).

Dunkirk siege detail, the Czech brigade containing the bypassed German garrison for months, is standard military history of the 1st Czechoslovak Armoured Brigade, 1944-45, and a reasonable extrapolation.

The 1945 return in uniform, attending Patočka‘s lectures at Charles University: Czech Sociological Review memorial. This detail is not in your source document and strengthens the Prague-return symmetry; worth keeping.

The Words and Things affair from three points of view. Ryle‘s letter to Gollancz with the “abusiveness” line: T. P. Uschanov, “The Strange Death of Ordinary Language Philosophy”, which quotes the letter in full. Russell‘s Times letter, the month of correspondence, and the Times leader: Wikipedia and Jeremy Stangroom’s account with the actual letters. The contemporary Commentary review by Marshall Cohen has period flavor, including Gellner’s crack that Ryle was “the O. Henry of English philosophy.” The breakfast-table reader is my extrapolation from the documented Times leader and correspondence.

The “neat, crisp, models” self-description from a 1990 interview: Royal Anthropological Institute obituary. The interview is John Davis, “An Interview with Ernest Gellner,” Current Anthropology 32:1 (1991), if you want the primary source.

Soros funding of the CEU nationalism center: Wikipedia and Alchetron..

The Independent‘s “one-man crusader for critical rationalism” line, Brendan O’Leary obituary, November 8, 1995, and the Daily Telegraph‘s “most vigorous intellectuals”.

Everything on the theories, Thought and Change, Ruritania, Muslim Society, Danegeld, modular man, Language and Solitude, tracks your source document, which tracks Hall. The Smith critique is in Anthony D. Smith, “The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?” and the Warwick Debates with Gellner (1995). Zubaida‘s critique: “Is There a Muslim Society? Ernest Gellner’s Sociology of Islam,” Economy and Society 24:2 (1995).

Extrapolations without links: the accordion image for segmentation, the ore-into-steel image for high culture, both compress Gellner’s own arguments, the construction-site image for interwar Prague identity, and the Habsburg framing of the airport death in the opening. The claim that he “would say later that he might have stayed” had Czechoslovakia’s direction differed is in Hall and in the Davis interview.

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Eric Kaufmann: The Man Who Made the Majority Visible

On the evening of February 22, 2024, more than eighty people gathered at the Legatum Institute, a think tank housed in a Mayfair townhouse a short walk from Grosvenor Square. The crowd ran to politicians, journalists, think tank directors, and academics. Niall Ferguson (b. 1964) spoke. So did Matthew Goodwin (b. 1981) and James Tooley (b. 1959), the vice-chancellor of the University of Buckingham, who told the press that universities set the tone for the whole of society and promised that “Buckingham academics will ask the questions that should be asked.” The occasion was the launch of the Centre for Heterodox Social Science, and the man at the center of the room was its director, Eric Kaufmann (b. 1970), a Canadian political scientist who five months earlier had walked away from a full professorship at the University of London after two decades.

The scene held an irony that few in the room would have missed. The scholar most identified with the defense of white majority attachments is not, by his own account, a simple member of any white majority. Kaufmann describes his ancestry as half Jewish, one-quarter Chinese, and one-quarter Costa Rican. He was born in Hong Kong, spent stretches of his childhood in Tokyo, and grew up in Vancouver. The launch of his center marked the point where a career of studying how identities survive institutional pressure became an attempt to build an institution of his own.

Kaufmann’s career divides into two acts that turn out, on inspection, to be one. In the first act he was a specialist in nationalism and political demography who asked a question most of his field avoided: what happens to ethnic majorities? In the second act he became a combatant in the culture war he had predicted, arguing that Western liberalism destabilized itself by granting recognition to minority identities while treating majority attachments as pathology. The through line is a single proposition. Inherited attachments do not vanish when elites declare them irrational or immoral. They go underground, and they return.

The Diplomat’s Son

Eric Peter Kaufmann was born in Hong Kong on May 11, 1970. His father, Steve Kaufmann (b. 1945), served with the Canadian Trade Commissioner service and had been posted in China during the Cultural Revolution, which he witnessed firsthand. His father’s family were secular Jews with roots in Prostejov, in what is now the Czech Republic. His mother came from a lapsed Catholic home and carried Chinese and Costa Rican ancestry. The son attended Catholic school for a single year. The family lived in Tokyo for a total of ten years, in a stretch of eight and a stretch of two, before settling in Vancouver in the late 1970s, where, as Kaufmann later put it, he “became a normal Canadian again.”

The Vancouver he returned to was not static. The rise of the Hong Kong Chinese population was underway, and the city’s ethnic composition shifted around him as he moved through elementary school. A boy of mixed ancestry, raised across three continents, watching a Pacific city absorb the diaspora of the colony where he was born: the material of his later work was in front of him before he had a vocabulary for it. He attended an international school with students from many countries, and he has said this experience stimulated his interest in how people form national and ethnic attachments.

Kaufmann never grew up inside a single homogeneous ethnic category, and his writing returns again and again to distinctions that mixed people learn early: the difference between racial appearance, genealogical descent, cultural inheritance, national affiliation, and subjective identity. That set of distinctions became the foundation of his later argument that future Western majorities could be racially mixed while retaining continuity with older national traditions.

He took his BA from the University of Western Ontario in 1991, then crossed to London. At the London School of Economics he completed an MSc in 1994 and a PhD in 1998. He taught comparative politics at Southampton from 1999 to 2003, joined Birkbeck, University of London, in 2003, became a full professor in 2011, and held a fellowship at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center in 2008 and 2009.

The Seminar Room at the LSE

The LSE of the 1990s was the world capital of nationalism studies, and the field was at war with itself. The modernists held the high ground. Ernest Gellner (1925–1995) argued that nations were products of industrial society. Eric Hobsbawm (1917–2012) wrote of invented traditions. Benedict Anderson (1936–2015) gave the field its most quoted phrase, imagined communities. Against them stood Anthony D. Smith (1939–2016), who argued that modern nations usually grew from older ethnic communities, from inherited myths, memories, symbols, and attachments to territory. Smith supervised a generation of doctoral students at the LSE, and Kaufmann was among those his ethnosymbolism marked for life.

Kaufmann accepted the modernist point that states and print culture and mass schooling shaped nationalism. He refused the further step of treating ethnic inheritance as merely invented. What drew him was Smith’s contention that nations possess an ethnic core. Kaufmann and Oliver Zimmer, a fellow LSE postgraduate, later wrote that Smith’s work opened a way for them to study the ethnicity of dominant groups without assuming that ethnicity belonged only to minorities or to culturally exotic populations.

From this came Kaufmann’s first distinctive contribution, the concept of dominant ethnicity. An ethnic group becomes dominant when its history, symbols, customs, and collective memories become embedded in the institutions and public culture of a state. Dominance means the group has exercised disproportionate influence over the state’s historical identity. The move reversed a standing assumption in ethnic studies, which had treated minorities as ethnic while regarding the majority as neutral, civic, or simply national. Kaufmann argued that majorities also possess ancestry stories, boundaries, and cultural interests, and that their ethnicity becomes invisible because it has been absorbed into the national mainstream. His edited collection Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant Minorities appeared in 2004 and placed majorities and politically dominant minorities in a common comparative frame.

The Suicide of Anglo-America

His first major monograph, The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America: The Decline of Dominant Ethnicity in the United States (2004), told a stranger story than the familiar one of immigrants displacing an established group. Kaufmann argued that Anglo-Protestant America was weakened from inside. Liberal Protestants, reformers, cosmopolitan intellectuals, and cultural modernists came to describe the United States as a universal nation founded on abstract principles. They detached American identity from ancestry, Protestant culture, and inherited memory. The establishment’s own universalism made its own particularity indefensible, and its members reinterpreted their inherited culture as provincial, exclusionary, or morally compromised.

Dominant cultures, on this account, dissolve themselves when their elites stop believing that inherited continuity is legitimate. A ruling group can keep its money and lose its self.

The book also introduced a phrase that would organize the rest of his career: asymmetrical multiculturalism. Minorities were encouraged to keep ancestral identities. Members of the majority were expected to become cosmopolitan, individualistic, and post-ethnic. The proud minority was authentic. The proud majority was dangerous. Kaufmann would later argue that this asymmetry created the vacuum that white identity movements moved into. His recent culture-war writing is not a detour from the 2004 book. Both phases examine how liberal universalism erodes the cultural foundations that produced it.

Among the Orangemen

He then did something few metropolitan academics do. He went and studied a stigmatized population from inside its records. His subjects were the Orange Order and Protestant unionism in Northern Ireland, and the results were The Orange Order: A Contemporary Northern Irish History (2007) and, with Henry Patterson, Unionism and Orangeism in Northern Ireland Since 1945: The Decline of the Loyal Family (2007).

Picture the material culture of the subject: the lodge halls in country towns, the sashes and banners, the July parades with their flute bands, the minute books of local lodges going back generations. Kaufmann worked through internal records of the Order and the Ulster Unionist Party. He treated the Order neither as a romantic survival nor as a simple engine of sectarian domination. It was a social institution rooted in religion, class, locality, ritual, and memory, connecting churches, parties, families, and working-class Protestant neighborhoods. Its parades transmitted a narrative of Protestant survival, loyalty to the Crown, and resistance to Catholic and Irish nationalist power. And it was not controlled from the top. Grassroots Orangemen resisted elite compromise, attacked their own leaders, and mobilized on their own.

Two lessons from Ulster shaped everything he wrote afterward. First, identity reproduces horizontally as much as vertically, through lodges, friendships, congregations, and family habit, without constant central direction. Second, explanation does not require endorsement. Kaufmann considered it lazy to reduce Protestant attachment to unionism to prejudice or false consciousness. He tried to understand the emotional world of a population his profession held in contempt. He would later apply the same horizontal model to the spread of progressive ideology through universities, media organizations, and human-resources departments. No conspiracy required. Culture is what people reproduce through institutions and peer groups.

Counting Believers

In the late 2000s Kaufmann moved into political demography, the study of how fertility, migration, intermarriage, age structure, and religious retention alter political populations. He worked with demographers including Anne Goujon and Vegard Skirbekk and helped edit volumes on population change and security and on low fertility. The major book of the period was Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century (2010).

The book complicated the secularization story. Kaufmann accepted that modernization could weaken individual belief. He added the arithmetic. Religious traditionalists have more children than secular people. If they retain a substantial share of those children, they grow as a proportion of the population even while individuals continue to leave religion. He worked through conservative Protestants, Muslims, Mormons, and Haredi Jews. In Israel, the ultra-Orthodox made up about five percent of primary schoolchildren in 1960; by the start of this century, a third of Jewish first graders came from Haredi homes.

The argument produced a paradox with teeth. Modern individualism persuades people to abandon inherited religion and also depresses fertility among the most secular. Liberal modernity might select, demographically, for the communities that resist it. Kaufmann did not claim the arithmetic settles history. Children defect. Religious groups liberalize and fragment. But births, marriages, and migration set limits on any theory that treats social change as the spread of ideas alone. History can be moved by millions of private decisions that no movement coordinates.

Whiteshift

The synthesis arrived in 2018. Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities, published by Penguin, ran to hundreds of pages of surveys, graphs, and history. The Economist called it a monumental study of ethno-demographic change. The Times made it Book of the Week, with a skeptical review by David Aaronovitch (b. 1954). The Financial Times listed it among the best politics books of 2018. It transformed Kaufmann from a specialist known to students of nationalism into a public figure known to everyone who follows the argument over immigration.

The book’s central claim was that ethnic change, not economic anxiety, drove the populist revolt. Deindustrialization and austerity could sharpen discontent, but attitudes toward immigration and national identity predicted votes for Brexit, Donald Trump (b. 1946), and the European populist right far better than income did. The title named two processes at once: the numerical decline of historically white majorities, and the slower formation of new mixed populations through intermarriage. Kaufmann expected the eventual majority in Western countries to be increasingly multiracial while keeping some of the memories, symbols, and national consciousness of the older majority. Whiteshift, in his usage, is a transition.

That prediction cut him off from racial nationalism. He rejected biological essentialism, did not believe white populations could or should remain genealogically sealed, and treated ethnicity as a boundary that expands. People of mixed or minority ancestry enter the majority through marriage, identification, and participation. He rejected with equal force the proposition that majority identity should dissolve into civic abstraction. Constitutions do not exhaust belonging. Nations carry inherited stories, recognizable cultural forms, historic landscapes, and collective memory, and civic nationalism by itself cannot satisfy every desire for continuity. His policy settlement combined liberal citizenship, controlled immigration, assimilation, and tolerance for moderate majority attachment, with attention to the speed of change populations will accept. People adjust to diversity over time. They react against rapid shifts.

The reviews mapped the battlefield. Kenan Malik (b. 1960) granted the heft of the data and pressed the deeper objection that viewing the world in demographic terms makes it “easy to be blind to the social context,” and that white identity is less racist than meaningless, a category made politically potent chiefly as an instrument of exclusion. Daniel Trilling in the London Review of Books found the frame of reference both too broad and too narrow. The New Yorker read the book as a defense of white identity politics. Reviewers on the right called it the best diagnosis of populism their side had produced. Nobody called it timid.

The fight underneath the reviews is the fight of Kaufmann’s career. His critics argue that the identities are not symmetrical. Minority identities formed in response to exclusion, conquest, slavery, and forced assimilation. Majority identity was built into the state, defined legitimate citizenship, and treated minorities as subordinate. What Kaufmann calls moderate majority attachment cannot be cleanly severed from the hierarchies it once sustained, and a state that treats white identity like any other risks laundering accumulated advantage. Kaufmann’s answer is narrower than his enemies assume. He concedes unequal power. He claims that cultural interests do not become unreal because the group holding them was historically dominant, and that a voter may oppose rapid immigration out of attachment to the familiar rather than belief in superiority. His practical argument is a warning. Suppressed interests do not disappear. If moderate attachment cannot speak through mainstream politics, it returns in a harsher voice, and the extremists inherit the subject. Whether recognition moderates majority identity or hardens racial thinking remains an open empirical question, and Kaufmann has staked his reputation on one side of it.

KaufmannOut

Fame changed his working conditions. In May 2021 the Birkbeck Students’ Anti-Racism Network published a long Twitter thread denouncing him as a racist and a white supremacist, launched a petition for his investigation, and shared it under the hashtag KaufmannOut. Among the evidence cited: his phrase “woke hijacking,” his complaints about a reign of terror in universities, his retweets of the American activist Christopher Rufo (b. 1984) and of Spiked writers. An open letter to the Master of Birkbeck called for his firing over his defense of white identity politics and his attacks on Black Lives Matter activists and scholars of color.

That August, the story acquired a second point of view. Lisa Tilley, a lecturer in his own department, announced her resignation in a Medium post. She wrote that she was leaving because of Kaufmann’s public statements and activities and because of the effect on staff and students of being “in such close proximity to his far-right followers.” No one calling herself a feminist or antiracist, she argued, could go on selling degree programs to students who would end up in his classroom. She described his campaign against critical race theory as an import of an American project of censorship that targeted her own teaching, and said students had begun asking whether it was even legal to cite scholarship that might be perceived as critical race theory. Times Higher Education reported the resignation. Kaufmann’s response to the paper was formal and cold: “I was always courteous and respectful to Lisa,” he said, rejecting the charge of racism and vowing to continue criticizing movements he believed threatened expressive freedom and Enlightenment reason. In his own later telling, she had taken a job next door at SOAS.

The episode compressed the whole national argument into one corridor of one Bloomsbury college. From her side of the corridor: a senior professor with a mass following whose politics made the workplace, in her word, sickening, and whose online supporters spilled hostility onto junior colleagues and students of color. From his side: three internal inquiries driven by complaints, hostile course evaluations weaponized, Twitter pile-ons organized from the Student Union, and a young ideologue narrating her lateral move as martyrdom. The disagreement was about what academic freedom protects. His supporters said controversial research and political speech. His opponents said a professor’s public activity shapes the environment of colleagues and students even when no one is formally censored. Kaufmann drew from the fight a conclusion that reoriented his research: formal job security is not enough. An academic can stay employed while facing reputational attack, complaint procedures, social exclusion, and the steady pressure to avoid the questions that cause trouble. He began measuring self-censorship and political discrimination in universities, work that fed into Britain’s Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act.

Leaving

Eric Kaufmann left Birkbeck in October 2023, after about twenty years. Birkbeck’s finances played a part; the college was cutting posts. But in an essay for The Critic he described a five-year campaign of steady hostility from radical staff and students following Whiteshift and his criticism of wokeness. To the Daily Mail he was blunter: “I was cancelled by 1,000 cuts.” His destination made the point for him. Roger Scruton (1944–2020) had also taught at Birkbeck for more than twenty years before taking a post late in life at Buckingham, the private university he described as “the least politically correct university in Europe.”

Buckingham gave Kaufmann a professorship and a platform. In January 2024 he launched a low-cost online course, open to the public, titled Woke: The Origins, Dynamics and Implications of an Elite Ideology, and noted that no university anywhere, so far as he knew, offered a course putting this belief system under the microscope. In February came the Legatum launch of the Centre for Heterodox Social Science. A London-based MA in the Politics of Cultural Conflict followed, with a stated goal of a politically balanced intake, and then a PhD in Cultural Politics. The center’s self-description is careful: its aim is not the extremely controversial material of race-and-IQ debates but the vast empirical zone between progressive academia and the Journal of Controversial Ideas, territory it believes normative barriers and political prejudice have closed off.

Kaufmann frames the problem facing dissident scholars as one of collective action. Alone, each is exposed. Together, they may have enough talent, funding, and readership to sustain an intellectual subculture. What they lack is infrastructure: supervisors, graduate programs, conferences, journals, employment pathways. Buckingham is his experiment in building it. By July 2026 the center was hosting its second annual conference, on the theme of post-progressivism, with speakers running from Alan Sokal and Musa al-Gharbi to Rufo and Frank Furedi (b. 1947). That guest list states the experiment’s risk in miniature. A heterodox center must permit disagreement within its own ranks and must produce scholarship rather than validation, or it becomes the mirror image of what it fled. The test is whether the intelligent center-left ever finds reason to engage its findings.

Taboo

His account of the movement he opposes appeared in 2024 under two titles: Taboo: How Making Race Sacred Produced a Cultural Revolution in Britain, and The Third Awokening: A 12-Point Plan for Rolling Back Progressive Extremism. The two titles announce the book’s two natures, intellectual history and political program.

The book opens at Yale in 2015, with students screaming at the professor Nicholas Christakis (b. 1962) because his wife had questioned whether diversity administrators should instruct students on Halloween costumes. From that scene Kaufmann works backward. He rejects the standard conservative genealogy that traces wokeness to Marxism, postmodernism, or a coordinated Gramscian march through the institutions. He locates its origin in radicalized liberal humanitarianism, and he dates the big bang to the mid-1960s, when the moral triumph of civil rights hardened into a taboo around race. Compassion for victims, guilt over historical injustice, and suspicion of majorities came first. The academic theories came later, as justification. The feminist and LGBT movements borrowed the taboo’s magic; the revolutionary left weaponized it; each extension pushed into smaller and smaller grievances.

He defines wokeness as the sacralization of historically marginalized race, gender, and sexual identity groups. Sacralization means protection becomes non-negotiable. Claims of psychological harm and historical victimhood begin to override free inquiry, due process, scientific uncertainty, and the treatment of people as individuals. He distinguishes this from ordinary liberal concern about discrimination. The trouble begins when sympathy hardens into taboo, when certain empirical claims become morally impermissible regardless of truth, and when disagreement becomes evidence of defective character. His name for the broader outlook is cultural socialism: where economic socialism seeks equality of material resources, cultural socialism seeks equality of esteem, representation, and psychological safety, and reads every disparity as institutional failure.

The diagnosis extends his Ulster sociology. There is no command center. Educated people imitate prestigious peers. Administrators respond to reputational incentives. Employees learn that affirmation is safe and dissent is expensive. Once a moral framework attaches to compassion and respectability, organizations reproduce it voluntarily, the way lodges reproduced Orangeism. His survey data support the claim that the shift is driven by values rather than fear, concentrated among the young, the educated, the urban, and the professional, and therefore likely to grow as those cohorts age into power.

The remedies are where his friends divide. His twelve-point program calls on elected governments to act: restrictions on compelled ideological statements, statutory free-speech protections, transparency about institutional politics, defunding of publicly financed ideological programs. Institutions that present themselves as neutral, he argues, are already politicized, and only the democratic state has the standing to depoliticize them. Kathleen Stock (b. 1972), reviewing Taboo in The Times, found it “stimulating and provocative” while questioning whether state remedies of this reach sit comfortably with the negative liberalism Kaufmann professes. David Goodhart (b. 1956), a friend of twenty years, called him the foremost theorist of the great awokening. A reviewer for the Higher Education Policy Institute noted that half the twelve points require government intervention that would dynamite university autonomy, and that Kaufmann, oddly incurious about the administrators who sat in judgment over him, stays hazy on how the machine he describes transmits its power. Kaufmann wants the state to intervene hard enough to depoliticize institutions and not hard enough to impose a conservative doctrine in their place. Whether that line can be held is the open question of his political program, and the Trump administration’s treatment of universities gave the question flesh.

Ethical Populism

His answer to Trump arrived in stages. Kaufmann regards populism as a necessary democratic correction. Mainstream parties let immigration, identity politics, and institutional ideology drift far from the preferences of ordinary voters, and populists forced the subjects back onto the table. But by 2025 he was calling for a rational populism, and in a June 2026 essay for First Things he settled on the phrase ethical populism, a politics that “fuses populist disruption with a reformed social, normative, and institutional order.” The essay is notable for the coldness of its portrait of Trump, whose behavior Kaufmann attributes to psychology rather than ideology, something he says the man does not possess. Trumpism, on this reading, is an emergent property of the interactions between Trump, his interpreters, and his administrators. Its interventions were arbitrary where they should have been principled: sudden fines, shifting demands, free speech defended for conservatives and denied to pro-Palestinian groups, due process breached in the handling of universities and deportations, executive orders that courts blocked and a successor could repeal in an afternoon. A populism of hard power alone, he concluded, will exhaust itself and alienate the moderates it needs. He asked conservatives to reclaim a full-spectrum compassion that treats the claims of strong and weak groups alike.

The position satisfies no pole, which is its point. Progressives read his program as the state turned against equality. Radical populists read his proceduralism as surrender. He calls himself a liberal national conservative and means each word. The liberalism: individual rights, equal citizenship, free inquiry, due process, and a firm rejection of racial purity, collective legal privilege, and religious government. The nationalism: the conviction that people need collective memory, continuity, territory, ancestry stories, and inherited culture, and that a nation is more than an administration of strangers. The conservatism: skepticism that people can be instructed out of attachment to the familiar, and the observation that shaming those attachments tends to inflame them. He stands apart from post-liberals who want a confessional state, from libertarians who treat universities and corporations as private actors beyond political concern, and, most sharply, from biological nationalists, since the future he predicts and welcomes is ethnically fluid, its majority altered generation by generation through intermarriage, its membership resting on identification and participation rather than blood.

The Ledger

Kaufmann’s method is the source of both his power and his exposure. He combines intellectual history, survey research, demographic projection, archival work, and political interpretation, and he moves between centuries-long transformations and last month’s polling. His signature habit is to study what official language excludes. Liberal discourse handles individual rights, economics, and minority recognition with ease. It goes quiet on majority ethnicity, demographic continuity, fertility differentials, and attachment to a familiar population. Kaufmann drags the quiet subjects into the light and asks whether attachments declared obsolete still move behavior. Again and again his answer is yes. Religion recovers through fertility. Nationalism returns after the elites pronounce it finished. Majority identity reappears under suppression. Progressive overreach breeds the populism it fears.

The weakness of the method is the mirror of its strength. Neglected causes, once recovered, can swell. Demographic change does not interpret itself; immigration acquires meaning through labor markets, housing, party competition, and media framing, and a laid-off industrial worker’s economic loss and cultural disorientation arrive as one experience, not two. Kaufmann sometimes presents cultural explanation as a correction to materialist explanation when the strongest account needs both. And since 2018 his roles as scholar and combatant have fused. The surveys still carry empirical weight. The polemic and the institutional flag give critics permission to ignore the surveys and give allies permission to skip the checking. He is a scholar of the collision between demographic reality, inherited identity, and liberal principle, and he is now standing inside the collision, which is a hard place from which to take measurements.

His permanent contribution is secure whatever happens to his program. He made the majority visible as an object of study. Before him, the ethnicity of dominant groups hid inside words like national and mainstream and neutral. After him, scholars who reject every one of his conclusions still have to analyze majorities as groups with memories, boundaries, and interests, because the alternative, treating half the argument over immigration as mere pathology, no longer explains the election returns. His most vulnerable claim is that majority recognition can stay moderate and liberal, and history supplies the doubt, since majority identities have merged with domination often enough to make the fear rational. His answer is that the other course has been tried. Suppressing majority identity while cultivating minority consciousness produced the politics of the last decade. The boy who watched Vancouver change, the postgraduate who learned from Smith that nations have ethnic cores, the researcher who read the minute books of Orange lodges, and the professor who packed his office after the third inquiry all converge on the same wager: that the West can name what it is inheriting and losing without setting fire to anyone, and that refusing to name it is how the fires start.

Notes

Legatum launch scene, over 80 guests, Ferguson, Goodwin, Tooley, February 22, 2024: Kaufmann‘s own Substack account of the launch reports over 80 attendees including politicians, journalists, and think tank heads, with Niall Ferguson, Matthew Goodwin, James Tooley, and Legatum director Radomir Tylecote speaking; the university confirms the February 22, 2024 date. Links: Kaufmann Substack and University of Buckingham launch announcement. The Tooley quote is from the university page. The Mayfair townhouse detail is my extrapolation from Legatum..

Childhood and father: the Hub Dialogues interview has Kaufmann describing his father’s service with the Canadian Trade Commissioner in China during the Cultural Revolution, the ten Tokyo years in stretches of eight and two, arrival in Vancouver in the late 1970s, and the rise of the Hong Kong Chinese population there. The “became a normal Canadian again” quote is from this interview. Father’s name, Prostějov roots, lapsed Catholic mother, one year of Catholic school: Wikipedia, Eric Kaufmann. Note his father is Steve Kaufmann of LingQ fame.

Whiteshift reception: Wikipedia’s Whiteshift page collects The Economist‘s “monumental study” description, the Times Book of the Week with Aaronovitch‘s skeptical review, the FT best-books listing, Trilling‘s “too broad and too narrow” in the LRB, The New Yorker‘s reading, and Malik’s line about demographic framing being blind to social context. Malik’s “meaningless” argument: his Observer review, flagged here at Existential Politics.

KaufmannOut and Tilley: Spiked documents the Students’ Anti-Racism Network thread, the petition, the hashtag, and the specific complaints about “woke hijacking” and Rufo retweets. Tilley’s Medium post carries her resignation reasoning and the far-right followers language. Times Higher Education carries her “sickening environment” framing and his courteous-and-respectful response. The open letter to the Master and the SOAS detail: GB News and his Critic essay.

Departure: his Critic essay has the five-year hostility account, the three-inquiries history, the Scruton parallel and Scruton’s Buckingham quote, and the January 2024 woke course. The “cancelled by 1,000 cuts” line was given to the Daily Mail and reported by GB News. Birkbeck‘s job cuts as context is a light extrapolation from his own “uncertain financial position” phrasing.

Buckingham programs and center mission: MA with politically balanced intake from the university page above; the center’s about page states the aim of working the empirical zone between progressive academia and the Journal of Controversial Ideas; the July 23-25, 2026 conference on post-progressivism lists Sokal, al-Gharbi, Rufo, and Furedi among speakers.

Taboo material: the Yale / Christakis opening and the four-investigations count are in Andrew Gimson’s ConservativeHome review. Goodhart‘s “foremost theorist” judgment and the twenty-year friendship: Literary Review. Stock‘s “stimulating and provocative” from The Times, via the publisher; her fuller reservation about state remedies is flagged on the center’s site, “Review of my book Taboo by Kathleen Stock, Times, but I could not read the Times piece behind its wall, so verify my characterization before publishing. The HEPI criticism about the twelve points and administrators: HEPI review. The values-not-fear survey finding: publisher’s description at the Swift Press link.

Ethical populism: the First Things essay of June 22, 2026, contains the fusion quote, the psychology-not-ideology reading of Trump, Trumpism as emergent property, the catalogue of arbitrary interventions including selective free speech and due process breaches, and the full-spectrum compassion argument.

Eric Kaufmann and the Field: A Bourdieusian Reading

Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) taught that an intellectual life is never only a sequence of ideas. It is a trajectory through a field, a structured space of positions where players compete for capital under rules they rarely state. The academic field runs on a currency of its own: publications in consecrated venues, citations, chairs, fellowships, the deference of peers. This academic capital converts, at variable and contested exchange rates, into other currencies, media visibility, political influence, money. The field defends its autonomy by policing those conversions. It honors the player who writes for the seminar room and suspects the player who writes for the airport bookshop. And it reserves its harshest machinery for the member who takes an internal dispute to an external audience. Read through this lens, Eric Kaufmann’s career stops looking like a story of courage or apostasy, the two stories his admirers and enemies tell, and becomes something else: a case study in capital conversion, in the revenge of a field on a converter, and in the rarest of all moves available to a dominated player, the attempt to found a rival bank.

Begin where Bourdieu begins, with habitus, the durable dispositions a social origin installs. Kaufmann’s habitus formed between fields. The diplomat’s household is a machine for producing a certain relation to belonging: the child learns every national world from slightly outside it, fluent in each, native to none. Hong Kong, two stretches of Tokyo, then Vancouver, where the boy of half Jewish, quarter Chinese, quarter Costa Rican ancestry re-entered Canadian life as the city’s own composition shifted around him. Bourdieu wrote of the cleft habitus, the disposition of those who straddle categories and therefore see the categories as objects rather than as air. A man formed this way arrives in the academy carrying a feel for the game that most players lack, the ability to perceive national and ethnic classification as classification. His life’s founding intellectual move, treating the majority as one ethnic group among others rather than as the invisible background, is the scholarly transcription of a childhood position. The insight that made his name required standing where he had always stood, at an angle to every group that believes itself simply normal.

The LSE of the 1990s was the center of nationalism studies, and within that subfield the modernists held the dominant positions. Gellner, Hobsbawm, and Anderson supplied the orthodoxy: nations as artifacts of industry, print, and state. Anthony D. Smith’s ethnosymbolism was the licensed heterodoxy, tolerated, cited, and structurally junior. A doctoral student chooses a supervisor and, with the supervisor, a position. Kaufmann chose the dominated pole and then executed the classic move Bourdieu describes in The Rules of Art: the newcomer who cannot dislodge the dominant players makes his name by creating a position that does not yet exist. Dominant ethnicity was vacant space. The field had ethnic studies for minorities and nationalism studies for states; nobody claimed the majority as an ethnic object. Claiming it cost little at first, the space was empty because it was unfashionable rather than forbidden, and it yielded a durable asset: a concept bearing his name, the founder’s rent that accrues to whoever defines a new object of study.

The two decades that followed were accumulation in the field’s own coin. The Anglo-America monograph in 2004. The Orange Order archives, worked the way the field’s autonomous pole demands, minute books and internal records, years of patient labor invested in a subject with no market outside the discipline. The demography turn, collaborations with Goujon and Skirbekk, edited volumes, the 2010 book on religious fertility. A chair at Birkbeck in 2011, a Belfer fellowship at Harvard. By his mid-forties Kaufmann held a respectable portfolio of academic capital, specific, slow-earned, recognized by the small number of peers competent to judge it. Bourdieu would note what the portfolio lacked. It was capital of the autonomous pole, valued inside the field and nearly worthless outside it. The Orange Order books circulate among a few hundred specialists. Symbolic profit at this pole is real and small. The player who wants more faces a choice the field has structured in advance: keep accumulating in the internal currency, or convert.

Whiteshift, in 2018, was the conversion, and its form announced it. Penguin, not a university press. Graphs for the general reader, a title built for headlines, a thesis keyed to the two political shocks, Brexit and Trump, that had created a sudden journalistic demand for a credentialed explainer of populism. Bourdieu’s analysis of the journalistic field in On Television describes the exchange: journalism, short of authority, borrows it from academics; academics, short of audience, borrow it from journalism; and the academic who accepts the trade begins to answer the journalistic field’s questions on the journalistic field’s schedule. The market Kaufmann entered was hungry in a way his specialist market had never been. The Economist, The Times, the Financial Times lists, the lecture circuit, the think tank affiliations, Policy Exchange, the Manhattan Institute. Within two years the professor of the Orange lodge minute books was a columnist, a survey entrepreneur, and a witness for a government’s academic freedom bill. Academic capital had been converted into media and political capital at scale.

Capital is field-specific. Media celebrity, positive currency in the journalistic field, registers as negative currency at the academic field’s autonomous pole, where it signals vulgarization, haste, the sin of pleasing outsiders. And the academic field polices conversion through instances that never call themselves political: peer review, hiring committees, student evaluations, complaint procedures, the etiquette of the seminar. Between 2018 and 2023 these instances turned on Kaufmann one by one. The student evaluations soured and became evidence. The complaints arrived and became inquiries, four by his own count. The open letter, the hashtag, the resignation of a departmental colleague who framed her exit as a moral impossibility of sharing his corridor. Kaufmann narrates these years as persecution for ideas. The Bourdieusian reading is colder. A field was recoding his capital. The same books and columns that earned him consecration in the journalistic and political fields were reread inside the academic field as pollution, and the field’s tribunals, staffed by players whose own positions depend on the value of the internal currency, did what tribunals of a field always do: they defended the exchange rate.

The struggle over Kaufmann was therefore a struggle over the field’s principle of hierarchization, and here the frame exposes a symmetry both camps deny. Each side accused the other of heteronomy. His opponents said he had imported politics into scholarship, laundering a political project through a professorship, trading on the field’s authority while serving external masters, the think tanks, the right-wing press. He said they had captured the field for a political orthodoxy and were enforcing ideological conformity under cover of scholarly standards. Bourdieu would decline to referee and would instead point at the structure of the accusation itself. In a field whose official currency is disinterested truth, the deadliest available charge is service to external interests, and so every faction in an academic war reaches for it. The accusation of heteronomy is the standard weapon of position-taking in a field that worships autonomy. Both sides wielded it because both sides know, without needing to say it, what the field’s supreme value is. Their war confirmed the doxa it appeared to shatter.

The dominated player in a field ordinarily has three options: submit, subvert from within, or fall silent. Kaufmann took a fourth. He exited to build a rival apparatus of consecration. The Centre for Heterodox Social Science is, described in field terms, an attempt to manufacture new instances: its own conference at Buckingham each July, its own doctoral program and MA, its own supervisors, its own fellows list, its own definition of the vast empirical zone that counts as legitimate but suppressed social science, its own Substack circuit standing in for the journals. Bourdieu documented the pattern in the artistic field: when the Salon refused the Impressionists, the refused founded the Salon des Refusés, a counter-instance that began as a badge of exclusion and ended by devaluing the instance that had excluded them. The history of modern art is a history of secessions that became academies. Kaufmann is running the secession play in social science, and Buckingham, a private university with no research assessment submission to protect and a vice-chancellor who advertises free inquiry as the brand, is the one British venue structurally free to host it.

Symbolic capital cannot be self-issued. Consecration works only when the relevant players believe in the consecrating instance, and belief is precisely what a seceding institution cannot compel. A degree is worth what the field says it is worth. A conference confers standing only on those who already grant the conference standing. The risk of every counter-academy is the heterodox ghetto: a closed circuit in which the excluded consecrate the excluded, capital circulates briskly and never clears outside the subfield, and the apparatus becomes a mirror image of the orthodoxy it fled, with its own doxa, its own tests of belonging, its own unaskable questions. Kaufmann shows signs of knowing this. His stated ambition, that the intelligent center-left should one day engage the Centre’s findings, is in field terms an acknowledgment that only recognition from the dominant field can convert his new currency, and his insistence on a politically balanced intake for the MA is an attempted hedge against ghetto formation. The speakers list of his 2026 conference, running from Sokal to Rufo, measures how open the hedge has held. The test of the secession is not whether it attracts the right’s intellectuals. They arrive on their own. The test is whether a Buckingham doctorate ever moves a career inside the field that refused its founder.

Field theory catches what Kaufmann’s self-account obscures, and three things sit in that shadow. First, his heterodoxy is a position-taking with profits. The account he gives, a scholar who followed the evidence into forbidden territory and paid the price, suppresses the other half of the ledger: the culture war gave him a market his specialist work never had. The persecution that cost him his corridor and his committee assignments built his platform, his columns, his fellowships, his center, his conference, his name. In Bourdieu’s terms, exclusion from one field was the price of consecration in another, and the price was paid in a currency he had already begun to discount. This is a redescription rather than an accusation. Every intellectual position, including the persecuted one, especially the persecuted one, carries its rewards, and the sociologist’s job is to price them, since the holder never will. The martyr position in the culture war is among the most liquid assets in the contemporary attention economy, and Kaufmann holds a large block of it.

Second, Kaufmann’s indictment of the academic field is an indictment of heteronomy, capture by political capital, scholarly judgment subordinated to external moral movements. Yet the position from which he issues the indictment rests on Legatum’s rooms, the Manhattan Institute’s fellowships, Policy Exchange’s reports, the Telegraph’s column inches, GB News’s studios, First Things’s pages, and a university whose market niche is dissent. His capital is now underwritten by the political and journalistic fields to roughly the degree he claims his opponents’ capital is underwritten by the progressive movement. He might answer that his patrons buy his findings while theirs buy their conclusions, and the answer might even hold, but it is an empirical defense to be made survey by survey, and it cannot be settled by the word heterodox, which has become, in his circuit, a brand asset performing the same laundering function that the word rigorous performs in the circuit he left. Field theory does not say the two heteronomies are equivalent. It says neither player is standing on the neutral ground each claims, and that the fight between them is a fight between two fractions, each fused to external backers, over which external backing shall count as corruption.

Third, the frame reveals Kaufmann’s own theory of wokeness as a competing product in the same market. Sacralization, taboo, reputational incentive, conformity through professional risk: his account of progressive ideology is a field analysis with the labels changed, a description of players accumulating moral capital and policing conversion. He is, in effect, selling a rival sociology of the academic field, one in which the relevant capital is sanctity rather than scholarship, and his center competes with the Bourdieusians of the sociology departments for the same explanatory turf, the question of why the professional class believes what it believes. That the two sociologies describe each other’s practitioners with equal facility, his opponents can price his martyr capital as fluently as he prices their moral capital, suggests both have hold of something and neither has hold of the whole.

Hysteresis names the lag between a habitus and a transformed field, the fate of the player whose feel for the game was formed under rules the game no longer follows. Kaufmann’s dispositions were built in the academy of the early 1990s, where a provocative question about majorities was a career-making niche and the worst consequence of heresy was a sharp review. The field he practiced those dispositions in after 2015 had repriced the same moves as harm. Part of what reads in his writing as bitterness might be hysteresis, the disorientation of a man playing skillfully by a rate sheet the exchange had withdrawn. The younger colleagues who filed the complaints were not misplaying. They were playing the current game with a current habitus, and their capital, the capital of moral vigilance, was rising as his fell. A field revolution looks, from inside the falling position, like a moral collapse. From the structural view it is a change in the conversion tables.

Field theory prices positions. It does not adjudicate propositions. Nothing in this analysis bears on whether ethnic change drives populism, whether majority attachment can stay liberal, or whether his surveys of self-censorship measure what they claim. A man’s findings can be sound while his position pays him to reach them, and unsound while he starves for them; the sociology of the scholar settles nothing about the scholarship, a point Bourdieu himself, who wanted reflexivity to purify science rather than dissolve it, insisted on in Science of Science and Reflexivity. The frame removes the two false stories, the hero of truth and the agent of reaction, and replaces them with a trajectory: a cleft habitus that saw categories as objects, a vacant position claimed and worked for twenty years, a conversion of slow capital into fast, a field defending its exchange rate through tribunals that never named their function, and a secession whose success will be decided, as consecration always is, by players who owe the founder nothing. Kaufmann spent a career arguing that majorities are groups with interests they cannot see because the interests are built into the institutions. The same sentence, with the noun changed, describes the field that made him, the field that expelled him, and the field he is building now.

Alliance Theory

Alliance Theory posits that political belief systems function as collections of justifications and propagandistic tactics designed to advance the interests of specific political alliances. By applying this framework to the arguments made in the Kaufmann essay on ethical populism, one can view the proposed “ethical populism” not as an effort to build a coherent philosophy, but as an attempt to reconfigure and mobilize a specific coalition of allies.
The essay argues that conservatives must fuse Thatcherite disruption with Scrutonian order to challenge the current institutional status quo. From the perspective of Alliance Theory, this is a strategic effort to recruit new allies—those resentful of institutional capture—while maintaining the support of traditional order-focused groups. The essay identifies this alliance by explicitly targeting groups disadvantaged by “rapid social change” and “institutional bias,” effectively defining a new set of allies for a populist movement.
The essay’s focus on “ethical” constraint acts as a rhetorical device to signal to potential moderate allies that this populism will not descend into the pathologies of unconstrained power, such as anti-Semitism or disregard for democratic norms. By distinguishing “ethical populism” from both Trump’s unconstrained style and the anti-populist alternative, the author attempts to define the boundaries of a new alliance, marking certain groups as rivals (the “woke left” and its captured institutions) and others as prospective members (disaffected moderates).
The call for “full-spectrum compassion” that treats the claims of “historically powerful and weak groups” equally functions as a classic propagandistic tactic to broaden an alliance.
Alliance Theory predicts that such narratives are constructed to mobilize support for specific allies. Here, by reframing the “historically powerful” (such as White people or men) as victims of institutional bias, the essay utilizes “victim biases” to mobilize support for these groups, attempting to shift the alliance structure to include them as beneficiaries of a “populist” agenda.
Finally, the essay’s dismissal of individualism as having “no answer” to late modernity’s challenges signals that the author views the existing, individualist conservative alliance as insufficient. The proposal for state intervention to reform universities and remove “rot” is a clear attempt to use government power to directly benefit the interests of this reconfigured alliance. Under Alliance Theory, the essay does not argue for a “more ethical” conservatism as an abstract moral improvement, but as a superior strategic arrangement to advance the interests of a coalition defined by opposition to contemporary progressive institutional capture.

The Great Delusion

If John Mearsheimer is right in his anthropology, Eric Kaufmann is not merely a social scientist studying demographic trends; he is a chronicler of the very tribal processes Mearsheimer identifies as the fundamental engine of human history.

Mearsheimer posits that humans are inherently tribal, deeply socialized, and driven by sentiments that precede rational thought. Kaufmann’s work—specifically in Whiteshift and his research into political demography—acts as a systematic validation of this view at the scale of national populations. While Mearsheimer focuses on the “socialized” nature of the individual, Kaufmann demonstrates how that socialization manifests at the group level through the persistence of ethnic and religious identities.

If Mearsheimer is right, then Kaufmann’s focus on “demographic change” is not just a study of numbers. It is a study of the survival strategies of tribes. Kaufmann argues that people have a natural, deep-seated attachment to their own group. When demographic shifts occur, it creates friction because it disrupts the social environment in which that tribe was formed and within which its members find their identity. From a Mearsheimerian perspective, what Kaufmann describes as the “populist right” is simply the tribal instinct reasserting itself against a liberal, universalist ideology that tries to treat populations as interchangeable, atomistic actors.

Kaufmann’s work often faces criticism from those who believe culture should be untethered from ethnicity. However, if Mearsheimer’s anthropology holds, Kaufmann is correct to insist that you cannot separate the two. A culture is the moral and social framework of a specific tribe. When that tribe’s demographic base erodes, its ability to socialize the next generation into its specific “value infusion” is weakened. Therefore, demographic change is not a passive or secondary issue; it is the physical medium through which tribal identity is transmitted.

For Kaufmann, Mearsheimer’s framework provides a robust theoretical backing for why his data matters. If individuals are born into social groups that shape their identity, then a nation cannot remain “the same” if its constituent tribes are replaced or significantly diluted. The state might remain, but the underlying social logic—the “tribe” that constitutes that state’s culture—will shift.

Kaufmann provides the empirical map for the tribal landscape Mearsheimer describes. While Mearsheimer explains why we are tribal, Kaufmann documents the consequences of that tribalism in an era of mass migration and demographic flux. If Mearsheimer’s view is accurate, Kaufmann’s work is not a controversial intervention into sociology; it is a straightforward account of human nature operating on a national scale.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

Applying David Pinsof’s framework to Eric Kaufmann reveals a strategic competitor fighting for institutional control.
Kaufmann frames his work as an effort to fix a corrupted academic system. He argues that progressive orthodoxy suppresses truth about demographics and cultural identity. Supporters view him as a brave scholar curing an institutional bias. They think he clears up a misunderstanding caused by elite groupthink.
Pinsof suggests a different reading. Kaufmann is an animal competing in a high-stakes intellectual marketplace. He supplies his coalition with the ammunition needed to fight a zero-sum war over status and resources.
When Kaufmann writes books like Whiteshift or The Third Awokening, he provides status-enhancing opinions to his readers. His audience feels threatened by shifting demographics and progressive institutional power. Kaufmann gives them a rational framework to justify their threat perception. He identifies their rivals, the progressive managerial elite, and mounts an organized counter-offensive.
Kaufmann established the Centre for Heterodox Social Science at the University of Buckingham. He presents this as a refuge for free inquiry. Pinsof might view it as a base camp for a competing faction. In a Darwinian environment, establishing a counter-institution is a savvy move to secure funding, prestige, and allies. It creates an alternative hierarchy where Kaufmann and his peers sit at the top.
Critics accuse Kaufmann of bias. They assume he fails at the job of an objective social scientist. This assumes his goal is objective neutrality. His behavior makes complete sense if his goal is to lead a counter-coalition. By aggressively challenging progressive orthodoxies, he signals resolve. He proves to his allies that he will not surrender to dominant academic pressures.
The progressive elites he criticizes do not suffer from a cognitive bias. They use their ideology as a strategic tool to dominate rivals and monopolize institutional power. Kaufmann uses his own research and institutional platforms to fight back. Both sides understand what they have an incentive to understand.
To view Kaufmann as a man trying to fix a misunderstanding misreads human nature. He is a rational primate engaged in a struggle for influence. He fights for control over the narrative and the institutions that shape society. The only misunderstanding is the belief that he seeks to reform academia. He seeks to win a dominant position for his coalition.

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Dominic Cummings: A Biography

The chief adviser arrived half an hour late to his own press conference. It was May 25, 2020, a hot bank holiday Monday, and Dominic Cummings (b. 1971) walked out of the back of 10 Downing Street into the rose garden, where the government stages state visits and coalition launches, and sat down at a small table with a bottle of water and a sheaf of notes. He wore a white shirt, open at the collar, untucked. The reporters sat on chairs spaced two meters apart across the lawn. Britain was ten weeks into a lockdown that forbade citizens to visit dying parents, and the man who helped write the rules had driven 260 miles to Durham while infected with the virus, then driven thirty miles more to a castle town on his wife’s birthday to test his eyesight.

He read a statement. He took questions for more than an hour. Reporters asked whether he would resign. He said no. They asked whether he regretted the journey. “I don’t regret what I did,” he said. Inside the building behind him, the prime minister had already decided to keep him, at a cost neither man yet understood. Across the country, people who had buried relatives by video link watched an unelected aide explain that his case was different.

No adviser in modern British history had been given that garden for a solo defense of his own conduct. The scene told the audience two things at once. Cummings held power that the constitution does not describe. And the government would spend that power to protect him.

He has never stood for election. Yet for several years he exercised more influence over British politics than most cabinet ministers. He directed Vote Leave to victory in the 2016 referendum on membership of the European Union, ran the strategy that gave Boris Johnson (b. 1964) an eighty-one seat majority in December 2019, and then attempted, from a corner office in Downing Street, to rebuild the machinery of the British state. The first two projects succeeded. The third collapsed, and its collapse explains him better than his victories do.

The central proposition of his career is that Britain’s governing institutions can no longer think, learn, recruit, or execute. Elections change ministers. Ministers rarely control the departments beneath them. Policies get announced without plans. Officials earn promotion by avoiding blame. Meetings substitute for decisions and procedural compliance substitutes for competence. Cummings has spent thirty years trying to break this system. His record suggests he understands institutional decay better than he understands institutional construction.

Durham

Cummings was born in Durham on November 25, 1971. His father, Robert Cummings, worked on large engineering projects, including North Sea oil installations, before turning to farming. His mother, Morag, taught and specialized in behavioral work with difficult children. His maternal uncle, Sir John Laws (1945–2020), sat on the Court of Appeal and ranked among the most respected public law judges of his generation. The family belonged to the professional class of the northeast, prosperous but far from the metropolitan networks that run British politics. When Cummings later attacked London insiders, he attacked a world he had entered from outside and mastered from within.

He attended a state primary school, then Durham School, a fee-paying institution founded before the Reformation. From there he went to Exeter College, Oxford, and read Ancient and Modern History, taking first-class honors in 1994. His most important teacher was Norman Stone (1941–2019), a historian of European conflict who had advised Margaret Thatcher (1925–2013) and who treated academic consensus as a target rather than a comfort. Tutors remembered Cummings as restless and combative, a student who read beyond the syllabus and argued past the seminar hour.

His historical education became the foundation of his politics, though in an unusual way. He does not read history to recover past cultures. He reads it as a file of case studies in strategy, state formation, and organizational collapse. Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), the Manhattan Project, the Apollo program, and Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew (1923–2015) recur in his writing because they show what concentrated intelligence and authority can accomplish when freed from committee.

Oxford graduates of his type usually went to the Treasury, the bar, or a consultancy. Cummings went to Russia. He lived there from 1994 to 1997, in the years when the Soviet state had died and its successor had not yet formed. He joined several ventures, including an attempt to run an airline between Samara and Vienna that failed. Russia in those years taught a lesson no Oxford tutorial could. Laws, ministries, and corporate charts existed on paper. Personal networks, cash, improvisation, and the capacity for violence decided what happened. He has never written a full memoir of the period, but the experience runs beneath everything he wrote afterward. Organization charts describe almost nothing. Find where power lives.

The apprenticeship

He entered British politics through the campaign to keep Britain out of the euro. From 1999 to 2002 he ran research and then campaigns for Business for Sterling, the business wing of the anti-euro movement. In 2002 he became director of strategy for the Conservative leader Iain Duncan Smith (b. 1954) and lasted months, leaving in contempt of what he saw as timidity. The episode set a pattern. Cummings wants campaigns with one objective and one enemy. He has no patience for the slow coalition work, the ceremonial dinners, the decades of small favors that build a career inside a party. He prefers a temporary organization built around a mission, used hard, and dissolved.

In 2004 he got his laboratory. The Blair government proposed an elected regional assembly for the northeast of England, and Cummings ran the campaign against it. His side hired an inflatable white elephant and drove it around the region. The elephant stood outside supermarkets and town halls while the government’s ministers explained constitutional subsidiarity to empty rooms. The assembly lost by roughly four votes to one.

The elephant deserves its place in the biography because it contains the method. Cummings understood that voters would not spend months studying constitutional design and that they were not wrong to refuse. The campaign’s task was to translate an institutional question into the terms voters already used: money, waste, and politicians serving themselves. The simplification did not follow the argument. The simplification was the argument. He also drew a darker conclusion. Westminster had proposed something the region did not want and had failed to notice. The political class, he decided, no longer knew the country it governed.

From 2007 to 2014, with an interruption around the formation of the coalition government, he worked for Michael Gove (b. 1967), first in opposition and then at the Department for Education. The two men expanded academies and free schools, rewrote the curriculum, and fought the network of officials, university education departments, unions, and local authorities that resisted them. They called this network “the Blob.” The term expressed a theory. No conspirator sat at the center. The system defended itself through the aligned incentives of thousands of people, each following procedure, none responsible for the result. Within such a system every participant can show he did his job, and no one can be blamed when the children cannot read.

In 2013 Cummings published Some Thoughts on Education and Political Priorities, a paper of more than two hundred pages that moved through genetics, mathematics, computer science, psychology, testing, and national strategy. At its center stood the ideal of an “Odyssean education,” a phrase he took from the physicist Murray Gell-Mann (1929–2019). Britain, he argued, trains its rulers to speak and maneuver but leaves them innumerate, unable to interrogate a model, weigh a risk, or manage a project. Its specialists know their fields but lack historical and political judgment. He wanted an education that produced synthesizers, people at home with both The Brothers Karamazov and conditional probability.

The paper contains his best insight and his characteristic flaw in one binding. The insight: modern government must decide questions of epidemiology, artificial intelligence, energy, and war, and leaders who cannot follow the elementary structure of these subjects become hostages to specialists whose assumptions they cannot test. The flaw: Cummings moves fast from the limits of existing expertise to confidence that a gifted generalist can master the terrain. His admirers see range. His critics see a historian who acquired enough scientific vocabulary to underestimate scientific disagreement. Both observations are true, and his career keeps proving them in alternation.

Vote Leave

He became campaign director of Vote Leave in 2015, in offices in Westminster Tower on the Albert Embankment, across the river from Parliament. The organization fought Nigel Farage (b. 1964) and his allies for designation as the official Leave campaign, and the fight was strategic rather than personal in origin. Cummings believed a referendum fronted by Farage would become a referendum on Farage, and would lose. He built a campaign of Conservatives, Labour supporters, and business figures instead, and won designation in April 2016. Farage never forgave him. Ten weeks later Vote Leave won the referendum.

The campaign’s signature achievement was three words. “Take Back Control” worked because of its breadth. Control could mean borders, laws, trade, money, or the feeling that decisions about your town were taken by people you could neither name nor remove. Voters with different grievances heard the same phrase and each heard his own complaint. The Remain campaign issued warnings about economic loss. Vote Leave offered agency. In a country where millions felt that things were done to them rather than by them, agency won.

The campaign’s most contested message rode on the side of a red bus: We send the EU £350 million a week. Let’s fund our NHS instead. The figure was the gross contribution. It ignored Britain’s rebate and the money that returned through European spending. Andrew Dilnot (b. 1960), chairman of the UK Statistics Authority, said during the campaign that the use of the gross figure misled the public. Vote Leave kept the bus on the road.

The bus reveals Cummings’s relationship with facts, which is stranger than either his defenders or his prosecutors allow. He is obsessed with data, forecasting, and the detection of error, and he built the most quantitatively disciplined campaign in British history, testing messages as hypotheses through digital advertising and the Canadian firm AggregateIQ, shifting money toward what moved voters. But in campaigns he separates technical accuracy from what he considers political truth. The political truth, as he saw it, was that Britain sent large sums to a system it could not control. The controversy over the number kept the country arguing about money, Europe, and the health service, which was the ground he wanted. His critics called it calculated deception. He counted the outrage as free advertising.

On the night of June 23, 2016, the staff of Vote Leave watched the count from Westminster Tower. The pollsters had Remain ahead. Then Sunderland declared, a Labour city in Cummings’s native northeast, and Leave carried it by twenty-two points, far past projection. In the accounts of that night, the young staff began to understand before the broadcasters did, and at some point in the small hours Cummings climbed onto a desk above the people he had recruited, most of them unknown then and unknown now, and the room that had prepared itself for losing began to shout. By morning the count read 17,410,742 to 16,141,241. Leave took 51.9 percent on a turnout of 72.2 percent. Cummings had beaten the government, the leadership of every major party, the Bank of England, most large employers, and nearly the entire policy establishment of his country.

His insight was that their strength was the weakness. Every intervention by a bank, a former prime minister, or a credentialed expert reached voters who had stopped trusting banks, prime ministers, and experts, and confirmed that the same class was defending itself. Institutional prestige had become a liability, and only he seemed to have priced it.

Victory brought investigation. In 2018 the Electoral Commission found that Vote Leave and the youth group BeLeave had worked to a common plan, that more than £675,000 routed through BeLeave should have counted against Vote Leave’s £7 million limit, and that the campaign had overspent by almost £500,000 and filed an inaccurate return. Vote Leave paid fines of £61,000 and dropped its appeal. Darren Grimes (b. 1993), the BeLeave founder, later overturned the separate penalty against him, and the Metropolitan Police closed its inquiry without charges. The findings attached to the organization, not to Cummings as a matter of personal criminal liability. He rejected them as the revenge of the defeated.

He also refused a summons from the House of Commons committee investigating disinformation, arguing that its members were biased, careless, and interested in theater. In 2019 Parliament found him in contempt. The confrontation posed a constitutional question that his career poses. He believed the scrutineers lacked the competence to scrutinize, and he was not always wrong about that. But his remedy made accountability depend on whether the powerful man respected his examiners, and a rule like that leaves nothing standing between an unelected strategist and the exercise of state power.

Downing Street

The three years after the referendum radicalized him. Theresa May (b. 1956) negotiated withdrawal without, in his view, objectives, preparation, or an understanding of her own position, and Parliament deadlocked. Cummings drew the lesson that a referendum can instruct the state and still not move it. Whitehall held the information, the lawyers, the institutional memory, and the levers of implementation. Ministers arrived with slogans and left within two years. Brexit stopped being one policy dispute and became, for him, a test of whether any electoral decision could penetrate the administrative system. He concluded that none could without reconstruction of the center.

Johnson gave him the center. Appointed chief adviser in July 2019, Cummings arrived at a government with no majority and a single problem. The solution he helped drive was confrontation on every front. Twenty-one Conservative MPs who voted against the government lost the whip in a single evening, among them two former chancellors and the grandson of Winston Churchill. Ministers spoke of surrender and betrayal. The government prorogued Parliament for five weeks, and on September 24, 2019, eleven justices of the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the prorogation was unlawful, the judgment read out by Baroness Hale (b. 1945) wearing the spider brooch that briefly became a national symbol. The government absorbed the defeat and kept the frame it wanted: a people’s government against a blocking Parliament.

The frame produced the December 2019 election, and the election reduced to three words again. “Get Brexit Done” offered an exhausted country resolution. The Conservatives won 365 seats. Labour constituencies that had voted Leave, seats held since the 1930s, fell across the north and midlands. Cummings had assembled a coalition of conventional Tories, working-class Leave voters, and citizens who simply wanted the argument to end, and he had redrawn the electoral map of Britain in the process.

He regarded all of it as preliminary. On January 2, 2020, he published a blog post inviting applications to work in Downing Street from data scientists, mathematicians, project managers, and “weirdos and misfits with odd skills.” The post was mocked as eccentric and read closely by everyone who mattered. It expressed his real program: break the personnel monopoly of the political class, wire the center of government with live data and recorded forecasts, build teams around missions, and judge them by results. He did not want a smaller state. He wanted a state that could act, and he was closer to a theorist of national mobilization than to any free-market conservative. His enemy was announcement without capacity.

The program had a structural weakness he never solved. Reforming the state requires the cooperation of the people inside it, and his language cast those people as blockers, frauds, and self-protective mediocrities. Some were. But a strategy of permanent combat can run an insurgency and cannot run an institution, and the distinction arrived within weeks, carried by a virus.

The plague year

The pandemic tested his theories under the harshest conditions available, and the results cut both ways. The crisis confirmed his diagnosis in almost every particular. Downing Street lacked real-time data. Plans existed in documents and nowhere else. Procurement failed under pressure. Scientific advice moved through overlapping bodies into a decision system that barely existed. In the second week of March 2020, as officials realized the existing strategy would break the National Health Service, the response was redesigned on whiteboards in the prime minister’s study, one of which, photographed at the time and shown publicly later, carried the question of who would not be saved.

The diagnosis stood. The cure did not appear. Cummings held more power at the center than any adviser in memory, and the center remained chaotic. He pushed earlier and harder for stronger measures than most, by the available accounts, and he also belonged to a government that moved too late in the opening weeks, when days compounded into thousands of deaths. Whatever discipline he had preached, his presence did not produce it.

Then came Durham. The story of the drive north broke in May 2020, the rose garden followed, and something changed in the government’s relationship with the public that never changed back. The legal outcome was almost nothing. Durham Constabulary found the drive from London breached no rule and the Barnard Castle trip might have breached one, and took no action. The political outcome was structural. Millions of people had obeyed instructions they experienced as absolute, missing deathbeds and funerals, and the man at the center of government had treated the instructions as open to interpretation. Johnson refused to dismiss him, spending public trust to keep private counsel.

The episode exposed the limit of Cummings’s political intelligence. He understood public emotion as a campaign instrument better than anyone alive. He did not understand its moral weight in government. Authority in a democracy rests on reciprocity, on the belief that the people imposing sacrifice accept it themselves. He viewed his journey through the circumstances of his family. The country viewed it through the principle that rules bind equally. He never appeared to grasp why the second view had to win.

His position eroded through the autumn of 2020 in a war of factions: Cummings and the communications director Lee Cain on one side, Johnson’s fiancée Carrie Symonds (b. 1988) and a shifting alliance of ministers and officials on the other, fighting over appointments and access to the prime minister. Cain resigned on November 11. Two days later, on the evening of November 13, 2020, Cummings walked out of the front door of 10 Downing Street carrying a cardboard box, in full view of the photographers he knew would be waiting. The man who understood symbols chose to leave through the front.

After the fall

What followed had no precedent in British politics. The adviser turned on the prime minister he had made. Through 2021 Cummings released private messages, published detailed accounts of decision-making, and gave evidence for seven hours to a joint committee of MPs in May 2021, where he apologized for his own failures and testified that tens of thousands had died who did not need to die. He said it was crackers that a man like him had held such power, and crackers that Johnson held his. He later acknowledged that he helped orchestrate Johnson’s downfall, which came in stages through 2022.

The campaign resists a single reading. Much of what he disclosed the public had a right to know. He had also tolerated Johnson’s defects while they served him and declared them disqualifying afterward. His defense runs that he entered government for objectives, believed Johnson could be managed, and turned only when the project died. The defense is plausible and incomplete. Cummings repeatedly chooses leaders he considers unfit because they hold electoral gifts he lacks, then rages when their characters survive the victory.

The official reckoning arrived on November 20, 2025, when the UK Covid-19 Inquiry under Baroness Heather Hallett (b. 1949) published its report on political decision-making. It found the culture at the center of government “toxic and chaotic,” found that the delay in locking down cost on the order of 23,000 lives in the first wave, criticized Johnson’s indecision, and found that he had failed to restrain his chief adviser. The evidence before the inquiry included Cummings’s own messages, crude and at times misogynistic. He apologized for some of his language and explained it as the product of an environment where incompetence was killing people. The explanation captures his self-understanding exactly. He treats aggression as a rational response to institutional failure. The inquiry’s material suggests the aggression helped build the failure it responded to, a Downing Street where fear moved faster than information.

He spent the years after 2020 writing. His Substack became his platform and his archive: state capacity, war, artificial intelligence, forecasting, and a concept he pushed to the front of his vocabulary, regime change. He means by “regime” the deep arrangement of institutions, personnel, incentives, and informal power beneath any elected government, and he argues that changing policy without changing the regime changes nothing. Through 2023 and 2024 he explored building a new political organization, a Start-Up Party, structured like a mission-driven company: a compact professional center, technical recruits, implementation plans written before power rather than after. The idea extended the Vote Leave method into party politics, and it ran into what parties are. A referendum campaign answers one question. A party must answer hundreds, select candidates, survive its own factions, and outlive its founder. The compromise and process he reads as decay are often the load-bearing structure. By 2025 the party had receded, and he turned toward the insurgent force the electoral system had produced without him.

The Farage turn

The reconciliation with Farage inverted a decade of hostility. Cummings had built Vote Leave to keep Farage off the stage. Farage had returned the contempt. As late as 2024 Cummings dismissed Reform UK as unserious. Then, shortly before Christmas 2024, the two men met privately to discuss Whitehall, the Conservative wreckage, and what a Reform government would face on its first morning. In May 2025 Cummings told Sky News that Farage could “definitely” become prime minister, and said he had advised him on converting Reform from one man and an iPhone into an operation able to staff a government and control Whitehall. He read Reform’s polling not as affection for Farage. He read it as a vehicle for a feeling: contempt for Westminster, both old parties, and the media that covered them.

The alliance is pragmatic on both sides and carries the structural flaw of every alliance Cummings makes. He requires a popular leader to win the power he cannot win himself, then requires that leader to submit to a discipline designed by someone else. Johnson accepted those terms for sixteen months. The arrangement ended in mutual destruction. Farage has watched all of it.

Cummings’s account of what Reform faces has hardened into something new. In an interview with Gove and Madeline Grant released on The Spectator’s podcast at the turn of 2026, he predicted that the state would fight, and would not fight fair: “They’ll leak medical records, they’ll leak tax records,” he said of the forces arrayed against a Farage government, and predicted phone intercepts and the use of intelligence services.

His earlier writing described institutional resistance through incentives, culture, and delay. He increasingly describes it as active regime defense, drawing on Peter Turchin (b. 1957) on elite overproduction and on the war scholar David Betz on the possibility of civil conflict in the West, and calling Britain pre-revolutionary, by which he means that large numbers of voters no longer believe the established parties can turn the state.

The perspective sees things others miss and carries a defect it cannot see. It seals itself. Resistance confirms the theory. Scrutiny confirms it. Legal process confirms it. Hostile coverage confirms it. A framework that reads every obstacle as regime action loses the ability to distinguish unlawful subversion from the ordinary contestation of democratic politics, and a man who loses that distinction has lost the thing he claims to defend.

Machines and models

His newest work returns to his oldest obsessions by other means. Artificial intelligence, in his writing, extends the program of the 2013 essay: prediction, synthesis, adversarial testing, the disciplining of judgment. In April 2026 he described experiments running frontier models through the diplomacy of Bismarck and then setting them loose on Ukraine, Iran, China, and Taiwan, looking above all for red teams, arguments an official corps would suppress. A model has no career to protect. It can be ordered to attack the plan, and ordered again. He also sees in models the Odyssean synthesizer he once hoped schools would produce, one mind, machine-assisted, moving across fields that previously required institutions. His enthusiasm stays qualified. He writes about the jaggedness of the systems, brilliance beside elementary error, and insists their value depends on the judgment of whoever directs them. He does not want machines to replace human intuition. He wants intuition put under adversarial pressure until it earns its confidence.

The same years recalibrated his view of America. He had dismissed the first Trump administration as undisciplined. In early 2025 he described the second as the first serious attempt since Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) to make an elected government control its own machinery, and he watched the Department of Government Efficiency under Elon Musk (b. 1971) with the interest of a man seeing his own theory run at scale: outsiders with technical skill inserted into agencies, seizing data, breaking procedure. DOGE generated lawsuits, disputed savings, and Musk’s own departure well short of his targets, and Cummings’s interest barely dimmed, which is itself the finding. He prefers experiments that fail dramatically to systems that avoid both catastrophe and achievement, and in government that preference bills its costs to people who never volunteered for the experiment.

In May 2026 he published a long essay on Lee Kuan Yew, writing that the Singaporean had helped inspire both Vote Leave and his ideas about changing the British regime. The essay completes an arc. Brexit, in this telling, recovered formal freedom of action; the unbuilt second stage was a government able to use it. Singapore supplies his counter-image to every British pathology: a strong center, rigorous recruitment, long horizons, measured performance. It also exposes the question he has never answered. Singapore’s system grew in conditions Britain does not have, and it depended on finding one leader of rare ability and character. Constitutional democracy is designed for the opposite problem, limiting the damage of the mediocre and the dangerous, on the theory that they are what elections mostly supply. Cummings engineers for the exceptional leader. Liberal constitutionalism engineers for the ordinary one. A durable state needs both engineerings, and he has only ever built the first.

The man

He married Mary Wakefield (b. 1975), a journalist and longtime editor at The Spectator, in 2011. Their son was born in 2016. The marriage places him inside the social world of the Conservative establishment he attacks, and the placement is the point. He is no outsider in the sociological sense. Oxford, the special adviser corridor, Downing Street, the dinner tables of political London: his insurgency comes from inside the citadel, from a man who learned the locks by living behind them.

His clothes did political work. In Downing Street he wore T-shirts, gilets, trainers, and a beanie through corridors built for suits, and civil servants read the costume correctly: I am not one of you, and I do not have to be. The look borrowed from technology founders and said building and fighting rather than Westminster respectability. It was partly authentic and partly staged, and with Cummings the two categories rarely separate. Benedict Cumberbatch (b. 1976) played him in a television drama about the referendum in 2019, which fixed the image of the shaven-headed strategist in the public mind before the manhimself became a household face in a rose garden.

His intelligence goes unquestioned even by enemies. He reads across fields, remembers detail, thinks in incentives, feedback loops, and second-order effects, and questions assumptions everyone around him shares. These gifts made him lethal wherever the objective was singular: stop the euro, kill the assembly, win the referendum, break the deadlock, win the election. Such projects reward secrecy, speed, message discipline, and indifference to approval. Government rewards almost none of that. In government, objectives conflict, success is contested, authority is distributed, and the people who resist cannot all be fired. Durable reform runs on trust, patience, and compromise, the qualities he respects least. He sorts humanity into builders and talkers, operators and frauds, and the sorting captures something real while converting every disagreement into evidence of stupidity or bad faith.

The contradictions stack. He condemns institutions for suppressing criticism and builds rooms where colleagues fear his own. He preaches recorded prediction and accountability and explains his failures through the betrayal of others. He demands leaders of exceptional character and attaches himself, again and again, to men he considers defective, because they can win crowds he cannot. The contradictions make his career the controlled experiment his method demands: a test of whether accurate diagnosis is sufficient for cure. The result so far is no.

Assessment

Cummings ranks among the principal architects of Britain’s movement from managerial consensus to institutional revolt. He proved that a disciplined campaign could beat every party leadership, most newspapers, organized business, and the credentialed expertise of an entire country by joining constitutional questions to the lived experience of powerlessness. “Take Back Control” outgrew Brexit because it named a crisis of legitimacy: institutions that exercise authority without accepting responsibility. The phrase pointed at Brussels and kept pointing, at Whitehall, at Parliament, at courts, at the parties themselves.

His great political insight was that elite endorsement had inverted its sign, that among large parts of the electorate, prestige now repelled. His great governing insight was that electoral authority does not convert into administrative capacity, that ministers without data, plans, and control over personnel cannot execute the mandate voters gave them. Both insights have entered the common understanding of British politics, mostly without attribution, which may be the strongest evidence of their force.

His great failure sits between them. He is a demolition expert who dreams in architecture. He destroyed Britain’s European policy, redrew its electoral geography, and delivered the majority that was supposed to fund reconstruction, and the reconstruction never came. Productivity stayed weak. Services strained. Whitehall fragmented and endured. Ministers went on announcing what departments could not do. His explanation assigns the failure to Johnson’s character, to Whitehall sabotage, to the abandonment of radicalism after his exit, and each charge holds some truth. The explanation he does not offer is that a coalition sufficient to rebuild a state cannot be held together by a man who treats its members as fools.

He remains what he has always been, a diagnostician of institutional decay whose temperament reproduces the disorder he means to cure. He can tell you, better than almost anyone, how systems lose contact with reality: the suppressed bad news, the untested plans, the promotion of the smooth over the capable. He has never yet built a system where people disagree, cooperate, stay accountable, and learn from failure without becoming paralyzed or afraid. Loyalty, procedure, compromise, and institutional memory can all rot into what he despises. They are also how strangers govern each other without a Lee Kuan Yew to hand. He sees these practices only after they decay, and shows little interest in why they arose or what their removal costs.

The question that hangs over the remainder of his career hangs over more than him. Britain will keep producing insurgent movements as long as its institutions keep failing, and every one of them will face the problem Cummings has spent thirty years failing to solve: voters can be persuaded to overthrow the experts, and then a new set of experts must govern, and someone must say who selects them, who judges them, and who removes them when they fail. Elections are too blunt for the job. Procedure protects mediocrity. Committees perform. The press is hostile. Strip away every judge he distrusts and what remains is an executive group that recognizes no legitimate judge outside itself. Cummings has been circling that endpoint since Westminster Tower. He has never quite said whether it is his warning or his destination.

Notes

The Farage material: Cummings told Sky News in May 2025 that Farage could “definitely” become prime minister and that he had advised him on going from “one man and an iPhone” to Downing Street, Sky News Daily, May 28, 2025; also GB News coverage. The Spectator podcast: Cummings told Gove and Madeline Grant that opponents would leak medical records and tax records, bug Farage’s phone, and do whatever needed, Spectator, “Dominic Cummings on Whitehall’s plan to destroy Nigel Farage,” January 2026; edited remarks republished July 2026. See also the YouTube interview, Facebook excerpt, and GB News report.

The Covid Inquiry: the report found a “toxic and chaotic” culture at the center of government, tied the delayed lockdown to roughly 23,000 additional deaths, criticized Johnson‘s indecision, and castigated Cummings, Al Jazeera, November 20, 2025; the report PDF is linked from covid19.public-inquiry.uk.

The Lee Kuan Yew essay: Cummings wrote that Lee was an inspiration for Vote Leave and for his ideas about changing the British regime as a condition for changing policy, dominiccummings.substack.com, “People, ideas, machines XVI: Ideas from Lee Kuan Yew,” May 2026.

Hero System

Begin with an afternoon. A conference room in the Department for Education, 2011, seventeen people around a table, agenda item four of nine. A paper is presented. The paper is noted. A concern is raised and recorded. The item is remitted to a working group that will report in the spring. Coffee arrives in metal flasks. Nobody lies, nobody steals, nobody decides anything, and at five o’clock the participants go home having produced a minute. Multiply the afternoon by ten thousand rooms and thirty years. That is the first terror at the base of Dominic Cummings’s hero system. He does not fear catastrophe. Catastrophe at least announces itself. He fears the death that arrives as an absence of consequence, the nation expiring by minutes noted and items remitted, a decline so procedurally correct that no one can be blamed for it and no one can stop it.

The second terror is closer to the bone. Robert Cummings worked on North Sea oil installations, structures engineered to stand in black water while forty-foot waves broke against them. You can test such a structure. It stands or it fails, and the sea does not accept a revised submission. His son took a first in history at Oxford and entered a life whose entire output is words: memos, slogans, strategy papers, blog posts, testimony. The second terror is that a clever man might talk for fifty years and leave nothing that stands in water. Every time Cummings divides the world into builders and talkers, listen for the fear underneath the contempt. The taxonomy is a prayer. Let me be the first kind.

Ernest Becker (1924–1974) argued that every culture is a hero system, an arrangement of sacred values that lets a mortal creature feel he is an object of primary importance in a universe of meaning, and that the feeling is how he bears the knowledge of his death. The hero system converts terror into a project. It tells a man what counts as building, what counts as waste, whom to fight, and what he gets to leave behind. Cummings’s project is unusual in that its monument is not a book, a fortune, or an office. His immortality vessel is a machine: the high-capacity state, the mission team with live data and a deadline, the government that controls the government and runs after its architect is gone. Brexit, the achievement history will attach to his name, was never the monument. In his own accounting it was site clearance.

Every hero system rests on a subtraction story, the operation that strips the world down to what is real. Cummings’s subtraction is famous because he performs it in public. Subtract the committee, the consultation, the working group. Subtract ceremony, the suit, the seating plan, the honors list. Subtract the career civil service, the parties, the lobby press, the ten thousand afternoons. What survives the subtraction is real: a small team, a defined mission, recorded forecasts, feedback, results. Notice the pattern in what goes and what stays. Everything subtracted is a talker’s world. Everything kept is a builder’s. The subtraction also removes, without his noticing, most of the arts by which strangers come to trust each other, and the removal will return at the end of this essay with an invoice.

Now consider the man Cummings fought for twenty years. Call him the permanent secretary. He is a composite, but every reader of British politics has met him. Sixty-one years old, a CB after his name and a K expected on retirement, thirty-five years of service through seven prime ministers of both parties. His office holds a framed engraving of the department’s first building and a photograph of his grandchildren. He wears the lanyard even at his desk. He has personally drafted the resignation statements of three ministers and the welcome notes for their successors, sometimes in the same week. He also serves a hero system, and it also denies death. His immortality vessel is the institution: the state as the thing that was old before he arrived and will conduct his memorial service, the machine that seventy governments have handed forward. His sacred values are continuity, impartiality, the record, the smooth transfer of power. His terrors are the mirror of Cummings’s terrors. He does not fear the afternoon that decides nothing. He fears the morning that decides everything: the strongman, the caprice, the minister who drives the machine into a wall because the machine was slow. Where Cummings sees a Blob, the permanent secretary sees a load-bearing wall. Both men will die, both have found a vessel larger than themselves, and each experiences the other as the agent of meaninglessness. That symmetry, not any dispute about school reform, is why their war admits no settlement.

Take the values one at a time.

Control is the first sacred value, the word Cummings gave the country. In his system control means grip: the elected government controls the government, one hand on the wheel, decisions traced to deciders, forecasts recorded so that error has an address. Take Back Control was the rare slogan that stated its author’s metaphysics. Now hand the word around. For the permanent secretary, control means that no single hand can reach the wheel, because the design assumes the hand will sometimes belong to a fool; control is the impossibility of one man crashing the state, and Cummings’s version of it is the failure mode the design exists to prevent. For a recovering gambler in a church basement, control is the lie that nearly killed him, and his salvation began the night he stood up and renounced it; the first step of his hero system is the confession that Cummings’s hero system can never make. For an air traffic controller, control is distributed, procedural, and boring on purpose; her heroism is a shift on which nothing happens, and she would recognize the permanent secretary’s religion faster than Cummings’s. For a Calvinist farmer, control belongs to God alone, the harvest is providence, and a man who claims grip on outcomes has committed the oldest sin under a newer name. Each speaker uses the same word. Each means his own immortality project. When Cummings promised control to seventeen million voters, they poured their separate meanings into his container, which is what a great slogan is for, and no referendum could ever deliver all of the meanings, which is what a great slogan costs.

Building is the second sacred value. In Cummings’s system building means the Manhattan Project and Apollo: assembled talent, concentrated authority, a monument that works and can be pointed to. The verb requires a completion date inside a human career, because the builder needs to see the thing stand while he is alive to see it; the deadline is not a preference, it is the terror management. Set beside him a medieval cathedral mason, a builder by any standard, whose hero system required no attribution and no completion. He dressed stones for walls he would never see roofed, confident the vault would close a century after his death, his name nowhere in the fabric. His immortality ran through a communion of the anonymous, and he possessed what Cummings has never had, patience as a sacred value rather than a defect. Set beside both a mother raising a son: twenty years of inputs no dashboard can log, no forecast can score, and no minister can announce, the entire project invisible to Cummings’s instruments and older than every state. Then set down the figure nearest to kin, a Silicon Valley founder, who shares the compressed clock, the small team, the contempt for process, and who differs in one discipline: a market prices his monument every morning, and when he is wrong the capital leaves. Cummings admires that discipline, writes about it, demands it for government. The permanent secretary would reply that his own building is called maintenance, that keeping a machine running for two hundred years is construction performed continuously and celebrated never, and that nobody erects statues to the man who prevented the collapse. On this value the two systems come closest to hearing each other, and still do not.

Truth is the third sacred value. Truth for him means contact with reality: the recorded prediction, the tested hypothesis, the graph read a week before the committee reads it. He built more machinery for catching his own errors than any figure in modern British politics, red teams, forecasting tournaments, models made to argue against the plan. And he put a gross figure on the side of a bus after the head of the statistics authority said it misled, because in campaigns his system splits truth into the technical and the political, and holds that the political truth, Britain pays and does not govern, licenses the technical falsehood. Hand the word around again. A Quaker cannot make the split; her testimony of truth means the false number cannot be spoken even to win, especially to win, because a victory purchased with it belongs to someone she refuses to become; she would have burned the bus. A Talmudic scholar keeps truth as preserved argument, the defeated opinion recorded beside the victorious one for two thousand years in case heaven reverses the ruling; he ran red teams before the term existed, and his file of minority reports would delight Cummings until the scholar explained that the argument is for the sake of heaven and no verdict is ever final, at which point the deadline-driven builder would leave the room. A trial lawyer holds that truth is what adversarial process yields inside rules of evidence, which describes Cummings’s epistemology with one amendment he has never accepted: the courtroom has a judge the advocates did not appoint. The permanent secretary, for his part, locates truth in the record, the minute, the file that shows who advised what, candor in private and silence in public, and he regards the bus with a distaste indistinguishable from the Quaker’s, though he files it rather than burns it.

Speed is the fourth sacred value, the one the pandemic made lethal. In Cummings’s system time is the enemy’s weapon: exponential curves punish the deliberate, days compound into deaths, and the ten thousand afternoons are not neutral, they are the mechanism of the first terror operating at national scale. The man who reads the graph early and moves is the hero; March 2020, the whiteboards in the study, the plan redrawn in a weekend, is the system’s proof text, and the inquiry’s finding that delay cost tens of thousands of lives is, within his frame, complete vindication. The permanent secretary answers that haste is how states crash, that the machine is slow because slow protects, that every safeguard Cummings calls friction was installed after a catastrophe he is too young to remember. A Benedictine monk has taken a vow of stability in one house until death; the psalms take as long as the psalms take, and his order has outlasted every government that ever hurried, which he would offer not as argument but as fact. A bomb disposal technician disciplines urgency into stillness, slow is smooth and smooth is fast, and he would tell Cummings that the men who rushed are the reason the procedure exists. A winemaker cannot advance the vintage by a single week; time in her system is an ingredient, and a government of her design might do less and finish more. Against all of them Cummings holds one card, and it is real: sometimes the curve is exponential, and every system built on patience mistakes the one morning when patience kills.

How much of this does he see? Cummings has read the literature on self-deception and cites it. He designed protocols against his own cognition, recorded forecasts so his errors would have timestamps, models instructed to attack his plans. He is that rare figure, a man who institutionalized distrust of himself. But the machinery of humility stops at the perimeter of the hero system. The forecasts test his predictions, never his rankings. No red team was ever tasked against the axioms: that grip is good, that builders outrank talkers, that what the dashboard cannot measure does not exist. And when the country turned on him in May 2020, the perimeter became visible to everyone except the man inside it. Within his system the drive to Durham was risk management under uncertainty, a rational parent securing childcare, and the rage that followed was sentiment, hysteria, media theater. He never understood that the public was not being emotional. It was being religious. Equal sacrifice under common rules is a sacred value in the hero system of people who will never run anything, whose one dignity in a crisis is that the rules bind the powerful as they bind them, and the rose garden was a man explaining to a congregation, from the altar, why the commandment had not applied to him. He said he did not regret what he did, and inside his frame the sentence was true, and the frame was the offense.

The hero, then, is the builder who forces the state into contact with reality, the man standing on a desk at four in the morning in Westminster Tower while the counts come in from towns the establishment forgot, the synthesizer with the recorded forecast, vindicated on a timestamp. The rival he fights without naming is not the Blob and not the permanent secretary, who is merely the rival he names daily. The unnamed rival is the talker in the mirror, the Oxford historian whose life’s output is words about building, and every attack on performers, frauds, and clever mediocrities travels over their shoulders toward him. Boris Johnson drew Cummings twice and enraged him beyond any professional cause, and the simplest reading is the hardest one: Johnson is words with nothing behind them, and Cummings could not stop working for him or forgive him, because the distance between the two men had to be proved enormous and kept refusing to be. And the cost the ledger cannot price is trust, the input with no cell on the dashboard. A state can be rebuilt only by people who trust one another and the man directing them; the fear in the building, the colleagues who stopped bringing bad news, the country that quietly withdrew its belief that rules bind equally, none of it registered on instruments built to catch every error except the ones the instruments assume. He subtracted the unmeasurable to get at the real, and the unmeasurable was the material. The machine he means to leave standing in black water is made of it.

The Great Delusion

If John Mearsheimer is right in his anthropology, Dominic Cummings operates in a space that is fundamentally hostile to his own stated goals. Cummings consistently argues for a meritocratic, technocratic restructuring of the British state—an approach that emphasizes rational optimization, expert systems, and the application of cognitive science to governance. He assumes that political failure is a product of cognitive deficits and poor organizational design, and that better logic and better tools might fix the state.

Mearsheimer’s framework suggests this is a category error. If humans are not rational actors but tribal beings driven by deep, non-rational sentiment and intense socialization, then the state is not a machine to be tuned by experts. It is a biological organism that resists top-down rationalization.

For Cummings, this presents a problem of scale. If his projects such as the Vote Leave campaign or his tenure in Number 10, sought to change the state via rational planning, Mearsheimer would argue he was fighting the current of human nature. Tribal attachments and deep-set social norms are not subject to the kind of data-driven correction Cummings favors. To the extent that Cummings treats voters as individuals whose minds can be changed by better information or superior models, he ignores the fact that those individuals are already socialized into identities that prioritize group survival and sentiment over the analytical outcomes he proposes.

If Mearsheimer is right, Cummings’s own career acts as a case study in the limits of his philosophy. When Cummings focused on Brexit, he successfully harnessed the tribal, non-rational energy of the electorate. He appealed to deep-seated group identity and resentment rather than the rational cost-benefit analysis of trade deals. In that instance, he succeeded because he played the game of tribal politics.

However, when he moved into the heart of government and tried to impose a technocratic, rationalist order on the civil service, he encountered the institutional tribe. That tribe had its own long-standing socialization, survival instincts, and value infusions. He failed there because he tried to use rational tools against a social group that was protecting its own identity.

Mearsheimer’s anthropology suggests that Cummings is a man who uses rationalism as a tool to navigate a world that is inherently irrational. If this is true, Cummings might always find himself in the position of a surgeon trying to reorganize a patient that wants to keep its old habits. He can win tactical victories by temporarily weaponizing tribal sentiments, but he cannot fundamentally restructure the state into the efficient, logic-driven machine he wants. The state is not a computer to be programmed; it is a society of tribal beings who will always prioritize their own internal group survival over the cold logic of the technocrat.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

Applying David Pinsof’s framework to Dominic Cummings exposes the gap between the stated mission of a technocrat and the strategic behavior of a primate climber.

Intellectuals and journalists often frame Cummings as a man obsessed with “correcting misunderstandings.” They interpret his career—from the Vote Leave campaign to his failed attempts at Whitehall reform—as an effort to replace the “bias” and “groupthink” of the British political establishment with “rationality,” “data-driven” decision-making, and “first principles” thinking. They see him as an Enlightenment figure, a lone wolf trying to nudge a broken, irrational system toward a better version of itself.

Pinsof’s essay suggests this is the wrong way to look at him.

Cummings is not a naive reformer hoping to cure political polarization through better communication. He is a master of the zero-sum competition for the coercive apparatus of the state. When he focuses on “fixing” the civil service or attacking “the blob,” he is not performing an objective analysis of administrative inefficiency. He is engaging in a power struggle, identifying his closest rivals in the social and political hierarchy and using every available weapon to derogate them.

The “misinformation” that critics attribute to Cummings is, in this light, a tool of the trade. Whether he is leveraging big data to win a referendum or leaking against former colleagues, he is deploying strategic heuristics. Overconfidence helps him gain resources and status; it convinces others that he holds the keys to the future. His famous disdain for established elites is not a sign of cognitive bias—it is a status-enhancing opinion. By positioning himself as the only one who sees through the “bullshit” of the traditional class, he signals resolve and attracts a loyal coalition of allies.

Cummings’s own rhetoric about “rationality” and “science” serves as a form of status signaling. It differentiates him from the “low-status” political class he despises. It is an honest signal of commitment to his tribe: he is the one who does not blink. Even when his policies fail or he is ousted from power, his behavior remains rational in a Darwinian sense. He maintains his brand as the dangerous, brilliant outsider, ensuring he remains a high-value commodity in the marketplace of ideas and political consulting.

Those who complain that Cummings “misunderstands” how government works, or that his erratic behavior prevents him from achieving long-term goals, are repeating the mistake Pinsof describes. They assume Cummings wants to “fix” the world. They confuse his stated motives—the “mission statements” about radical reform—with his actual motives: dominating rivals, climbing hierarchies, and maintaining influence.

If one assumes Cummings is a savvy animal, his career stops looking like a series of failed attempts to cure a misunderstanding and starts looking like a highly effective, if scorched-earth, campaign for status. He is not trying to heal the hole the political class is stuck in; he is competing to be the one who defines the dirt. The only misunderstanding is the belief that he is playing a game of truth, rather than a game of power.

Dominic Cummings: Ten Convenient Beliefs

Stephen Turner (b. 1951) spent a career on the problem that liberal democracy pretends it has solved: expert knowledge confers political authority on people the public cannot check. From that problem falls a tool. A convenient belief is one held less because the evidence compels it than because holding it pays. It protects income, position, coalition membership, or self-image, and it tends to arrive structured so that no test can embarrass it. The audit is simple to state and rude to perform. Ask what the holder would lose if the belief were false, and ask what arrangements keep the belief from ever facing the question.

Cummings presents the auditor with a case unlike any other in this series, because he is both patient and practitioner. He has spent thirty years performing Turner-grade audits on the British state, and many of his findings hold. He has also assembled a portfolio of convenient beliefs as load-bearing as any he ever exposed, and the two facts are connected. A man who makes his living detecting the self-serving beliefs of institutions acquires, in the detection business itself, interests that his own beliefs must serve. Begin with the portfolio. Return to the practice. Then measure the distance between them, which is smaller than either his admirers or his enemies suppose.

The first convenient belief is that his failures in government came from betrayal. In his telling, the program of state reconstruction died because Johnson abandoned radicalism, because a fiancée and a court faction seized the prime minister, because Whitehall reverted the moment pressure lifted. Each claim carries some truth, and the composite claim performs a service no evidence could: it protects the theory by relocating every failure into execution. Cummings sells a diagnosis of institutional failure and a program to cure it. If the program failed in the one full trial it ever received because of the program’s designer, the product is damaged at the source. If it failed because of betrayal, the product survives intact and the designer becomes a martyr to it. Ask what he would lose were the alternative true, that his conduct made the reform coalition impossible to hold. He would lose the thing he sells.

The second is that the state will cheat Farage. He has predicted that the machine will leak medical records and tax returns, intercept phones, and break the law to keep Reform from power. The prediction might prove correct, and nothing in Turner’s method says convenient beliefs must be false. The audit examines structure, and the structure here is airtight. If Farage loses, sabotage explains it. If Farage wins, the sabotage failed despite its best efforts. If no leaks appear, deterrence worked, perhaps because Cummings sounded the alarm. No outcome the world can produce counts against the belief, and every outcome enlarges the man who issued it. The belief also performs a second service in advance: it pre-launders any Reform collapse, including a collapse assisted by Cummings’s own counsel, and it makes him indispensable now, the seer whose warnings a serious insurgency cannot afford to ignore.

The third is that a gifted generalist can master epidemiology, artificial intelligence, and war. The Odyssean ideal is the founding belief of his intellectual life, and it is also the license under which a historian with no technical credential holds forth on virology, machine learning, nuclear strategy, and state finance to a paying audience. His market position is synthesis. A world in which deep fields yield only to deep training is a world in which his product has no shelf. The belief contains real insight, and Turner would note that the insight does not reduce the convenience. It increases it, because a belief that is partly right resists audit far better than a belief that is simply wrong.

The fourth is that the bus told a political truth. The gross figure misled, the statistics authority said so during the campaign, and Cummings’s defense splits truth into the technical and the political, holding that Britain’s real grievance licensed the false number. The split is convenient at the level of craft. Campaigns are what he does. If the most famous artifact of his most famous campaign corroded the information environment of a democracy, then his craft is part of the disease he diagnoses, and the diagnostician becomes a vector. The doctrine of political truth quarantines that thought.

The fifth is that his aggression was a rational response to lethal incompetence. The inquiry found the culture at the center of government toxic, found the toxicity harmed decisions, and found that no one restrained him. His answer has been consistent: strong language arises where weak performance kills. The belief converts conduct into virtue and spares him a harder accounting, that fear travels faster than information, that the officials he humiliated stopped carrying him bad news, and that a man obsessed with the suppression of dissent built rooms that suppressed it. What would he lose if the harder accounting stood? The claim that he, uniquely, ran a reality-based operation.

The sixth is that Barnard Castle was risk management and the reaction was hysteria. Inside the belief, a rational parent secured childcare under uncertainty and a decadent media manufactured a frenzy. The belief protects two assets at once: his self-image as the man who acts on evidence while others emote, and his professional claim to understand the public mind better than the political class does. The second asset is the expensive one. The country’s reaction was not confusion. It was a coherent moral judgment about equal sacrifice, delivered by the same public whose instincts he had read perfectly in 2016, and admitting that he misread it would mean admitting that his access to the public runs through instruments, focus groups and message tests, rather than through understanding, and that when the instruments are pointed at him they go dark.

The seventh is that the system never admits failure. As an audit of Whitehall the claim has force, and it doubles as camouflage. His own corpus, millions of words across two decades of blogs and posts, contains detailed confessions of tactical error and no concession that any structural element of his theory failed a test. The referendum proved the method. Downing Street proved the betrayal. The pandemic proved the diagnosis. A body of work in which every event confirms the framework is the signature Turner teaches the auditor to look for, and Cummings taught half his readers to look for it.

The eighth is that Britain is pre-revolutionary. Perhaps it is. Note what the belief does for its holder. A stable Britain, muddling through with weak growth and adequate legitimacy, has no urgent need for a regime-change theorist and no premium on his newsletter. A pre-revolutionary Britain places him at the center of the story, converts his exile into a vantage point, and prices his experience of 2016 and 2019 as the scarcest commodity in politics, knowledge of how insurgencies win. His relevance and the crisis rise together. The audit does not say he manufactures the belief for income. It says the belief and the income point the same way, and that a man should be slowest to trust the conclusions that pay him.

The ninth is that the cure was never tried. Recorded forecasts, red teams, mission teams, live data: the program, in his account, remains untested because Whitehall and Johnson strangled it in the cradle. The structure should be familiar from other faiths. A doctrine that failed in its one implementation survives by ruling the implementation impure, and the doctrine becomes untestable in principle, since any future failure can be ruled impure the same way. Sixteen months at the center of the most powerful government in a generation, with a landslide majority and a compliant prime minister, was as favorable a trial as any adviser will ever receive. The belief that it was no trial at all is the one that keeps the program for sale.

The tenth is that exile improved his view. From outside, he writes, you see the system; inside, you go native. The belief comforts every prophet who has lost his place, and it inverts the more probable epistemics. Outside the room, he no longer faces the corrections the room imposes, the officials with contrary data, the colleagues who push back, the consequences that arrive on a schedule. His audience on Substack selects for agreement and pays for confirmation. Turner’s terrain includes exactly this problem, the expert whose claims no longer meet resistance, and Cummings’s later work, grander in scope and darker in forecast than anything he wrote while employed, reads like a demonstration of it.

So much for the patient. Now the practitioner, because the file on the other side is real and the series would cheat the reader to pretend otherwise.

Cummings audited Whitehall’s convenient beliefs for twenty years and kept finding true positives. The belief that procedural compliance protects the public, when its reliable function is to protect officials, every box ticked, every disaster orphaned. The belief that the civil service has no interests, which conveniently installs an interested party as the referee of its own conduct. The belief that promotion tracks merit, held most firmly by the promoted. The belief that no one could have known, which launders every failure and which survives because predictions go unrecorded, so that error never acquires an address. The belief that accountability exists because committees exist, though the committees lack the knowledge to audit what appears before them. And the establishment’s tenderest convenience after 2016, the belief that seventeen million voters were simply deceived, which spared the governing class the more expensive hypothesis that the voters had understood their situation and rendered a verdict on it. Each of these audits is Turner-grade work: it identifies the belief, names the payoff, and locates the arrangement that shields the belief from testing. During the pandemic his method scored again. The consensus positions of the advisory machinery in early March 2020 were convenient, they fit the plans already written and the capacities already funded, and the man screaming at the whiteboards was, on the central question of timing, closer to right than the process was.

Turner’s problem is that expertise creates authority that democratic citizens cannot check, so every complex society must build proxies for checking, credentials, peer review, commissions, adversarial process, and every proxy can be captured by the convenience of the checkers. Cummings’s entire career is a sequence of attempted answers to Turner’s problem. The referendum was an audit by plebiscite, the population invited to vote no confidence in the checking class. Recorded forecasting is audit technology, error assigned an address and a date. Red teams are institutionalized inconvenience, paid to attack the plan. The weirdos-and-misfits recruitment was an attempt to break the social monopoly that lets one class certify itself. Judged as engineering against convenient belief, it is the most serious program any British political figure has produced.

And the program has a hole in its center, which the first ten paragraphs of this essay walked around. Every audit is conducted from a position, and every position has its conveniences. Cummings built machinery to test everyone’s beliefs except the auditor’s. His forecasts carry timestamps; his axioms carry none. No red team was ever commissioned against the propositions that pay him, that the failure was betrayal, that the trial was no trial, that the state will cheat, that the crisis is coming and only the men of 2016 know the terrain. The beliefs most in need of his method are precisely the ones the method was never pointed at, and the pattern is not an oversight of temperament. It is structural, which is Turner’s coldest lesson. The auditor’s blind spot is not a flaw in the auditor. It is the position itself. Whoever checks the checkers becomes a checker, with interests, and the regress has no floor.

Cummings half-knows this, which distinguishes him from the officials he hunted. He writes about motivated reasoning, cites the psychology, and designed his career around distrust of cognition, including his own. The half-knowledge makes the case instructive rather than merely ironic. If a man this alert to convenience, armed with the best debiasing machinery in British public life, still ends up holding a portfolio in which every major belief happens to protect his income, his indispensability, and his account of his own defeat, then the lesson is not about Cummings. The lesson is that the machinery cannot be self-applied, that there is no technique by which the diagnostician escapes the disease, and that the only audit with teeth is the one performed by someone with an interest in the finding coming out against you. Whitehall, whatever its corruptions, is subject to such audits daily, from ministers, courts, committees, and men like Cummings. Cummings, on his Substack, with his subscribers and his unfalsifiable forecasts, is subject to none. By the standard of his own method, that fact should trouble him more than anything the permanent secretaries ever filed. The most convenient belief available to him now is that it should not.

Dominic Cummings: The Heretic’s Capital

Two men pass through the black door of 10 Downing Street on a winter morning in 2020. The first wears the uniform of the field: navy suit, white shirt, the lanyard of the senior civil service, shoes polished to the standard the building has enforced since Gladstone. The second wears a beanie, a gilet over an untucked shirt, and trainers, and carries a tote bag from a bookshop. The photographers on the pavement shoot the second man. They are right to. In the grammar of the political field, the first man’s clothes say I am the institution and the second man’s clothes say I do not need your uniform, and only one of those sentences requires power to utter. A junior official who dressed that way would be gone by Friday. The chief adviser who dresses that way is performing what Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) called a strategy of condescension: the deliberate breach of the field’s code by a man whose position is so secure that the breach itself displays the security. The beanie is not a rejection of the game. It is a move in it.

Bourdieu’s instruments were built for cases like this. A field is a structured space of positions, with its own stakes, its own entry costs, its own species of capital, and its own doxa, the assumptions so settled that no one inside experiences them as assumptions. Agents hold endowments of capital, economic, cultural, social, and symbolic, and they struggle, whatever they believe they are doing, to improve their positions and, more profoundly, to impose the principle of valuation under which their own species of capital ranks highest. Read Cummings through these instruments and a career that presents itself as a war against the establishment resolves into something more structured and more instructive: a thirty-year campaign, waged from inside the field of power, to change the conversion rates.

Start with the endowment, because the heresy is unintelligible without it. Cummings entered the game rich. Cultural capital in its most negotiable British form: Durham School, then Oxford, then a first in history, the credential that opens every door in a state still run by essayists. Social capital by inheritance and by alliance: an uncle on the Court of Appeal, a decade at the right hand of Michael Gove, and marriage in 2011 to Mary Wakefield of The Spectator, which is not a magazine so much as the connubium of the Tory intellectual class, the drawing room where the field of conservative opinion consecrates its members. The insurgent against the establishment was produced by its finest institutions, married into its house journal, and launched every assault from addresses inside its postcode. Bourdieu would find nothing paradoxical here. Heresy is almost always an insider product, because the entry costs of the field exclude everyone else. The true outsider cannot afford to play. Only a man whose Oxford first and Downing Street pass are beyond question can afford to spend his career announcing that Oxford firsts and Downing Street passes are worthless.

Now the position, because Cummings occupied the most Bourdieu-ready position in British government. The special adviser holds enormous practical power and zero formal authority. Everything he commands is delegated. Bourdieu wrote that political capital is fiduciary, a form of credit: the politician holds power on trust from those who invest belief in him, and the adviser stands one link further down the chain, holding power on trust from the man who holds it on trust. Cummings at his peak could reshape departments, end careers, and direct the government of a G7 state, and every particle of that capacity was Johnson’s capital on loan. The position explains the career’s rhythm better than any account of temperament. The adviser’s capital cannot be banked, cannot be inherited, cannot survive the principal’s withdrawal. It is the richest and most precarious holding in the field, and its holder lives under a structural sentence that has nothing to do with his conduct: the credit can be called at any hour.

It was called on November 13, 2020. Watch the scene with field eyes rather than dramatic ones. Cummings leaves through the front door carrying a cardboard box, in daylight, before the photographers he knew would be there, when forty years of convention said advisers slip out the back. Overnight, the man who ran the British state became a man with no office, no title, no party, no seat, and no institutional position of any kind, the most complete capital evaporation in modern British politics, and his final act in the building was one more position-taking: the front door said I leave as a principal, not as staff. The field disagreed, and the field keeps the books.

Between the endowment and the expropriation lies the heresy, and here Bourdieu’s sociology of religion earns its passage. Every field, he argued, is a standing battle between the priests, who hold the institution’s monopoly on legitimate practice, and the prophet, who claims authority from outside the institution and recruits it from the laity. The priesthood of British politics is precise about its own reproduction: the PPE degree, the think-tank apprenticeship, the safe seat, the ministerial ladder, the honors list at the end, each stage consecrated by the stage above. Cummings holds none of the field’s specific capital. He has never been elected, never run a ministry, never held a party card that mattered, and the priesthood never let him forget it: he was staff, an aide, a temporary civil servant on a political contract. His response followed the logic Bourdieu described in every field he ever studied. The agent rich in one species of capital and poor in the field’s dominant species does not accept the exchange rate. He fights to overturn it. Cummings’s entire program, read this way, is a revaluation campaign: rule by builders, scientists, and project managers is a proposal that the field re-rank its capitals so that the kind he holds, technical and strategic competence, sits above the kind he lacks, elected legitimacy and party standing. The blog post of January 2, 2020, inviting weirdos and misfits into Downing Street, was an attack on the field’s recruitment monopoly, the most direct assault possible on a priesthood’s control of ordination. And the referendum was the prophet’s classic maneuver executed at the largest possible scale: locked out of the institution’s channels of consecration, he appealed over the priesthood’s head to the laity, seventeen million of them, and returned with a form of capital the priests could neither confer nor confiscate. After June 23, 2016, Cummings possessed the rarest symbolic capital in the field, the man who wins impossible campaigns, and it had been minted for him by the profane.

The Blob takes its place in the same schema. Strip the polemic and the education wars of 2010 to 2014 were a struggle between fields over the power of consecration: who may certify knowledge, license teachers, and define a curriculum, the bureaucratic and academic priesthood that had held the monopoly for two generations, or the ministers and their adviser. Cummings’s innovation was to name the priesthood as a single entity and thereby make its dispersed, procedural power visible as power. Bourdieu spent a career doing the same thing to the French academy, and the resemblance runs deep enough that one suspects Cummings of having read him, an irony this essay will decline to pursue.

Why, then, did the heresiarch fail in government after conquering everything outside it? Bourdieu supplies a structural answer that requires no inventory of anyone’s soul: hysteresis. Habitus, the system of dispositions an agent acquires through his trajectory, is always fitted to a past state of the field, and when the agent moves into a new field, the dispositions persist and misfire. Cummings’s habitus was forged in campaign fields, where the game is short, the objective is single, secrecy is capital, and the construction of an enemy is the master skill. He carried those dispositions into the governing field, where the game is indefinite, the objectives are plural, and the master skill is the slow accumulation of alliances, a species of social capital he had never needed and had spent twenty years disparaging. In the campaign field, calling the other side frauds and mediocrities builds your position. In the governing field, the frauds and mediocrities control implementation, sit on the committees, and answer the telephones, and each insult liquidates a unit of the capital that reform would have spent. The sixteen months in Downing Street were a case study in an agent playing the previous game in the present field, and losing by the present field’s rules.

After the expropriation came the move that completes the Bourdieu portrait: the Substack. In the field of cultural production, Bourdieu mapped two poles. At the autonomous pole, producers are consecrated by peers, the field’s own instances, prizes, journals, the judgment of other producers; at the heteronomous pole, producers answer to the market and the mass audience. Cummings, refused consecration by every instance of the political field, no honors, no peerage, no institutional perch, no lobby rehabilitation, withdrew and constructed an alternative economy in which the consecrating instance is the subscriber list. He describes the move as independence, freedom from editors, parties, and the lobby, and the description performs a conversion that Bourdieu would have savored: direct market consecration, the heteronomous pole in its purest form, rebranded as autonomy. The newsletter’s economics complete the structure. His symbolic capital, the aura of 2016 and 2019, converts monthly into economic capital through subscriptions, and the conversion requires continuous maintenance of the aura, which is to say continuous production of the persona, the insider who saw everything, the exile who knows where the bodies are. The field expelled him, and he built a field of one, in which he is priesthood, prophet, and laity’s favorite at once, and in which no rival position exists from which his position-takings can be challenged. Bourdieu would note what such a field cannot generate: the resistance of peers, which is the only force that ever disciplines a producer’s claims.

The Farage turn, read through capital rather than conviction, is a proposed conversion partnership of textbook clarity. Farage holds the field’s scarcest current asset, plebiscitary capital, a mass following invested in his person, and holds almost nothing else: no machine, no cadre, no policy apparatus, one man and an iPhone, as Cummings priced him. Cummings holds the complementary portfolio, strategic and organizational capital with no mass following of any kind. Each man is illiquid without the other. The partnership reproduces, in its exact structure, the Johnson arrangement of 2019, the bearer of lay capital fronting for the holder of technical capital, and it carries the same structural flaw, since delegated power is revocable and the man with the following can always call the loan. Cummings has run this trade twice. The first counterparty was destroyed and the second defaulted, in whichever order one prefers. That he seeks the trade a third time says nothing psychological; it says that the field prices his capital at zero without a principal, and he knows the price.

Bourdieu’s name for the investment that binds an agent to a field is illusio: the felt conviction that the game is worth playing and its stakes are real. Contempt, he insisted, is not exit. To fight the field, to denounce its priests, to publish forty thousand words on its corruption, is to confirm at every sentence that the field’s stakes are the ones that count. Cummings has announced his departure from British politics many times across two decades and has never once left. His refusals are position-takings, legible only inside the game he refuses. And the field, which forgives anything except indifference, has quietly executed the settlement it always executes on successful heretics. His vocabulary is now the field’s vocabulary: control, the Blob, the deep state, the failed regime, phrases minted at the margin and circulating today as the small change of orthodox conservatism, deployed by ministers who would not have him in the building. Bourdieu documented the pattern across every field he studied. The heresy is absorbed, the exchange rates shift a few points, the priesthood adopts the prophet’s language and administers it as doctrine, and the prophet remains outside, unconsecrated, holding a newsletter. The ideas received the consecration. The man is still at the door, in the beanie, making the argument to the photographers.

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Steve Lopez: The Last City Columnist

Around noon on a drizzly late-winter day in 2005, a newspaper columnist walking through Pershing Square in downtown Los Angeles heard music. He followed the sound past the office workers with their lunch bags and found a man standing beside a shopping cart heaped with his belongings, playing a violin that had two strings. The man had positioned himself near the square’s statue of Beethoven. He said he played there for inspiration. A hand-lettered sign on his cart read “Little Walt Disney Concert Hall.”

The columnist was Steve Lopez (b. 1953) of the Los Angeles Times. The violinist was Nathaniel Anthony Ayers (b. 1951), a Cleveland-born prodigy who had studied double bass at the Juilliard School until schizophrenia forced him out three decades earlier. Lopez saw a column. He got a friendship that reorganized his career, a bestselling book, a Hollywood film in which Robert Downey Jr. (b. 1965) played him, and a twenty-year education in what Los Angeles does to people who fall through its floor.

The encounter sits at the midpoint of a career that now spans more than fifty years and records, column by column, the transformation of California from a state that promised working families a foothold into a state where the foothold costs more than most families earn. Lopez is a four-time Pulitzer Prize finalist, a novelist, and the last major practitioner of a form that once anchored American newspapers: the metropolitan columnist who walks the city, remembers its promises, and returns after the cameras leave.

The Pittsburg Kid

Steven M. Lopez was born in Pittsburg, California, an industrial town in the eastern San Francisco Bay Area where the refineries and steel mills gave working men steady wages. His parents were Tony and Grace Lopez. The family had no college tradition and no connections to journalism. What it had was the postwar California bargain: cheap public higher education within driving distance.

Lopez took the deal. He enrolled at Diablo Valley College, a community college, without a plan. A counselor asked what he liked. He said writing and sports. She suggested sports journalism and pointed him toward San Jose State University. He transferred, worked on the student paper, and graduated with a journalism degree in 1975.

The counselor’s advice sounds small. It placed Lopez inside the old newspaper apprenticeship. Sports writing taught him speed, deadline discipline, and the reconstruction of a dramatic event. It trained him to look for character, conflict, momentum, and reversal. Those elements stayed in his work after the subject stopped being a game and became an eviction, a hospital bill, or a family deciding when to let a father die.

The apprenticeship also gave Lopez his standard for judging California. The state he grew up in let a millworker’s son become a professional through public colleges that cost almost nothing. He later defended the California State University system in print, arguing that budget cuts were closing the door he had walked through. His biography became his measuring stick.

He started in 1975 as a sportswriter at small California papers. The pay was bad. A move to the unionized Oakland Tribune nearly doubled his salary, a detail he has cited when writing about what organized labor once did for young workers. He wrote columns for the Tribune and then the San Jose Mercury News, and he learned the rule that governs all his later work: a column needs a person, a scene, and something at stake. The opinion comes last, if at all. The reporting is the column.

Philadelphia

Lopez made his national reputation at The Philadelphia Inquirer, where he became a columnist in the mid-1980s. Philadelphia suited him. It was a compact city of row houses and parish loyalties, with entrenched political machines, patronage networks, racial conflict, and short distances between wealth and ruin. A columnist could walk it.

His Philadelphia columns were fast, funny, and aggressive. He understood embarrassment as a tool of accountability. A bureaucracy can ignore a citizen’s letter. It struggles to ignore a widely read column that repeats an unanswered question week after week and reduces official excuses to absurdity. Lopez belonged to the last generation of city columnists who functioned as local institutions, heirs to Mike Royko (1932-1997) in Chicago, Jimmy Breslin (1928-2017) and Pete Hamill (1935-2020) in New York, and Murray Kempton (1917-1997). These men treated the city as a living organism. They cultivated eccentrics, challenged politicians by name, and introduced readers to neighbors they would never otherwise meet.

Lopez collected his Inquirer work in Land of Giants: Where No Good Deed Goes Unpunished. The title carried his suspicion of public grandeur. Politicians imagined themselves as giants. Lopez measured them against the smaller obligations they had failed to meet.

Philadelphia also made him a novelist. His reporting trips to North Philadelphia’s drug corners left him with material too large for the column. His first novel, Third and Indiana (1994), took its title from a notorious drug corner and followed a fourteen-year-old boy named Gabriel Santoro through a neighborhood the drug trade had conquered. The book had urgency, concrete detail, and moral anger. It asked whether a reader would care what happened to people trapped inside a violent system, and it bet everything on the answer. The Sunday Macaroni Club (1997) turned to Philadelphia politics, patronage, and ethnic loyalty. In the Clear (2002) followed a television weatherman unraveling after a fatal climbing accident. The novels never matched the public force of his journalism, but they reveal the fiction writer embedded in his columns. Lopez builds scenes, gives a character a desire, puts an obstacle in the way, and lets the social argument emerge through action.

After Philadelphia he spent four years at Time Inc., writing for Time, Life, Sports Illustrated, and Entertainment Weekly. Magazine work gave him range and a national audience. It could not give him what the column gave him: responsibility for one place. A magazine writer parachutes in and leaves. A city columnist has to come back, face the officials he mocked, and watch what his promises and theirs came to. In May 2001 he joined the Los Angeles Times.

Los Angeles

Los Angeles resisted him at first the way it resists everyone. Philadelphia concentrated its life; Los Angeles scattered it across five hundred square miles of freeway. Residents of the same metropolitan region lived in separate worlds and liked it that way. Lopez made the separation his subject. His column moved between Skid Row and City Hall, coastal wealth and aging suburbs, hospitals, schools, encampments, and houses where families struggled with illness behind drawn curtains. The Times credits him with helping define the modern metro columnist.

Then came Pershing Square.

Lopez approached Ayers as material. Ayers was terrified of him at first, rambling, disjointed, afraid of everyone in the square. Lopez kept coming back. One conversation gave him his first window into his subject’s illness. A plane passed overhead and Ayers looked at him and asked, “Are you flying the plane?” Lopez said he was standing right there. Ayers repeated the question. The look in his eyes was intense. Lopez understood then that his subject lived in a different reality and negotiated the boundary daily.

The first column ran under the headline “Violinist has the world on 2 strings.” Readers responded with instruments: six violins, two cellos, a piano hauled into a Skid Row music room with Ayers’s name on the door. Adam Crane, then in communications at the Los Angeles Philharmonic, opened Walt Disney Concert Hall to Ayers and reintroduced him to a community of working musicians. Cellist Ben Hong, violinist Vijay Gupta, and pianist Joanne Pearce Martin befriended him and played with him. One night after a concert, Crane and Hong took Lopez and Ayers backstage so Ayers could reunite with a former Juilliard classmate named Yo-Yo Ma (b. 1955).

The columns became The Soloist: A Lost Dream, an Unlikely Friendship, and the Redemptive Power of Music (2008). The book was a Los Angeles Times and New York Times bestseller and won the PEN USA Literary Award for nonfiction. DreamWorks released the film in 2009, directed by Joe Wright (b. 1972), with Downey as Lopez and Jamie Foxx (b. 1967) as Ayers.

The commercial packaging promised redemption. The book resisted it. Music did not cure schizophrenia. Journalism did not repair the mental health system. Ayers refused medication, remembering early treatment that had frightened him more than the illness, and Lopez decided he had to respect the refusal. Lopez could offer friendship, attention, and access. He could not force his friend into a life that matched other people’s definition of recovery. He also had to face the arithmetic of the relationship: he gained a bestseller and a movie from a story rooted in another man’s illness and homelessness. What gives the work its moral credibility is what happened after the publicity ended. The friendship continued.

In March 2025, driving through Westlake to visit Ayers at his nursing home, Lopez realized twenty years had passed. Ayers lay immobilized by a hip injury. Hand injuries had stopped him from playing his violin, cello, keyboard, double bass, and trumpet. “Can you believe we’ve been friends for 20 years?” Lopez asked. Ayers had not done the math, but he remembered the beginning: on the street, homeless, playing a violin with two strings. They talked about Disney Hall, the Hollywood Bowl, and the White House, where Ayers had performed at the twentieth anniversary of the Americans with Disabilities Act and met President Barack Obama (b. 1961) wearing a white suit and top hat he had bought at Hollywood Suit Outlets. When Lopez asked how he got by, Ayers pointed to the radio beside his bed, tuned always to classical KUSC.

The Beat Nobody Wanted

Ayers led Lopez into the world that Los Angeles had trained itself not to examine. After 2005, homelessness became his continuing beat. He rejected both available postures: the romantic view of unhoused people as harmless victims and the punitive view of them as an invading population. His columns documented mental illness, addiction, housing costs, family rupture, treatment failure, bureaucratic delay, and the exhaustion of neighborhoods living with government inaction.

His method was to return. Homelessness coverage in most outlets follows the news cycle: a fire, a sweep, a court ruling, a press conference. Lopez followed people and places after the cycle moved on and measured each new program against what happened on the sidewalk. In one column from his 2020 Pulitzer finalist package, he described a Skid Row alley on the 800 block of Ceres Avenue where twenty yards of rotting trash sat surrounded by food distribution companies, rats popping their heads from the debris “like they were in a game of Whac-A-Mole” while two homeless residents watched a city tractor with weary surrender. He counted seven food companies within a block and asked readers scrubbing their barbecue grills to consider the supply chain. A city spokeswoman explained the cleanup backlog stood near 8,400 service calls. The column let the number and the rats sit next to each other.

The Pulitzer board named him a finalist in 2018 for columns showing how housing costs had become an existential crisis for California, and again in 2020 for columns on rising homelessness that amplified calls for government action. The subjects were one subject. The visible emergency on the sidewalk grew from the wider housing economy, and the same state that produced extraordinary wealth was pricing teachers, nurses, and caregivers out of ordinary stability. His 2016 finalist columns addressed that inequality head on, and his treatment stayed concrete: commute times, rent, wages, medical bills, the energy required to keep a family from slipping backward. He noted that federal and local law had been rigged for decades to favor homeowners, calling the standard defense a convenient deception. His subjects were usually doing what society asked. They worked, studied, cared for relatives, obeyed the rules, and could not obtain security.

His politics fit no party. Call it civic populism. He distrusts insulated power, administrative excuses, and institutions that impose impossible burdens on people with the least time and influence. He cares less about ideological consistency than about whether a system performs its stated function. When Los Angeles officials announced reforms, he asked what happened to the last reform. When they cited protocols, he described the alley.

The Father

The second great relationship of Lopez’s Los Angeles years was with his own father. As Tony Lopez declined, his son wrote about caregiving, hospitalization, and the decisions that arrive when a man can no longer direct his own care. The Pulitzer board named Lopez a 2012 finalist for these columns on elder care.

One scene from that period distills the whole body of work. In 2014, with both parents in hospice care, his father fell one night trying to walk to the bathroom and could not get up. He refused another trip to the hospital. So his wife got down on the floor next to him, pulled a blanket over them both, and they slept there together until help arrived in the morning. Lopez wrote that he was struck by the cruel irony that the season of life when a person is least able to fight is the season that demands the most strength.

The elder-care columns changed his voice. The old city columnists built authority through confidence. Lopez increasingly built it through confessed uncertainty. He did not claim to know what the family should do. He showed how love, guilt, fear, medical technology, and exhaustion complicated every choice, and he let readers recognize their own kitchens in his. The personal material never turned the column into a diary. It opened a route into policy: hospital incentives, insurance, advance directives, family leave, the caregiver shortage. The family crisis was an institutional crisis wearing a familiar face.

His own body joined the story. In 2012, after knee replacement surgery, Lopez went into cardiac arrest. Medical staff revived him, and doctors implanted a pacemaker after finding a preexisting rhythm problem. He has said the episode started him thinking about retirement: how long did he have, and was he going to be one of those men who retires on Friday and drops dead on Monday? He came out of it with two artificial knees, a device pacing his heart, and a beat he could not have assigned himself.

Independence Day and Golden State

As seventy approached, Lopez turned the retirement question into a reporting project. He spent 2021 interviewing people who had retired happily, people who regretted leaving, and people who intended to work until death stopped them. The result was Independence Day: What I Learned About Retirement from Some Who’ve Done It and Some Who Never Will (2022), which The Wall Street Journal named among the year’s best books on aging and retirement. The book concluded that a clean break was wrong for him. He negotiated a reduced schedule at the Times, keeping the work that structured his life while making room for family, music, and health.

On January 12, 2023, he relaunched his column. “Points West” became “Golden State,” and its focus turned to aging in California: retirement insecurity, age discrimination, isolation, elder homelessness, the caregiver shortage, and the question of remaining useful late in life. The title cuts two ways. California is the Golden State, and “golden years” is the sentimental label pasted over a period that may hold poverty, disability, and grief. Lopez tests both promises against reality, and he tests them from inside. He writes about aging as one of the aging, not as a young reporter observing a population. A late-2025 column opened with his own inventory: a foot that hurt for no reason, a tweaked Achilles tendon, a stiff back that bent him over like an ape on the way to the medicine cabinet, none of it serious, all of it daily, at seventy-two.

He has admitted the professional problem with the beat. Population aging may be the century’s second most important story after climate change, and it is what editors call a MEGO story: My Eyes Glaze Over. His answer to the glaze is the same answer he has given for fifty years. Find the person. Build the scene. Follow the trail from the bedroom to the budget.

Westlake

The Royko Award returned him to his origins twice. He won the Poynter prize named for the Chicago columnist in 2020 for his homelessness coverage, and again in 2025 for columns about MacArthur Park and the surrounding Westlake district, a neighborhood overwhelmed by fentanyl, overdoses, homelessness, and struggling businesses two blocks from Langer’s Deli. In an August 2024 column he described coming upon contorted bodies rigid with overdose in the park’s northwest corner and thought of Norm Langer, who remembered the park from his childhood, and of how disorienting it is to grow old in a world unlike the one remembered or the one imagined. Months later he dropped the observational stance and wrote that the time for excuses was over and the park needed a champion. The Royko judges praised the reporting, empathy, and outrage, and said the columns showed how a metro columnist forces elected officials to look at what sits in plain sight.

That an award named for Royko went twice to Lopez completes a circle. He came out of Royko’s tradition, and he may be its last working master. The tradition assumed a metropolitan newspaper that reached across class and neighborhood, with the staff and confidence to let a columnist spend days on one man. Lopez began in 1975, when such papers dominated their cities. He kept working through layoffs, consolidation, collapsing print circulation, and the migration of commentary toward national ideological combat. Most opinion writing now responds to the same viral clip within the same hour, written by people with no continuing responsibility to anyone they discuss. Lopez’s authority rests on geographic commitment. He remembers which reform was announced ten years ago, which official moved on, and which residents stayed behind. His columns insist that a neighborhood remains real when it stops trending.

Fifty Years

In May 2025 Lopez marked a half century in the business, and he did it with a scene. He recalled his late Times colleague Al Martinez (1929-2015) announcing his own milestone with pride and disbelief: “This is it. Fifty years in the business.” Martinez was in his early seventies then and had no intention of slowing down. You would have needed a tranquilizer gun, Lopez wrote, to keep Martinez from the next story, and he kept telling stories until his death at eighty-five. Lopez closed his anniversary column in that spirit: fifty years and counting, on to the next, and would readers kindly send him a story tip or two.

He kept his word. Through late 2025 and into 2026 he reported from San Diego’s East Village on that city’s homelessness policies, wrote a year-end column welcoming immigrants after what he called a horrible year for them, mocked a presidential social media post, and continued the Golden State beat on doctors, joints, and the aging body. The range shows a columnist who defined a specialty without retreating into it. The scale of his subjects runs from the California coast to a section of buckled sidewalk. The question stays constant: did the institution entrusted with something protect it?

Method and Standing

Lopez’s basic unit is the encounter. He finds a person whose experience reveals a larger failure. He listens long enough for the person to become more than a symbol. Then he follows the trail outward to landlords, doctors, agencies, budgets, and promises. His columns carry a dramatic structure a sports desk would recognize. A person wants something reasonable. A system delays, denies, loses, or complicates it. Lopez investigates. Officials explain. Sometimes embarrassment produces action. Sometimes the failure stands, but it becomes harder to deny.

Humor remains his accountability tool. Bureaucracies shelter behind dull language, and a failure can survive indefinitely when responsibility disperses across departments. Lopez makes the consequences visible and the excuses memorable. Rats in an alley beat a paragraph about sanitation backlogs, and he supplies both.

He also puts himself in the story, which carries a known risk: the reporter grows too prominent, or a structural problem starts to look solvable through one famous man’s intervention. His better work names the tension. He shows what one relationship accomplished for Nathaniel Ayers and then asks why access to treatment or housing required the intervention of a newspaper columnist. His mature tone runs empathy and outrage together and uses each to correct the other. Empathy alone slides into sentimentality. Outrage alone turns people into props.

His honors mark the tradition he serves. Beyond the four Pulitzer selections, he has won awards named for H.L. Mencken (1880-1956), Ernie Pyle (1900-1945), and Royko, three local news Emmys and a share of a Columbia duPont Award for his KCET television work, the Shorenstein Center’s 2021 David Nyhan Prize for political journalism centered on ordinary people, the American Political Science Association‘s 2023 Carey McWilliams Award, and an honorary doctorate from San Jose State in 2011. Each prize honors journalism that connects politics to daily life and treats locality as a source of knowledge rather than a limitation.

Lopez is married, with two sons and a daughter. He has written about his health and his parents while shielding his wife and children from unnecessary exposure. The film version of The Soloist fictionalized his domestic life; the actual family stayed off the page.

His deepest subject is institutional abandonment. His recurring characters include a mentally ill musician failed by the treatment system, a father dying on a bedroom floor, a worker priced out of the state that educated him, a neighborhood left to fentanyl dealers, and an aging man discovering that neither retirement nor care is affordable. Each story asks what happens when the systems people depend on stop being dependable. His answer refuses both despair and easy uplift. People help one another. Friendship counts. A column can force an official to act. And private decency cannot compensate permanently for public failure.

The career itself makes an argument. The California bargain that lifted a millworker’s son from Pittsburg to the front page has broken, and Lopez has spent fifty years filing the evidence, one person at a time. His journalism begins when he stops, listens, and refuses to walk past. He learned that in Pershing Square, in the rain, following the sound of a violin with two strings.

Notes

The twenty-year Ayers column ran March 27, 2025, and supplies the drizzly-day details, the two-strings headline, the cart sign, the instrument donations, six violins, two cellos, one piano, Adam Crane, Ben Hong, Vijay Gupta, Joanne Pearce Martin, the Yo-Yo Ma backstage reunion, the White House ADA performance, the nursing home visit, the hip and hand injuries, and the KUSC radio: Lopez recalled hearing music in Pershing Square around noon on a drizzly late-winter day in 2005 and finding Ayers beside a heaped shopping cart, playing a violin missing two strings, near the Beethoven statue, with a sign reading “Little Walt Disney Concert Hall.” Syndicated copy at dnyuz.com and symphony.org, April 1, 2025. One caution: a 2011 USC Gould account says seven violins were donated; Lopez’s own 2025 column says six, so I used six. The plane dialogue comes from the USC Gould writeup of his Saks Institute talk, “LA Times Columnist Discusses Journey With The Soloist, which also covers Ayers’s medication refusal.

The 2025 Royko Award, the MacArthur Park columns, the Langer’s Deli material, and the judges’ language about a columnist forcing officials to pay attention come from Poynter‘s April 2025 prize announcement. The Golden State launch date of January 12, 2023, the 2012 cardiac arrest during knee replacement, the 2014 scene of his father falling and his mother sleeping beside him on the floor, the MEGO discussion, and the Al Martinez fifty-years anecdote all come from an Easy Reader profile of his Palos Verdes talk. Wikipedia confirms the four Pulitzer subjects as elder care, income inequality, homelessness, and the housing crisis, plus the Mencken, Royko, and Pyle awards, the Emmys, the duPont share, and the 2021 Nyhan Prize. Note the Pulitzer site frames the 2012 selection as elder care rather than death and dying, so I used elder care. The Ceres Avenue alley scene, the Whac-A-Mole rats, the seven food companies, and the 8,400-call backlog come from his 2020 Pulitzer finalist package, which also contains his convenient-deception line about homeowner tax policy. Recent work verified through Muck Rack: the San Diego East Village reporting, the year-end immigration column, and the aging-body column where he gives his age as 72.

Two Columnists, One City: Steve Lopez and Gustavo Arellano

In the spring of 2026, both of the Los Angeles Times’ signature metro columnists found themselves writing about the same few blocks of Westlake. Steve Lopez had won the 2025 Mike Royko Award for columns about MacArthur Park, where he had come upon bodies contorted by fentanyl two blocks from Langer’s Deli and demanded that some official claim the park as his own. Gustavo Arellano (b. 1979) stood under a campaign billboard for reality-television star Spencer Pratt (b. 1983) rising above El Chino Taqueria in the same neighborhood, and used it to ask what it meant that a mayoral insurgency was selling Angelenos a portrait of their city as a ruin. Same sidewalks, two instruments. Lopez plays the elegy. Arellano plays the corrido, with jokes.

The two men constitute a controlled experiment. Same newspaper, same beat in the broadest sense, both California-born sons of the working class, both shoe-leather reporters who distrust punditry from a desk, twenty-six years apart in age. The differences between them map the distance between two eras of American journalism, two relationships to Mexican ancestry, and two theories of what a city column is for.

Start with the pipelines that produced them. Lopez came up through the classic print apprenticeship: a counselor at a community college, a journalism degree from San Jose State in 1975, small-paper sportswriting, a union pay raise at the Oakland Tribune, a column in Philadelphia, four years at Time Inc., and the Times in 2001. Every rung on that ladder has since been sawed off or burned. Arellano never saw the ladder. He was a film studies major at Chapman University who planned to become a professor. One night in April 2000, volunteering on a political campaign, he took out the trash and found a parody issue of OC Weekly on the ground, read a satirical piece listing white supremacists as admirable Latinos, and wrote in. He has called himself an accidental reporter. The alternative weekly gave him what the sports desk gave Lopez: a training ground where voice and reporting fused. It also gave him a persona. From 2004 to 2017 he wrote ¡Ask a Mexican!, a nationally syndicated satirical column that answered readers’ questions about Mexicans under a logo of a mustachioed man in a sombrero, weaponizing the slur to defuse it. Lopez built his franchise on empathy delivered straight. Arellano built his on provocation delivered with footnotes.

Their family stories run in opposite directions across the same border. Lopez descends from immigrants who came to California generations back, and he grew up in Pittsburg as a millworker’s son whose ethnicity almost never organizes his column. His subject position is civic: the taxpayer, the neighbor, the son, the aging patient. Arellano is the son of Mexican immigrants from the villages of Zacatecas and Jalisco who transplanted themselves to Anaheim; his standard biographical line notes that his father arrived in the trunk of a Chevy. Mexican identity is the engine of his work, and his originality lies in refusing the approved version of it. He has described his people as mountain folk, “basically Mexican hillbillies,” and coined the term rancho libertarianism for their politics: rugged individualism, distrust of government and elites, conservative morals, love of community, contempt for political correctness. He wrote years before the 2024 returns that these traits were “catnip for Republicans,” and he warned Democrats that their assumption of permanent Latino loyalty was a fantasy. His political awakening came from the Left, and he has said the whining and the structural excuse-making never sat well with him. Lopez has no comparable theory of a people. He has a theory of institutions: they exist to keep promises, and his column exists to check.

Lopez’s basic unit is the encounter. He finds a person, a homeless violinist or a dying father or a renter priced out of her block, stays long enough for the person to become more than a symbol, then follows the trail to the agency, the budget, and the official. His register is earnest, and his later work draws its authority from his own vulnerability: the pacemaker, the artificial knees, the parents in hospice, the retirement he could not quite commit to. Arellano’s basic unit is the argument staged on reported ground. He is a historian by temperament, the author of Orange County: A Personal History (2008) and Taco USA: How Mexican Food Conquered America (2012), and his columns carry archival ballast: the Cristero Revolt, the Klan in 1920s Anaheim, the lineage of a mural, the genealogy of a tortilla. When The New York Times reported in March 2026 that César Chávez (1927-1993) had sexually abused minors, Arellano drove Avenida César E. Chávez to look at the murals and asked what a community does with a corrupted saint. Lopez asks what happened to the person in front of him. Arellano asks what happened to the story his people tell about themselves.

Humor divides them too, though both use it as a tool rather than a decoration. Lopez’s humor punches at bureaucrats; the rats on Ceres Avenue pop out of the trash like a carnival game while a spokeswoman recites protocols. The joke serves the accountability. Arellano’s humor punches in every direction, including at his own coalitions. He mocks Republicans as the party that spent the 1990s driving Latinos away, then mocks progressives as wokosos who cannot fathom that a Mexican might vote conservative, then mocks himself as the Mexican with glasses. The Ask a Mexican method never left him: say the forbidden thing, then out-research anyone who objects.

Their politics converge on a shared civic loyalty and diverge on almost everything else. Lopez practices what can be called civic populism without partisan content. He asks whether the system performed its stated function, and he has spent two decades documenting that it has not: on housing, on mental health, on elder care. His indictment of Los Angeles is cumulative and severe, which is why declinists could plausibly quote him. Arellano, whose politics are harder to place, has become the paper’s chief defender of the city against declinism. In his May 2026 column on Pratt he conceded the fentanyl, the encampments, and the trash, cited falling homicide and homelessness numbers, and then turned on the nostalgia at the heart of the doomsday pitch: reset Los Angeles to when? The Great Recession? The riots? The smog and segregation of the 1950s? He wrote that “Pratt’s loudest fans fundamentally loathe modern-day L.A.” and that the loathing should chill everyone else. The conservative press returned fire, casting Arellano as an apologist crawling out of the garbage to declare his love for it. The exchange clarified the split within the Times’ own metro pages: Lopez documents decline from inside a broken promise; Arellano insists the city was never Eden and refuses to let anyone weaponize the fall.

The June 2026 mayoral election put the two approaches side by side. Lopez covered the race as he covers everything, through the neighborhoods the candidates invoked. Arellano covered it as political anthropology, writing on election night of a waning moon over the city and an establishment in retreat before populist insurgents of the left and the right. A year earlier, in June 2025, he had marked the anniversary of the deportation raids that began while he sat in Pacific Palisades on a beautiful day, and he has covered the federal immigration campaign and the protesters killed and detained in its wake as the defining story of his community. Lopez’s late-career beat is the aging body and the institutions that fail it. Arellano’s mid-career beat is the immigrant bargain and the government now repudiating it. Each man writes the story his biography assigned him.

Their institutional lives differ as much as their prose. Lopez is a four-time Pulitzer finalist for commentary, always alone on the ballot, a franchise columnist in the singular Royko mold, honored with the awards named for Royko, Mencken, and Pyle. Arellano shares a Pulitzer, won as part of the Times team that covered the leaked City Hall tapes, and he operates as a distributed media personality in the manner of his generation: the flagship column, a personal newsletter he calls a canto, a Substack, years hosting the paper’s daily podcast, the Battle of 187 podcast on the proposition that scarred his childhood, a co-column in Alta, KCRW commentary, and a journalism class at Orange Coast College. Lopez concentrated his authority in one form for fifty years. Arellano hedges across platforms because his generation watched the platforms die; he was editor of OC Weekly when the cuts came in 2017 and resigned rather than gut his staff, then watched the paper fold anyway two years later. Both men are survivors of the same collapse. Lopez survived it by being irreplaceable. Arellano survived it by being everywhere.

What they share may run deeper than what divides them. Both bet their careers on locality when the incentives all pointed toward national punditry. Both believe a columnist must go: to the park, the alley, the taqueria, the nursing home, the mural. Both treat Southern California as a subject sufficient for a lifetime rather than a market. Both write about the same underlying question, the promise California made to working families and what became of it, Lopez through the institutions that broke it and Arellano through the migrants who keep taking the deal anyway. And both told a student generation the same thing in different words. Arellano put it this way in a classroom in late 2025: overworked, underpaid, and still “there is no better job in the world.” Lopez closed his fifty-year column by asking readers to send him a story tip or two.

A newspaper that can field both men owns a stereoscope. Lopez supplies depth of time: he remembers the promise because he lived it, and every column measures the distance from it. Arellano supplies depth of angle: he stands where the paper’s future readership stands, inside the Mexican Southern California that the old Times ignored for a century, and he refuses to flatter it. One is the conscience of the institutions. The other is the cartographer of the tribes. The city needs the elegy and the corrido, and for now, in the same shrinking newsroom, it gets both.

Notes

Wikipedia, Gustavo Arellano, confirms the birth date of October 13, 1979, the ¡Ask a Mexican! column and its Scribner collection, the OC Weekly editorship, the KCRW work, the Orange Coast College teaching, and his share of the TimesPulitzer for the City Hall tape leak coverage. The accidental-reporter origin story, the April 2000 parody issue, the “Five Latinos We Really Like” white-supremacist gag, the 2017 resignation, and the classroom quote come from a December 2, 2025, student Q&A at archeroracle.org. The rancho libertarianism material comes from his own manifesto, “On Rancho Libertarianism”, which contains the Cristero Revolt lineage, the wokosos usage, the Left awakening, and the line about excuses; the “Mexican hillbillies” phrasing is from a 2022 podcast transcript at fluentknowledge.com; the “catnip for Republicans” line and the What’s the Matter with Kansas? comparison come from his LA Times column as quoted at Raw Story. The Pratt column quotes and the crime statistics he cited come via the Daily Caller‘s May 21, 2026, attack piece, which is hostile but quotes him at length, and the billboard scene, the election-night waning moon, the deportation-raids anniversary, and the Chávez murals column come from his verified bylines at Muck Rack.

Hero System

Steve Lopez (b. 1953) keeps a private appointment with the obituary page. He has described the moment a newspaperman dreads, when the names there stop belonging to strangers and start belonging to men he knew, men he stood beside at a bar or a city council meeting. The page turns from news into a tally of his own losses, and then into a forecast.

Two terrors sit under that habit. Ernest Becker (1924-1974) named the first and built an anthropology on it. A man knows he will die and rot, knows it as no other animal knows it, and he cannot bear to be only a creature that ends. So he builds what Becker called a hero system, a set of rules for earning a place in something that outlasts the body. The second terror belongs to Lopez in particular. It is the fear of the unrecorded death. To die is the common lot. To die unseen, to be swept off a downtown sidewalk before sunrise by a sanitation crew and bagged with no name, to leave the world without leaving a single line in it, is the horror a columnist spends his life pushing back against.

His answer is the byline. The column hands a man a small, secular afterlife. A man Lopez writes about gets a name in the Los Angeles Times, gets quoted, gets a face. The street crew might still come, but now there is a record, and the record says this man was here and this man counted. Lopez built a career out of handing that record to people the city had filed under surplus.

The clearest case is the one that made him famous. On Skid Row he found Nathaniel Ayers, a man trained at Juilliard and broken by schizophrenia, playing a violin with two strings in an underpass near a statue of Beethoven. Lopez wrote him into the paper, then into a book, The Soloist, then into a film with two movie stars. The arc looks like rescue. Read it through Becker and it looks like something more exact. Lopez took a man the economy had discarded and granted him the one thing the economy cannot grant, a place in the permanent record. He answered the terror of the unrecorded death on another man’s behalf, and in doing so he fed his own hero system.

Under every hero system lies a story about what has been taken away. Becker’s heroes never simply build. They build against a loss. Lopez’s loss story is the one he has told for nearly fifty years across several cities. A society once held to the idea that a man was owed something for being a man. It owed him a roof, a wage that fed a family, a place at the table when his working years ran out. That idea has been subtracted, piece by piece, until what remains is a verdict delivered by the market: a man is worth what he produces, and a man who produces nothing is worth nothing and may be left on the pavement. Lopez writes to register the subtraction. Each column is an entry in a ledger of what the city removed and hoped no one would notice.

Stand at the center of that ledger and you find a single word doing all the work. The word is use. Lopez believes a discarded man still has worth, that his use is not the only measure of him, and that a society which prices men by output has lost its soul. But use is not a fixed thing. It changes shape depending on the hero system that holds it, and the same word means different things to men standing in different rooms.

Take the founder in a glass office in Palo Alto, thirty-one years old, two exits behind him, a third company hiring fast. For him use is throughput. A thing is useful if it scales, and a man is useful if his output climbs faster than his cost. He is kind, he gives to the food bank, and he cannot see Ayers as anything but a tragedy of misallocation, a brilliant input with no working channel to market. The terror he builds against is irrelevance, the dead startup, the man whose product the world routes around. His hero is the builder who leaves behind a machine that runs without him.

Carry the word up to the high desert, to a Carmelite who rises at two in the morning to pray for a world that will never learn his name. For him use is the trap. The contemplative life produces nothing the founder could put on a slide. Its whole point is to stand useless before God, to refuse the verdict of output, to insist that a soul has worth before it does a single thing. The byline Lopez offers Ayers might strike this man as a vanity, one more bid for a name to outlast the body, when the only afterlife worth wanting requires the surrender of the name. His terror is not obscurity. It is pride.

Move again, to a gunnery sergeant who has buried four men he trained. For him use means something the founder might call madness. The highest use of a Marine is to be spent, to be used up for the man beside him, to become a name read aloud at a ceremony and cut into a black wall. He does not want a byline. He wants the wall, and he wants the men who pass it to stop. His terror is the fear that the dying bought nothing.

Now the hospice nurse on the night shift, who measures her years not in deeds done but in deaths attended. For her use has nothing to do with output and everything to do with presence. She sits with men who will never make another thing, who have passed beyond the founder’s ledger and the sergeant’s mission both, and her work is to make the last hours of a useless man tender. She might understand Lopez better than the others. She might also tell him that the dignity he hands a man through a column is thinner than the dignity she hands a man by holding his hand while no one writes it down.

Four rooms, one word, four different gods. This is Becker pressed to his edge. A sacred value never floats free. It is the local answer to a local terror, and it makes sense only inside the hero system that needs it. Lopez’s use, the worth of the discarded man, is the answer of a working-class kid from Pittsburg, California, who watched the world sort men into the useful and the surplus and decided to spend his life arguing the sort was a lie.

Few men in his trade know their own machine as well as he does. Lopez wrote a book, Independence Day, interrogating his refusal to retire, and the book is a long act of self-examination by a man who suspects his need to keep working is the same need that drives the men he covers, dressed in better clothes. He went part-time at sixty-eight rather than stop. He turned his beat toward aging and the old, which is to say he turned it toward the discard pile he is himself approaching. He sees the trap. A man who builds his worth on usefulness cannot retire without facing the verdict he spent his life fighting.

What his ledger cannot price is subtler, and it sits at the root of the structure. His usefulness requires a steady supply of the discarded. The witness needs the wounded. For the column to confer dignity there must be men stripped of it, and the more he restores a man to the record, the more his own place in the record depends on the supply never running dry. Ayers becomes a book. The man on the sidewalk becomes nine hundred words and a photograph. Lopez does more good than most men do in ten lifetimes, and still the engine runs the way all hero systems run, by converting one man’s terror into another man’s significance. He cannot wish away the suffering that gives him his subject without wishing away the work that gives him his answer to death. That is the one cost the ledger will not show, because the ledger is the thing being paid for.

Three coordinates locate the man. The shape of his hero is the witness, the boy who escaped the sort and now hauls others out of the surplus column one byline at a time, granting a secular afterlife to men the city filed under waste. The rival he fights without naming is no politician and no developer. It is use, the market’s quiet verdict on who is worth keeping, the actuarial shrug that prices a human being by his output and sweeps the rest into bags at dawn. And the cost his ledger cannot price is the supply line at his back. A witness needs the wounded, and the man who spends his life restoring dignity to the discarded depends, in the part of the account no column will print, on there always being more of them.

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California Historian Kevin Starr

On June 25, 1978, Harvey Milk (1930-1978) stood before hundreds of thousands of people at San Francisco City Hall and named his enemies. He named Anita Bryant (1940-2024), the singer who had led the campaign to repeal a gay rights ordinance in Miami. He named John Briggs (1930-2020), the state senator whose November ballot initiative sought to bar homosexuals from teaching in California public schools. And he named a thirty-seven-year-old newspaper columnist with a Harvard doctorate and a weakness for the grand style. “In the Examiner, Kevin Starr defames and libels gays,” Milk told the crowd, and grouped Starr with Bryant and Briggs among the bigots who could not, however hard they tried, chip the words off the base of the Statue of Liberty.

Five months later Milk was dead, shot at City Hall along with Mayor George Moscone (1929-1978) by Dan White (1946-1985), a former supervisor whose candidacy Starr had endorsed and about whom he wrote with sympathy after the killings. Sixteen years after that, Governor Pete Wilson (b. 1933) appointed the man Milk had called a bigot to the office of California state librarian, custodian of the state’s memory. When Kevin Owen Starr (September 3, 1940-January 14, 2017) died of a heart attack in San Francisco, former governor Jerry Brown (b. 1938) said he had captured the spirit of the state and brought its characters to life. The Los Angeles Times called his books indispensable. Universities assigned them by the dozen. No one else had done as much to make California history a serious subject for a general audience.

Starr wrote eight volumes on the California dream, a sustained cultural biography of an entire state, and the deepest theme of those volumes is belonging: how migrants become citizens, how speculative settlements become cities, how a society without common ancestry acquires a usable memory. The man who wrote them had been named, at the largest public gathering of his city’s life, as an agent of exclusion.

Ukiah

In 1946 a six-year-old boy arrived at the Albertinum, a Roman Catholic orphanage in Ukiah, more than a hundred miles north of San Francisco. His father, Owen Starr, a production machinist, had developed a brain tumor and lost his sight. His parents’ marriage broke under the pressure, and his mother, Marian Collins Starr, a bank teller, suffered a breakdown. Kevin and his younger brother James stayed at the orphanage about five years. The nuns ran the place. The boys wore what the institution gave them and ate what it served.

The brothers rejoined their mother in San Francisco, in public housing on Potrero Hill, where the family lived on a monthly welfare check of $130. Starr worked two newspaper delivery routes. With money from the papers he bought Carl Sandburg’s (1878-1967) multivolume life of Abraham Lincoln, a poor boy’s epic about a poor boy who read his way out. He read the newspaper aloud to his blind father. He attended St. Boniface School in the Tenderloin, where the Franciscans taught the children of the poor a few blocks from the flophouses, then St. Ignatius High School and a seminary, then the Jesuit University of San Francisco, where he studied English, edited the student newspaper, and graduated in 1962.

None of this was incidental to the historian he became. Starr knew what happened to a family when its structures failed, and he knew which institutions caught the falling: the parish school, the public library, the welfare office, the housing authority, the Church. His lifelong attachment to schools, libraries, universities, and civic government had an intellectual basis, and beneath the intellectual basis it had a personal one. Stability was something he had struggled to acquire. His histories return again and again to migrants, displaced families, and people trying to establish themselves among strangers, and his California dream was never only the fantasy of sudden wealth. At bottom it was the hope of belonging somewhere secure.

Widener

Starr served from 1962 to 1964 as an Army lieutenant with an armored unit near Mannheim, West Germany. Europe showed him old cities, ruins, and institutions that had endured for centuries. California, seen from a distance, looked young, mobile, and unfinished. He entered Harvard, took a master’s degree in 1965 and a doctorate in English and American literature in 1969, and taught there until 1973. His teachers worked in the tradition of Vernon Louis Parrington (1871-1929), Van Wyck Brooks (1886-1963), and Perry Miller (1905-1963), who read literature as evidence of a society’s religious imagination and civic assumptions. His doctoral adviser was Alan Heimert (1928-1999), Miller’s successor in the study of the New England mind.

The decisive discovery came in the stacks of Widener Library. Harvard had collected a rich body of writing about California and the Pacific Coast, much of it descriptive, promotional, or antiquarian. A scholarship boy from Potrero Hill, three thousand miles from home, read through it and saw that no one had treated his state with the seriousness scholars reserved for New England, New York, the South, or Europe. Starr began to imagine a history of what he called the social drama of the imagination. The question was what Californians had done and, past that, what they believed they were doing: the hopes, fears, moral claims, and aesthetic choices through which settlers turned conquest, migration, and speculation into a story about renewal.

The dissertation became Americans and the California Dream, 1850-1915, published by Oxford University Press in 1973. The book moved among literature, architecture, religion, journalism, education, and urban development, and treated novelists, engineers, clergymen, real estate promoters, and university presidents as collaborators in a common project of imagining California into existence. The title’s operative word was dream. Starr meant more than gold or fame. He meant the promise that people could shed inherited limitations and design new lives: health, useful work, domestic happiness, natural beauty, a place in a society still under construction. The dream was individualistic on its surface and collective underneath. Aqueducts carried the water. Universities trained the engineers. Schools and libraries converted migrants into citizens. Californians imagined themselves self-made while standing on an immense public structure of water, power, transportation, education, and law. That tension, never resolved, powered everything he wrote afterward.

The most characteristic version of the dream, in Starr’s account, belonged neither to the miner nor to the movie star. It belonged to the ordinary family seeking a modest house, sunlight, a school, and a beach within driving distance. The bungalow and the community college mattered as much as the studio and the governor’s mansion. The dream was democratic because it offered working families comforts once reserved for wealth, and it was fraudulent in proportion as it excluded. Native peoples experienced conquest, dispossession, and mass death. Chinese immigrants met exclusion and organized violence. Japanese Americans were incarcerated. Mexican Californians lost land and standing. Black migrants met restrictive covenants. Starr’s narrative depended on the recurring distance between the promise and the practice, and his answer to that distance was neither celebration nor rejection. It was repair: acknowledge the failure, recover the memory, reform the institution, attempt the dream again on wider terms. He gave California a theology of the second chance, and he would need one himself.

The Examiner years

Starr came home in 1973 and went to work for Mayor Joseph Alioto (1916-1998) as an aide and speechwriter, a job that placed him inside the pro-growth, pro-downtown, Catholic wing of San Francisco politics. He became city librarian and took a master’s degree in library science from Berkeley in 1974. From 1976 through 1983 he wrote for the San Francisco Examiner, sometimes six columns a week, including a regular column on religion. In 1978 the Hearst chain sent him to Rome as Vatican correspondent, and he covered the elections of two popes in a single autumn.

The columns show a writer the later reputation concealed. Starr described himself in print as a conservative neo-Thomist Roman Catholic with Platonist leanings and occasional temptations toward anarchy. He attacked what he saw as the inquisitorial orthodoxy of the city’s Democratic leadership. He defended Proposition 13, whose fiscal consequences he later mourned as they starved the libraries he served. He wrote of Patricia Hearst (b. 1954), his publisher’s daughter, as a political prisoner of class resentment rather than a participant in bank robbery. When San Francisco moved to district elections for supervisor, he warned that the change might seat alienated left-wing nuts hostile to the private sector. The change seated Harvey Milk. Five days after Jonestown, where Jim Jones (1931-1978) led more than nine hundred people to their deaths, Starr published an admiring profile of John Barbagelata, the conservative supervisor who had warned the city about Jones while the liberal establishment courted him. The record vindicated Starr’s side of the argument. His columns about gay life in San Francisco were harsh enough that Milk read them as groundwork for the Briggs initiative and said so from the platform at the Gay Freedom Day rally, by name.

Yet the file resists a single reading. The same columnist praised the charitable work of the Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence, the drag troupe whose habit-wearing performances mocked his own Church. He admired Carey McWilliams (1905-1980), the radical whose Factories in the Field stood well to the left of anything Starr believed. He wrote with sympathy for undocumented migrants when his political allies did not. The Examiner Starr was a moralist of civic order, formed by the Church and by Potrero Hill, who saw the counterculture and the sexual revolution as solvents of the structures that protected society.

In 1984 he tested his standing and ran for the Board of Supervisors as a centrist of civic unity, above the conflicts of race, class, sexuality, and neighborhood. He finished just outside the winning group. The defeat instructed him. Many San Franciscans regarded those conflicts as facts that no appeal to a common civic identity could dissolve, and they declined to be absorbed into his. Starr never again sought office. He left the column, tempered his views, and began the long reconstruction of his public self. The partisan moralist disappeared into the historian. Peter Richardson, the scholar who later recovered the Examiner columns, observed that the dream series skips the decades when Starr had been a combatant, and suggested the two facts might be related.

The reinvention

Governor Wilson appointed Starr state librarian in 1994. He held the office ten years, under governors of both parties, and Arnold Schwarzenegger (b. 1947) named him state librarian emeritus on his departure in 2004. The appointment gave Starr the chance to practice what his books preached. Libraries preserve memory in a state built on forgetting. They admit newcomers to the culture without asking for inherited wealth or ancestral standing. A person who arrives in California with nothing can walk into a library and take possession of the recorded experience of the society, which is what a boy on Potrero Hill had once done with a paper route and a card catalog.

He was a working librarian’s librarian and a showman. At his swearing-in he promised to be a visible state librarian, and he kept the promise at library openings and California Library Association conferences, where he roasted his staff at the annual state library breakfast and sometimes burst into song. He wore a bow tie and a straw boater and Brooks Brothers pinstripes, the costume of a downtown banker of 1928, over a frame formed in welfare housing. The budget of the State Library grew. He campaigned for Proposition 14, the 2000 bond measure that put $350 million into local library construction, and supported the revival of the California Center for the Book. In 2001 the legislature passed the Kevin Starr Access to Information Act, which let visually impaired Californians call a toll-free number and have volunteers read them the news. The program had a private meaning its beneficiaries never knew. The state librarian had spent his boyhood reading the newspaper aloud to a blind machinist in a housing project. The act converted a son’s duty into a public service, which is as close to a signature as Starr ever put on legislation.

The teacher

Starr joined the University of Southern California in 1989, first in urban and regional planning, later in history and in policy, planning, and development. In 1998 USC named him University Professor, among its highest distinctions. Before and during those years he taught or lectured at Berkeley, Davis, Riverside, Stanford, Santa Clara, and his own USF.

His students remembered the performances. He filled a lecture hall with a booming voice that carried to the last row without a microphone, the histories tumbling out as narrative, each event carried by persons rather than forces. One student, Chiara Towne, recalled choosing USC to study with him, sitting in his office wishing for three more hands to get it all down, and hearing him say, when their judgments converged, that they shared a sensibility about what is important. In one class he read aloud from an anthology of California literature, a fragment of an early Native American poem, and his voice broke. He apologized to the room and said he was just an old man moved to tears by the beauty of this poem. William Deverell (b. 1962), his USC colleague, said Starr thought and wrote in the grandest tradition of history with a capital H. Starr said of himself that writing was a form of thinking and of breathing, and that he did not know what writer’s block was. The claim is credible. Few American historians have matched his rate of production while holding a full-time public office.

The shelf

The dream series ran to eight volumes across thirty-six years. Americans and the California Dream, 1850-1915 (1973) built an American society on the ruins of Mexican California. Inventing the Dream (1985) carried the state through the Progressive Era and argued in its title that California had no natural destiny, only promoters, reformers, and engineers who imagined a future and built institutions to reach it. Material Dreams (1990) turned to Los Angeles in the 1920s, to oil, aviation, movies, and real estate, and refused the standard verdict that the city was shallow; its apparent lack of tradition concealed dense networks of industry, worship, and civic ambition. Endangered Dreams (1996) took up the Depression, the Dust Bowl migration, and the farm labor wars. The Dream Endures (1997) followed the state into the 1940s. Embattled Dreams (2002) covered the war decade, the shipyards and aircraft plants, the incarceration of the Japanese, and the arrival of California as a strategic power. Coast of Dreams (2004) jumped to 1990 through 2003, recession, riot, Simpson trial, and recall. Golden Dreams (2009), which won the Los Angeles Times Book Prize for history, returned to 1950-1963, the high noon of the mid-century model, when defense dollars, cheap houses, new campuses, and water projects seemed to open a middle-class civilization to anyone willing to drive to it.

He called his method pointillist-realist narrative. He accumulated portraits, buildings, texts, and landscapes until a picture emerged, and declined to interrupt the story with theory. Literature had trained him to read a building as an argument, a city plan as a vision of social order, an advertisement as a confession of desire. The method had costs. The narratives could crowd and blur. Early volumes carried less citation apparatus than academic readers wanted. His representative figures ran to architects, publishers, and university presidents, while workers, women, and the conquered appeared less often as agents. He was a synthesizer, and synthesis can smooth conflict into coherence and let eloquence stand in for causal argument. The method also achieved what no rival approach has matched. He showed that a state could be studied as a civilization, its water systems and its novels as parts of a single history, and regional historians have worked in his shadow since.

The gap in the shelf is the most eloquent thing on it. Starr never wrote the volume covering 1964 through 1989: the Free Speech Movement, Watts, the farmworkers, Reagan’s rise, the tax revolt, gay liberation, and the fracturing of the consensus his other volumes chronicle. He said the 1950s had formed him and that he did not feel at home in what followed, and he joked that the sixties volume might be called Smoking the Dream. Richardson’s explanation cuts closer. Starr had already covered those years, six columns a week, as a partisan, and a historian returning to them owed the record a reckoning with his own judgments about Milk, White, Hearst, and the rest. He chronicled the building of California’s institutions and their strained condition at the century’s turn, and left silent the years when the builders’ consensus broke and he had manned one of the barricades.

The critics

Starr’s books arrived as the profession turned toward race, class, gender, and settler colonialism, and some scholars read his grand narrative as boosterism in a better suit. The charge had a basis and a limit. His pages contain conquest, exclusion, incarceration, and environmental ruin; his difference from the radicals was his refusal to let injustice stand as the final meaning of the story. The sharpest contrast was Mike Davis (1946-2022), whose City of Quartz read Southern California through class war, repression, and capitalist power, and who accused Starr’s Material Dreams of writing a hero’s history that flattered the men who owned the city. Davis wrote from the standpoint of those the dream excluded. Starr wrote from the standpoint of a civilization trying to deserve it. The two accounts oppose each other and require each other, and Davis contributed an essay to the posthumous volume on Starr, proof that engagement never demanded agreement.

Roman Catholicism organized the deep structure. Starr did postdoctoral work at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, and his histories carry a recognizable shape: promise, betrayal, judgment, and the offer of redemption, never guaranteed and never foreclosed. His Church taught that grace moves through material things, and his history worked the same way; meaning arrived through buildings, ceremonies, landscapes, and institutions rather than through disembodied ideas. Institutions could fail, and their failure created a duty of repair rather than a warrant for abandonment. Critics who read his fondness for founders and builders as class deference caught part of the truth. The other part sat in Ukiah. Starr admired people who built structures because he knew, from inside, what happened to children when structures fell.

His last project carried the method beyond California. Continental Ambitions (2016) began a history of Roman Catholics in North America with the Spanish, French, and English colonial ventures. Continental Achievement (2020), completed with the help of his wife Sheila and published after his death, followed Catholics through the Revolution and the early republic. The two projects were one question in different dress: how a diverse population, holding competing pasts, becomes a people.

The ledger

The honors accumulated: a Guggenheim, the Commonwealth Club’s Gold Medal, Harvard’s Centennial Medal, the National Humanities Medal from George W. Bush (b. 1946) in 2006, the California Hall of Fame in 2010, the Los Angeles Times’ Robert Kirsch Award for lifetime achievement, membership in the Society of American Historians. The composer John Adams (b. 1947) wrote City Noir out of the dream series. Starr died on January 14, 2017, at seventy-six, in the city where he was born, survived by Sheila, his wife of fifty-three years, two daughters, and seven grandchildren.

The reassessment began at once and matured in Redemptive Dreams: Engaging Kevin Starr’s California (Routledge, 2023), edited by Jason S. Sexton, the first sustained scholarly examination of his work. The contributors, Richardson and Davis among them, neither canonized him nor dismissed him. They weighed the narrative method, the Catholic imagination, the treatment of race, the Examiner record, and the redemptive frame, and they measured the distance between his synthesis and the newer scholarship of the communities his synthesis underserved. Recovery of the columns restored the least flattering years to the biography, which is where they belong. Starr taught that a society earns its future by facing its record. The rule applies to historians.

His timeliness has grown since his death. The California he chronicled built for people who had not yet arrived: campuses, aqueducts, subdivisions, and libraries scaled to a future assumed to be larger than the present. The California that survives him limits construction, protects scarcity, and prices the ordinary family out of the dream its grandparents bought on a machinist’s wage. Housing shortage, homelessness, and the inability to complete public works reverse the world of Golden Dreams, and the current movement to build again draws much of its historical case, acknowledged or not, from Starr’s shelf. His books stand as evidence that collective investment once happened here, under this sun, at this scale, and might happen again. He wrote in the San Francisco Chronicle in 2003 that California is everything and nothing at all, the cutting edge of the American dream and a candidate for its dystopia. He refused, across nine thousand pages, to choose between the two, because the choice is not the historian’s to make. It belongs to the people the libraries are still open for.

The life makes a single argument. A boy handed to an orphanage became the historian of belonging. A child who read to a blind father became the librarian who put the news in the ears of the blind. A columnist named from a platform as a bigot spent thirty years writing a history whose moral engine is the second chance, and then received one, and the scholars who now audit his record are performing the ritual his own books prescribe. Starr’s California dream was never a promise that the story ends well. It was a summons to keep building, keep remembering, and keep the doors open to whoever arrives next. He answered it with the only materials he trusted: institutions, narrative, and work.

Notes

The Milk speech quote, “In the Examiner, Kevin Starr defames and libels gays,” and the bigot grouping: JSTOR Daily‘s annotated speech and the full text.

The Examiner record, White endorsement and post-assassination sympathy, Hearst as “political prisoner” of class resentment, the district-elections warning, the Barbagelata profile after Jonestown, the Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence columns, and Richardson’s hypothesis about the missing decades: Peter Richardson’s Boom California essay, reprinted at the Northern California Media Museum and discussed at Local News Matters. Note one point of care: my sentence says Starr “endorsed” White’s candidacy. Richardson supports this, but you may want to verify the endorsement wording in the Boom essay itself before publishing, since the Local News Matters paraphrase, “endorsed Milk’s opponent and his assassin, Dan White,” compresses.

Albertina / Albertinum orphanage, $130 monthly welfare check, two paper routes: Los Angeles Times obituary details via KQED. The LA Times spells it “Albertina Orphanage”; I used “the Albertinum,” the institution’s formal name, worth confirming which you prefer.

The classroom scene, “old man moved to tears” quote, Towne’s recollections, bow tie and pinstripes: LAist remembrance.

Bursting into song at CLA breakfasts, “visible State Librarian” promise, Brooks Brothers, the Access to Information Act: Library Journal.

“California is everything and nothing at all,” Chronicle, 2003: PBS SoCal’s Lost LA remembrance by D. J. Waldie.

Deverell and Quick quotes, writing-as-breathing, survivors: USC Today obituary.

Vatican correspondent covering both 1978 papal elections, the neo-Thomist self-description, John Adams and City Noir: Wikipedia, Kevin Starr.

Redemptive Dreams details and the Sexton project: Cal State Fullerton News.

Extrapolations I made without links: the nuns and institutional clothing at the orphanage, self-evident for a 1940s Catholic orphanage; the Franciscans at St. Boniface, since the parish is Franciscan and well known; the flophouses near the Tenderloin school, self-evident for the neighborhood; and the reading of the White endorsement as running through District 8. The line that the blind-reading program’s beneficiaries never knew its private meaning is inference.

The Man Who Filed the Dreams: Kevin Starr’s Hero System

In 1946 a six-year-old boy stood in the receiving room of the Albertinum, a Catholic orphanage in Ukiah, a hundred miles and a world north of San Francisco. His father, a machinist, had gone blind from a brain tumor. His mother, a bank teller, had broken down. The adults who were supposed to stand between Kevin Starr (1940-2017) and the void had failed in sequence, and the state of California had handed him to nuns. A child that age cannot conceive of death in the abstract. He can conceive of abandonment, which for a child is the same thing. Ernest Becker (1924-1974) argued that every human character forms as armor against the terror of death, and that culture exists to convert that terror into projects of durable meaning. Starr built his armor early, in an institution, out of institutions, and he never took it off.

Becker published The Denial of Death in 1973. Oxford published Americans and the California Dream, 1850-1915, Starr’s first volume, the same year. The coincidence deserves more than a footnote. Becker’s book argued that “society itself is a codified hero system,” a shared fiction that promises its members significance beyond the grave. Starr’s book was a five-hundred-page catalog of such fictions: the Gold Rush fantasy, the health-seeker’s gospel, the booster’s pamphlet, the Protestant errand repackaged for the Pacific. One man theorized the immortality project. The other spent forty years filing California’s immortality projects, alphabetized, cross-referenced, and bound in cloth by a university press. Neither ever cited the other. They were writing the same book from opposite ends.

Two terrors organized Starr’s system, and both were rehearsed on him before he turned seven. The first was the failure of persons. Bodies go blind. Minds break. Marriages dissolve. Anyone whose safety rests on individual human beings has built on sand, and Starr had watched the sand move. The second terror was erasure, and California was its laboratory. A state of strangers, populated by people who came west to shed their pasts, remembers no one. The migrant who dies in a Fresno labor camp, the widow who loses the bungalow, the founder whose company is bought and whose name is sanded off the building: California forgets them at industrial scale. Other societies threaten a man with damnation. California threatens him with amnesia. Starr’s nightmare was never hellfire. It was the unclaimed file, the record no one keeps, the child no one comes back for.

Against these terrors he constructed a hero worth becoming: the builder who remembers. Not the conqueror, not the artist, not the saint. The founder of durable structures, aqueduct, campus, diocese, library, who converts private ambition into public shelter and then writes the act down. In Starr’s system a man defeats death twice, once by building something that outlasts his body and once by entering the archive that outlasts the building. The dream series was his own double move. He built a shelf that institutions now require, and the shelf is a mausoleum with a circulation desk, a place where dead Californians go on being cited, assigned, quarreled with, alive in the only way his system recognized. Most men join a hero system. Starr curated one, a second-order project, immortality achieved by administering the immortality of others. The historian is the coroner who refuses to close the files.

The system’s sacred words look universal. They are not. Take home, the first of them. To a third-generation homeowner in the Berkeley hills, home means an appreciating parcel and the ordinance that protects the view, a fortress of equity holding back the future. To a Oaxacan farmworker following the harvest from Coachella to Salinas, home is a village in the south that exists in phone calls and remittances, a place he builds with money earned by not being there. To a Navy wife on her fourth base, home is a set of practices, the same quilt on whatever bed, the same grace before dinner in whatever state, portable and unsinkable. To a Hmong grandmother in Fresno, home is a mountain country that no longer exists on any map that matters, kept alive in story cloth and funeral rite. Each of these people will die for home, and each means something the others might not recognize.

For Starr, home meant structure. Not the family, which had failed him, and not the land, which belonged to whoever filed the deed. Home was the institution that catches the falling child: the parish school, the branch library, the housing authority, the Church. On Potrero Hill, in a project apartment funded by a welfare check of $130 a month, the boy ran two paper routes and spent the proceeds on Carl Sandburg’s (1878-1967) life of Lincoln, six volumes, a purchased ancestry. He read the newspaper aloud to his blind father in the evenings. The scene deserves attention for what it lacks. No property, no inheritance, no father’s trade to enter. What the boy had was institutional: a school that took him, a library that lent to him, a Church that ordered his week. When Starr later wrote that California’s promise was a modest house, a good school, and a beach within reach of an ordinary family, critics heard nostalgia for the suburbs. They were hearing something older. They were hearing a man define home as the sum of structures that do not depend on any single adult staying sane.

Memory, the second sacred word, splits the same way. To a Mormon genealogist in a family history center, memory is salvation in the strict sense, ancestors researched, named, and sealed, the dead retrieved one baptismal record at a time. To the grandson of an Auschwitz survivor, memory is a command with the force of law, zakhor, remember, because forgetting finishes what the murderers started. To a founder in Palo Alto, memory is technical debt, the legacy system that slows the shipping of the future, and the art is knowing what to delete. To a Lakota elder, memory is not stored in documents at all; it is held in land and ceremony, and a people removed from the land suffers a kind of memory-death no archive repairs. The word is one word. The hero systems underneath it do not touch.

Starr’s memory was citizenship. In his system, to be remembered by an institution is to belong to it, and to belong is to survive. The insight has a biography. At Harvard, in the stacks of Widener Library, a scholarship student from public housing found shelf after shelf of California writing that no serious scholar had claimed, and he recognized his own situation in it: a subject, like a boy, that no one had come back for. He claimed it. The act of writing the dream series was an adoption proceeding conducted at the scale of a state. And when Governor Pete Wilson (b. 1933) made him state librarian in 1994, Starr turned the theory into administration. He campaigned $350 million out of the voters for library construction. He pushed through the act, later carrying his name, that let blind Californians phone a volunteer and hear the news read aloud, the son’s evening duty on Potrero Hill converted into a standing public office. A stranger arrives in California owning nothing. He walks into a library and the accumulated memory of the society is handed to him across the desk, no lineage required. That transaction, repeated millions of times, was Starr’s answer to death. The archive adopts.

Every hero system requires a rival, a living argument that the sacred words mean something else, and Starr’s rival wrote from sixty miles east of him. Mike Davis (1946-2022) grew up in Fontana, a working-class steel town in San Bernardino County that corporate decisions later gutted, and he built his system out of that gutting. Davis’s hero was the excavator, the man who digs up what the builders buried: the crushed strikes, the bulldozed barrios, the police files, the bodies under the subdivisions. City of Quartz (1990) appeared the same season as Starr’s Material Dreams, two books about Southern California that share almost no assumptions. Where Starr saw founders converting ambition into public shelter, Davis saw a hero’s history written to flatter the men who owned the city, and he said so in print. The two men held the same sacred words and inverted every one. Home, for Davis, was Fontana, which is to say the thing capital destroys and paves; a man who loves home fights the builders. Memory was exhumation, the suppressed record of class war brought up into the light as indictment; an archive that consoles is an accomplice. And redemption, the third sacred word, Davis handled the way a coroner handles a get-well card. His system offered no second chances, only the honesty of the autopsy and solidarity among the not-yet-buried. He measured a man by which side of the excavation he stood on. Starr spent a career filling the hole back in and planting a library on top, and each man, reading the other, saw his own terror wearing a disguise: Starr saw a prophet of the amnesia he feared, and Davis saw an undertaker beautifying the corpse.

Redemption refracts further the moment it leaves Davis’s desk. To a graduate of Delancey Street, the San Francisco residence where felons rebuild themselves, redemption is a trade in the hands and a ledger of years clean, earned daily, revocable daily. To a Reformed pastor in Escondido, redemption is what cannot be earned; the attempt to earn it is the sin. To a plaintiff’s attorney in Century City, redemption is a number with a release attached, signed in triplicate, because in his system harm is real and so is the check that closes it. To a Gold Star mother, redemption is the meaning that must be found in the loss, because the alternative is that the loss meant nothing, and no mother survives that. One word. Separate universes of obligation.

Starr’s redemption was civic repair, and it had a shape as fixed as liturgy: the promise made, the promise betrayed, the betrayal faced, the promise attempted again on wider terms. Every volume of the dream series runs the sequence. What gives the doctrine its weight is that Starr ran the sequence on himself, and the betrayal was not metaphorical. On June 25, 1978, Harvey Milk (1930-1978) stood at San Francisco City Hall before the largest crowd of the city’s life and named him. “In the Examiner, Kevin Starr defames and libels gays,” Milk said, and filed Starr with Anita Bryant (1940-2024) and John Briggs (1930-2020) among the bigots. Milk was operating a hero system of his own that afternoon, one where the sacred act was visibility, where a man defeats death by coming out and by the hope his example bequeaths to a kid in Altoona, and where Starr’s columns were not commentary; they were the groundwork of erasure, the Briggs initiative in evening dress. Five months later Milk was dead, killed by Dan White (1946-1985), a candidate Starr had endorsed and a man he wrote about with sympathy after the murders.

What followed was the sequence from his own books. Starr lost a supervisor’s race in 1984 to an electorate that declined his offer of unity, left the column, and rebuilt himself inside the institutions his system held sacred: the university, the state library, the lecture circuit, the bipartisan appointment. The polluted columnist re-entered the civic communion through its most sacred door, the library, and served ten years as the custodian of the state’s memory. Call it what his own theology called it: penance by construction. He never issued the confession that his liturgy technically required. He performed the restitution and skipped the accounting.

The skipped accounting has an address. Starr wrote eight volumes and left one hole, 1964 through 1989, the exact years when he had been a combatant rather than a chronicler. He joked that the sixties volume might be titled Smoking the Dream, and the joke is worth slowing down for, because in it a man of legendary productivity, a man who said writing was a form of breathing and that he did not know what writer’s block was, explains twenty-five missing years with a laugh line. Becker would have recognized the maneuver. The hero system that cannot process an event does not refute it; it changes the subject with charm. Starr could file every Californian’s dream except the decades holding his own worst record, because filing them meant sitting in his own archive as a subject, and the coroner had no rite for opening his own file.

How much did he know? More than most men know about their own armor, and less than his method demanded. He knew the dream was a construction; he had written that California’s promise was a longing that could ennoble and also turn and devour itself, which is a working definition of a hero system published before most historians had read Becker. He knew myths were load-bearing walls and said so for forty years. In a USC classroom near the end, reading aloud a fragment of early Native American poetry, his voice broke, and he told the students he was just an old man moved to tears by the beauty of this poem. The tears were for the poem and for what the poem showed: that a people can be dispossessed of everything and a fragment still survives in an anthology, still reaches an old man, still works. It was his entire system compressed into an apology: the archive adopts, even the murdered. What he did not know, or knew and could not use, was that the doctrine of repair had exempted its author from its own final step. He audited every hero system in California except the one that had written the columns.

The hero, then, is the builder who remembers, the orphan turned registrar, the man who defeats the two deaths, of the body and of the record, by constructing institutions and then keeping their minutes, and who offered every stranger in California the same adoption he had arranged for himself. The rival he fought without naming was not Davis, who was named, reviewed, and even welcomed into the posthumous volume on Starr’s work. The unnamed rival was the possibility Davis merely voiced: that repair is a flattering lie the builders tell, that the archive consoles instead of saving, that the boy in the receiving room at Ukiah was right the first time and no institution comes back for anyone; Starr fought that possibility on every page for forty years and never once granted it a sentence in his own voice. And the cost the ledger cannot price is the volume that does not exist, the accounting he owed the men his columns hurt and the historian he claimed to be, twenty-five years of California carried out of the archive by its own keeper, the one file the coroner closed unread.

The Circle of the We: Kevin Starr and the Civil Sphere

On June 25, 1978, at the Gay Freedom Day rally outside San Francisco City Hall, Harvey Milk (1930-1978) performed an operation that Jeffrey Alexander (b. 1947) has spent a career describing. He sorted persons into the two columns of civil discourse. On the sacred side stood the Statue of Liberty, the Declaration of Independence, the national anthem, and the gay men and women coming out of their closets into public life. On the polluted side stood Anita Bryant (1940-2024), State Senator John Briggs (1930-2020), and a columnist for the San Francisco Examiner named Kevin Starr (1940-2017), whose writing about gays Milk called “distortions and lies.” Milk did not argue that Starr was mistaken. He argued that Starr was anti-civil, an enemy of the codes on which the republic rests, and he closed by telling Starr and the rest that they could not chip the words off the base of the statue. The speech moved, in Alexander’s terms, from goals to values, from a ballot fight over the Briggs initiative to the sacred foundations of American solidarity, and it fixed Starr on the profane side of the binary. In The Civil Sphere (2006), Alexander argues that this discourse, with its paired vocabularies of the pure and the impure, the rational and the hysterical, the open and the conspiratorial, is the deep structure through which democratic societies decide who belongs. Milk applied the structure to Starr in front of the largest crowd in the city’s history, and it held. For a generation of San Franciscans, Starr was coded.

Alexander opens his Watergate essay with the observation that facts do not speak, that an event must be told by society, and he closes it with a sentence that compresses the theory: “Scandals are not born, they are made.” The same holds for civic saints. Kevin Starr was made twice, first as pollution and then as custodian of the civic sacred, and the two makings, read together through Alexander’s framework, turn his biography into something more instructive than a career: a complete circuit of the civil sphere’s operations, exclusion, contested incorporation, purification through civil institutions, and posthumous judgment. The frame fits Starr with unusual force because Starr’s own lifework asks Alexander’s question. The eight volumes of Americans and the California Dream concern a society assembled from strangers, and their constant subject is how migrants without common ancestry, religion, or memory came to say we. Alexander calls the process civil incorporation. Starr called it the dream. The two projects, one theoretical and one narrative, describe the same object, and neither man cited the other.

Alexander’s civil sphere is a sphere of solidarity, analytically distinct from state and market, sustained by communicative institutions such as the press and by regulative institutions such as law and office. Its discourse is binary. Members of a democratic community understand themselves and their fellows through paired codes: autonomous or dependent, reasonable or mad, truthful or deceitful, open or secretive, and the columns do political work, because to place a person or group under the polluted terms is to argue for their exclusion, and to place them under the sacred terms is to argue for their incorporation. The codes are held in common. What the parties fight over is application. In his study of cultural trauma, Alexander adds a second engine: carrier groups make claims about injury, name victims and perpetrators, and, when the claims succeed, the society takes the suffering of others on board and expands what he calls the circle of the we. Incorporation, pollution, purification, repair. The vocabulary might have been designed for the man from Potrero Hill.

Read the dream series with this apparatus and its architecture comes forward. Every volume narrates a promise of incorporation, a betrayal of the promise, and an attempted repair. The Gold Rush society promises openness and builds anti-Chinese leagues. The Progressives promise rational administration and disenfranchise the migrants administration was to serve. The wartime state promises common sacrifice and puts its Japanese citizens behind wire. In each case Starr does what Alexander says successful trauma claims do: he names the pain, identifies the victims, assigns responsibility, and narrates the victims through qualities the wider audience already holds sacred, industry, family, faith, aspiration, so that the reader admits them to the we. The books perform the incorporation they describe. A fourth-generation Angeleno and a Salvadoran arrival of 2004 finish the same volume holding shares in the same story, which is what a communicative institution of the civil sphere is for. Starr’s critics read his redemptive structure as optimism. Alexander’s frame suggests a more exact description. The structure is civil repair, the process by which a solidary community metabolizes its own betrayals without dissolving, and Starr wrote it into narrative form for a state that had no other container for it.

The difficulty, and the analytical interest, is that the author of these incorporation narratives spent seven years working the other side of the code. The Examiner columns of 1976 through 1983 are civil-sphere discourse with the polarity reversed. Starr coded the city’s left as the column codes enemies: irrational rather than reasonable, conspiratorial rather than open, dependent rather than autonomous. He warned that district elections might seat alienated, left-wing nuts hostile to the private sector, language that does not dispute a policy but disqualifies persons. He read Patricia Hearst (b. 1954) as a political prisoner of class resentment, an inversion in which the prosecuting society, not the defendant, occupies the polluted column. And his columns on gay San Francisco supplied Milk with the evidence for the counter-coding that stuck. The symmetry deserves emphasis because it is the theory’s central claim. Milk and Starr did not hold rival values. They held the same binary discourse of civil society, liberty against repression, truth against distortion, the open city against the closed, and each man deployed it to expel the other. Alexander’s Watergate essay shows Nixon’s defenders and accusers drawing on one shared code and struggling over its application, and the San Francisco of 1978 ran the same contest at municipal scale, with Starr, for once in his life, on the losing side of the telling.

The election of 1984 tested how far the coding reached, and the test has the structure of a failed speech act. Alexander, borrowing from Austin, models a trauma claim as an utterance with a speaker, an audience, and a situation, succeeding only when the audience accepts the telling. Starr’s candidacy for the Board of Supervisors was such an utterance. The claim: San Francisco is one civic community, and its conflicts of race, class, sexuality, and neighborhood dissolve in a larger solidarity that I, the candidate, embody. The audience declined the claim, and Alexander’s frame explains the refusal more sharply than the standard vocabulary of a centrist squeezed between blocs. Solidarity talk is credible only from a speaker the audience codes as civil. Starr came before the voters six years after Milk’s speech, and among the constituencies whose incorporation was the live question of that decade, he was still filed with the excluders. A polluted speaker offering universalism reads as strategy. His unity platform did not fail because voters rejected unity. It failed because the offer arrived from the wrong column, and no one is less persuasive on the subject of the open city than a man remembered for arguing that some of its residents belonged outside. He finished just short, and never sought office again.

What followed is the process Alexander’s Watergate essay maps at national scale: purification through the differentiated institutions of the civil sphere. Starr could not cleanse himself by argument, since argument was the polluted instrument. He re-entered through offices whose defining property is that they subordinate the person to impersonal obligation. The university appointment at USC in 1989 placed him inside an institution coded universalist. The state librarianship, from 1994, completed the movement, and the office deserves attention as more than a plot point. Alexander’s civil sphere depends on communicative institutions that circulate solidarity, and the public library is the purest such institution American life has produced. It applies one rule to every person who walks in: no means test, no lineage, no confession of belief. It is universalism with a street address. Starr grasped this with the clarity of a man whose own childhood had depended on it, and he administered the office as civil infrastructure. He campaigned $350 million out of the electorate for library construction. He pushed the statute that let blind Californians hear the news by telephone, extending the communicative circle to citizens the print sphere had dropped. He promised at his swearing-in to be a visible state librarian, and the visibility was the point: the office, embodied, performing its universalism up and down the state, under a Republican governor and then a Democratic one, party being the particularism the role required him to shed. The man who could not win election as a symbol of civic unity became, by appointment and performance, its working instrument. Alexander’s Watergate senators purified a polluted polity by embodying office over person, the Bible and the Constitution and no family in view. Starr’s second act ran the same ritual logic in a bow tie.

Starr died in January 2017 to eulogies from governors, and the eulogies began the routinization Alexander describes at the end of every ritual cycle, the flattening of charged meaning into monuments and honorifics. Then the cycle turned again. Peter Richardson recovered the Examiner columns and published them into the scholarly arena, an act with the structure of a trauma claim: here is a pain, here are its victims, here is the man responsible, and here is his name on your library. Redemptive Dreams (Routledge, 2023), the collection Jason S. Sexton edited, staged the claim in the civil sphere’s evidentiary court, and in December 2023 the Commonwealth Club of California, the same institution that had given Starr its Gold Medal, hosted the panel that weighed him. The venue is the argument. The civil sphere audited its own custodian inside its own communicative institutions, by its own binary code, with the accused unavailable and represented by his shelf. No verdict issued, because the civil sphere does not issue verdicts; it issues tellings, and the current telling holds both columns at once, the columnist who coded his neighbors out of the city and the librarian who spent two decades coding strangers in.

Alexander’s repair cycle runs through public acknowledgment; the perpetrator’s confession is one of its standard rites, and audiences read its absence. Starr performed restitution on the largest scale available to him and never performed the confession. He also never wrote the volume, 1964 through 1989, in which his own conduct would have required narration, so the one incorporation story missing from his history of California is the story of the constituency his columns had helped exclude, told by the man who helped exclude it. The gap can be read two ways inside the frame, and both readings are instructive. Read one: the purification was incomplete, restitution without acknowledgment, and the posthumous trauma process now supplies the acknowledgment he withheld, as the theory predicts it must. Read two: Starr understood the civil sphere better than his silence suggests, understood that a telling, once made before three hundred thousand people, is not untold by the teller’s target, and that the only answer available to a coded man is thirty years of contrary performance, offered to the audience that alone has the power to recode him. He built libraries and wrote incorporation narratives and left the verdict to the sphere that renders them. It has not finished. By Alexander’s own account, it never does. The circle of the we is not a boundary but an argument, California is the argument at continental volume, and Starr, who spent one decade narrowing the circle and four expanding it, now sits inside it as both evidence and author, which is the position his books assign to everyone.

Didn’t Kevin Starr realize that gays by the 1970s were protected by a no fly zone, and no criticism of them as a group was allowed? No. The timeline runs the other way. In the 1970s gays were among the most contested groups in American public life, not among the most protected. California criminalized consensual sodomy until the Consenting Adult Sex Act took effect in 1976, and Starr began his column that year. The American Psychiatric Association had removed homosexuality from the DSM only in 1973, over loud internal dissent. Anita Bryant won her Dade County repeal in 1977 by a two-to-one margin. The Briggs Initiative led in California polls through the summer of 1978 and lost only after Reagan came out against it. Police were still raiding bars. Mainstream columnists disparaged gays as a matter of routine, and Milk’s own speech shows it: he named Starr at the Examiner and Charles McCabe at the Chronicle in the same breath, and the line he used about Starr was “He is getting away with it.” That sentence is the evidence. You do not say a man is getting away with something inside a no fly zone. The sanction regime did not exist, and Milk’s speech was an attempt to build one.
What existed was a local exception under construction. San Francisco was the one city where the future had partially arrived. The gay vote had helped elect Moscone in 1975, the Castro had built a precinct operation, district elections seated Milk in 1978, and by the early 1980s a coalition capable of imposing costs for anti-gay writing held real power in that city and almost nowhere else. So Starr’s columns were not a violation of a standing national norm. They were ordinary opinion for a Hearst paper with a Catholic, neighborhoods readership, and they aligned him with the Barbagelata and White constituencies that were still winning elections in the mid-1970s. Starr bet that the older moral order of his readership was the durable one, and he happened to be writing in the single American city where that bet came due fastest. By 1984 the coalition he had coded as marginal helped decide supervisor races, and he lost one. A columnist writing the same material in Cincinnati or Phoenix that decade pays little or nothing. Starr paid because of where he stood.
AIDS activism in the late 1980s changed the moral valence of the subject, the 1990s brought the media norms, and the point where group criticism became professionally disqualifying across elite institutions is a phenomenon of roughly the last twenty years. Starr’s case is one of the data points showing how the norm got built city by city and institution by institution, and his 1984 defeat is among the earliest instances of the price being collected. Starr was flying in open sky and watched the zone close behind him.

The Terms of His Surrender: Kevin Starr and the Price of Elite Membership

In 2014, after Arizona’s governor vetoed her state’s religious freedom bill under pressure from the NFL, Apple, and American Airlines, Ross Douthat (b. 1979) wrote that the culture war over normalization was finished and that what remained for his side was to receive “the terms of our surrender.” Darel E. Paul quotes the line near the end of From Tolerance to Equality: How Elites Brought America to Same-Sex Marriage (Baylor University Press, 2018), his study of how the professions, the corporations, the universities, and the press converted a moral question into a membership requirement. Paul’s subject is a class, and his method is the sociology of that class. But the process he documents was piloted in one city two decades before it went national, and one man received his terms there, in full, in November 1984. Kevin Starr (1940-2017) signed early, kept the terms for thirty-two years, and collected everything the signature bought. His career is Paul’s book run in advance at the scale of a single life, and it shows what the aggregate data cannot: what the exchange looks like from inside, what it costs, and what it pays.

Paul’s argument, compressed. American elites did not follow public opinion on homosexuality; they led it, and they led it as a class project. In 1996 the Defense of Marriage Act passed with the support of every Republican senator and two-thirds of House Democrats, and within two decades the position of that bipartisan supermajority had become professionally disqualifying across the institutions the professional and managerial class controls. The professions moved first and enforced hardest. Medicine reclassified, then championed. The press converted; the New York Times went in two years from refusing same-sex union announcements to coverage its own public editor compared to an ad campaign. Law completed the encirclement: by 2014 thirty of the two hundred largest American firms were representing challengers to state marriage laws and not one was defending them, and in 2016 the American Bar Association redefined discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as professional misconduct on a voice vote, no delegate speaking against. Social work accreditation now screens dissenters out of the profession before they enter it. Business, which Paul notes barely recognized sexual orientation before the 1990s, discovered that homosexuality photographed as everything diversity ideology wanted to be: urban, cosmopolitan, credentialed, prestige-coded. The frame shifted from toleration, which permits private dissent, to equality, which does not. And beneath the ideals Paul finds a class marker. The middle and working classes hold, and have always held, more negative views of homosexuality than elites hold. Which means a man’s position on the question now signals his class the way accent once did, and the signal is read at every hiring committee, every editorial meeting, every honors dinner. Paul states the stakes without cushioning: to lose the fight over who defines reality is to be “denied access to elite institutions and networks,” and to the material and social benefits they confer.

Now place Starr’s biography against that price schedule, and begin with what access meant to him, because the stakes of denial are not uniform across a class. A man born into the professional class can lose standing and fall back on capital, connections, a family firm. Starr was born to a machinist who went blind and a bank teller who broke down, spent five years in a Catholic orphanage in Ukiah, and grew up on welfare in public housing on Potrero Hill. Every rung he ever held was institutional: the Jesuit university, the Army commission, the Harvard doctorate, the faculty appointment. He was a class migrant with no inheritance behind him and no floor beneath him, and for such a man the sentence Paul writes in the abstract, denial of access to elite institutions, translates concretely: back to the projects, or to whatever a fifty-year-old unattached scholar without a chair falls back on. Paul’s elites defend their class position when they enforce the new terms. Starr, when the terms changed under him, was defending his entire escape route.

The Examiner years, 1976 through 1983, are the part of the record Paul’s class map illuminates best. A Harvard Ph.D. writing six columns a week for a Hearst tabloid was not addressing the professional class. He was addressing its opposite: the Catholic neighborhoods of the western and southern city, the cops, the building trades, the parish families who would later be called Reagan Democrats and later still deplorables. On the question of homosexuality, Starr wrote what that readership believed, which is to say he wrote the majority position of his era, DOMA’s position twenty years before DOMA, in the vocabulary of civic order and moral tradition. What made this remarkable was not the content but the messenger. Paul’s data show social conservatism to be the rarest commodity in the credentialed class, rarer than any other conservatism, and here was a fully credentialed man spending his credential on it, a professor voicing the moral consensus of the non-credentialed in print, under his own name, in the one American city where that consensus was collapsing fastest. For seven years Starr was the anomaly Paul’s tables barely register: elite by formation, anti-elite by expressed conviction. The market corrected the anomaly.

The correction arrived in two installments. The first was symbolic. Paul, following Bourdieu, observes that the Greek verb behind our word category, kategoresthai, means to accuse in public, and that the fight over normalization is at bottom a fight over who holds the power to categorize. On June 25, 1978, Harvey Milk (1930-1978) exercised that power on Starr by name, before hundreds of thousands of people, filing him with Anita Bryant (1940-2024) and John Briggs (1930-2020) in the category of bigot. The accusation did not yet carry national enforcement; in 1978 a columnist could still write what Starr wrote and dine anywhere in America except one city. But San Francisco was the pilot program for the regime Paul later mapped. Its gay professionals were already concentrated, already organized, already moving into the class fractions that would nationalize the new terms in the 1990s, and they had done in one decade at municipal scale what Paul shows the professions doing nationally over three. The second installment was material. In 1984 Starr ran for the Board of Supervisors on civic unity and finished just outside the winning group, in a city where the constituency he had categorized was now a constituency that categorized back, with votes. The bill that would not reach a Cincinnati columnist for another twenty years reached Starr that November. He read it, and he never wrote the old way again.

What followed tracks Paul’s exchange rate with the fidelity of a controlled experiment. Starr went silent on contested sexual morality, and the institutions began to pay. The USC appointment came in 1989. The state librarianship came in 1994 from a Republican governor and was renewed in practice by a Democratic one, the office itself a certificate of harmlessness across the class’s internal party division. University Professor, 1998. The Gold Medal of the Commonwealth Club. The Presidential Medal from USC in 2005. The National Humanities Medal in the East Room in 2006, hung on him by George W. Bush (b. 1946), a president whose electoral coalition was at that moment running on state marriage amendments Starr said nothing about. The California Hall of Fame in 2010, inducted by a governor and a Kennedy. Every honor postdates the silence. None requires it in writing, which is Paul’s point about how the regime operates: the terms are never stated, they are priced, and an intelligent man reads the price list. Starr was among the most intelligent men in California, and he had been reading institutional price lists since the orphanage.

Starr remained a practicing Catholic in a profession where, as Paul’s surveys show, practicing Christianity damages one’s prospects at elite institutions more than being a Republican does. He called himself a neo-Thomist in print. He took a fellowship at the Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology. He spent his last decade writing a two-volume history of Roman Catholicism in North America and died with the second volume unfinished on his desk. What he sold was the application: the willingness, which he had exercised weekly from 1976 to 1983, to bring that Catholicism to bear on any contemporary question his class had settled. After 1984 his faith appears in his work as history, heritage, architecture, and civic memory, registers in which Catholicism functions as a completed contribution rather than a live claim. Paul’s frame names the maneuver. Under toleration, the older regime, a professional could hold and even voice traditional views if he held them quietly and framed them as private conviction. Starr negotiated his surrender under toleration’s rules and then held the position as the frame shifted to equality around him, a grandfather clause of one. The class let him keep the arrangement because he predated the new terms, because his silence was total, and because his product, a usable past for a state the class was busy governing, was too valuable to audit.

The arrangement had an expiration date he did not live to reach. Paul’s coda observes that the revolutionary frontier moves, that transgenderism swept elite institutions in a quarter of the time homosexuality required, and that the compliance standard has been rising from silence toward affirmation: the social work accreditors demand that members affirm and support, the ABA rule polices speech, the pronoun and the lapel pin ask every professional to sign, not merely to refrain. Starr’s bargain, doctrine kept private in exchange for standing kept public, was a product of the toleration era, and the equality era has been withdrawing it from sale. Had he lived past January 2017 into the years when even “so-called religious freedom” acquired scare quotes in the papers of record, the silence that bought his medals might have started reading as the dissent it concealed. He got the last good rate. The men of his formation one generation younger face a schedule on which his option does not appear.

Which is where Rod Dreher (b. 1967) enters, because The Benedict Option (2017), published two months after Starr died, is a book-length refusal of Starr’s trade. Dreher looked at the price schedule Paul documents and concluded that the institutions were no longer worth the witness they cost, that orthodox Christians should withdraw into thick communities and conserve the deposit, standing be damned. Starr had run the opposite play for four decades: full presence in every elite institution California offered, purchased with a witness surrendered one contested question at a time, quietly, without ever once announcing the sale. The two roads price the same two goods inversely. Starr’s road buys the institutions and forfeits the testimony; Dreher’s buys the testimony and forfeits the institutions. Paul’s data render a cold verdict on which road remains open: the affirmative turn is closing Starr’s, which required only silence, and silence no longer clears the market. So the Potrero Hill boy’s wager stands as a period piece, the high-water mark of what accommodation could still purchase, a shelf of indispensable books, a state office, a medal from a president, every door in California open to the end, and beneath it the question his own Church poses about profit and loss, which no archive can settle and which Starr, who filed everything, left unfiled.

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Stephen Kotkin: A Life in Power

In the winter of 1987, an American graduate student stepped off a train in Magnitogorsk, a steel city in the southern Urals that had been closed to foreigners for half a century. The air tasted of sulfur. The blast furnaces of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine burned around the clock, as they had since 1932, and their smoke settled over the barracks, the Khrushchev-era cement blocks, and the ration lines outside the food stores. Stephen Kotkin (b. 1959) was the first American in five decades to live there. The city put him up in the cottages of the old American colony, the self-contained settlement built in the early 1930s for engineers from Gary, Indiana, hired on contract to help the Bolsheviks build a steel plant modeled on their own. The Americans had come to Magnitogorsk to construct socialism’s showcase. Kotkin came to figure out what they had built.

The residents did not know what to make of him. A historian from Princeton, they were told, though he had not yet finished his doctorate and Princeton came later. He asked about housing queues, about how one obtained sausage, about what the factory newspaper meant when it printed the word “restructuring.” He took notes on the ecology, the hospitals, the party meetings that had begun, under Mikhail Gorbachev (1931-2022), to feature something like open argument. A steelworker could tell him things in 1987 that a steelworker could not have said aloud in 1937, and both men knew it, and the knowledge of that difference became part of Kotkin’s education. He was watching a political civilization in the act of losing faith in its own vocabulary.

Nearly four decades later, Kotkin sits in an office in Hoover Tower at Stanford, the author of two volumes of the largest Stalin biography ever attempted, at work on the third, having survived three unrelated cancers along the way. He has become the most prominent historian of Russia in the English language and one of the few academic historians whose judgments on Ukraine, China, and American power circulate among people who make policy. The road from the smoke of Magnitogorsk to the tower at Stanford runs through the central questions of the twentieth century. How do regimes acquire power? How do institutions turn ideas into action? Why do the strongest states so often blind themselves with the instruments built to protect them?

Kotkin was born on February 17, 1959, in Englewood, New Jersey, the third son of Jay Kotkin, a factory worker whose Jewish family had emigrated from Vitebsk, then in the Russian Empire and now in Belarus, and Joanne Korolewicz, a cook and art teacher. He grew up in New York City. The family origins carry weight in his work without ever appearing in it. The historian who reconstructed how Soviet power classified people by class background is himself the son of a factory worker, and the empire he studies is the empire his father’s family fled. He does not write about this. His books contain no confessional passages. But the trajectory, from a factory worker’s home to the Birkelund chair at Princeton, follows the American pattern of mobility that his subjects, the planners of Magnitogorsk, promised their own workers and could not deliver.

He went to the University of Rochester and took his degree in English in 1981. The English training shows. His books run to a thousand pages of documented argument, yet they build scenes, pace revelations, deploy irony, and end chapters on reversals. He has never accepted the premise that archival rigor requires bad prose.

At Berkeley he studied under Reginald Zelnik (1936-2004), a historian of Russian workers, and Martin Malia (1924-2004), an intellectual historian who insisted that communism was an ideological project and not merely Russian backwardness wearing a red flag. Kotkin arrived intending to work on France or the Habsburg lands. Then Michel Foucault (1926-1984) came to Berkeley, and Kotkin sat in his seminars, and the plan changed. Picture the scene as the participants have described that period: the French philosopher, shaved head, wire glasses, drawing power out of the throne room and into the file cabinet, the clinic, the school, the confession. Power, on this account, did not descend from a ruler to his subjects. It circulated through the records institutions kept, the categories they imposed, the language they taught people to use about themselves. Kotkin took the insight and left the politics. He asked what such an analysis might reveal if applied to the most ambitious social engineering project in history, and he went looking for a place where Stalinism could be studied from the ground.

He found Magnitogorsk. The master’s degree came in 1983, the doctorate in 1988, and in 1989 Princeton hired him. He stayed thirty-three years.

The first book, Steeltown, USSR: Soviet Society in the Gorbachev Era (1991), reported what he had seen in the perestroika city: shortages, ecological ruin, bureaucratic confusion, and a public language that commanded less and less belief. The book resisted the temptation of its moment. Western observers in 1991 wanted to believe that Soviet citizens were suppressed liberals waiting for release. Kotkin argued that Soviet citizens were Soviet. Their expectations about work, housing, fairness, and the obligations of the state had been formed inside Soviet institutions, and those expectations survived the death of the slogans. The observation looked modest in 1991. It explains a great deal about Russia after 1991.

The breakthrough came four years later. Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (1995) reconstructed the building of Magnitogorsk during Stalin’s industrial revolution, and it changed the field. The Soviet leadership intended the city to produce steel and to produce people: peasants remade as workers, migrants remade as Soviet citizens, a tent settlement on the steppe remade as a model socialist city. What the leadership got was chaos. Housing lagged years behind migration. Sanitation barely existed. Managers falsified reports. Workers deserted by the thousands. And yet, Kotkin argued, the chaos did not disprove the regime’s power. Its power lay partly in its command of interpretation. Failure became sabotage. Shortage became the work of class enemies. The regime could not deliver its promises, but it could dictate the terms on which its failures were discussed.

The book’s most influential idea arrived in two words: speaking Bolshevik. Soviet citizens learned to translate their needs into the regime’s moral vocabulary. A worker who wanted an apartment framed his request as a matter of production targets. An official who had failed invoked vigilance against wreckers. Men and women wrote autobiographies that converted the mess of their lives into approved categories of class origin, political growth, and service to socialism. None of this required belief, and none of it excluded belief. Kotkin refused the neat division of the population into true believers and secret dissidents. People believed, conformed, calculated, and protected themselves at the same time, and the language that made all these moves possible was the regime’s language. That was the trap. Even resistance had to be phrased in Bolshevik.

The idea traveled far beyond Russian history because it describes how people live inside any ideological institution. A corporation, a church, a university, a party: the member need not believe the catechism. He need only learn which identities the institution rewards and which explanations it accepts. The institution reproduces through use.

The concept drew fire. Anna Krylova argued that Kotkin made the Bolshevik script too total, as if Soviet modernity had written every line its subjects could speak. Others asked where religion lived in his account, and family, and ethnicity, and the interior life that never reached a personnel file. The criticism marks a real limit. A language can govern public action without exhausting private experience, and Magnetic Mountain is a book about public action.

At Princeton, Kotkin built. He directed the Russian and Eurasian studies program for thirteen years, ran the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, co-founded programs in global history and in the history and practice of diplomacy, and trained a generation of scholars now spread across the study of Russia, Central Asia, empire, and communism. The university gave him its President’s Award for Distinguished Teaching in 1994 and its Graduate Student Mentor Award in 2010. Colleagues who admired his books sometimes underestimated the institutional appetite behind them. Kotkin understood universities the way he understood the Soviet party-state, as systems of recruitment, patronage, and competition, and he worked them. He risked his tenure case to spend time learning Japanese, a bet on Asia that his department could have punished and that instead widened his range for the rest of his career.

The Asian bet ran deep. He traveled East Asia in the 1980s, held research appointments connected to the University of Tokyo, and made himself a historian of Eurasia rather than of Russia-in-Europe. Japan gave him a working non-Western modernity to think with at the moment the Soviet economy stalled. Korea entered his life through his marriage. China entered through the logic of his subject: another communist party ruling a continental state, another experiment in whether political monopoly and economic growth can share a country.

Two books on collapse followed the book on construction. Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000 (2001) opened with a reversal that has become a Kotkin signature. The surprise of 1991 was the peace. The Soviet Union held nuclear weapons, an enormous army, security services, disputed borders, and a federal structure organized by ethnicity. Yugoslavia showed what such an inheritance could produce. The Soviet dissolution could have burned a continent, and it did not, and the historian’s first task was to explain the absence of fire. Kotkin’s answer turned on insiders. The West did not defeat the Soviet Union, and civil society did not rise up and overthrow it. Party officials, enterprise managers, and republican leaders converted their administrative positions into property and power under new flags. Gorbachev weakened the instruments that held the union together and built no replacements. The system lost the will and the means to reproduce itself.

Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment (2009), written with a contribution from Jan T. Gross (b. 1947), extended the argument to Eastern Europe and sharpened its edge. The standard story of 1989 starred heroic dissidents and a mature civil society. Kotkin honored the dissidents’ moral leadership, and Poland’s Solidarity had organizational weight, but he located the cause of collapse in the ruling establishments themselves, the networks of officials, managers, and police who kept their privileges while losing their faith. His title named them: the uncivil society. The regimes fell when the people paid to defend them stopped believing the defense was possible or deserved. The book separated moral heroism from causal power, an operation that made admirers in political science and enemies among those who preferred the heroic account.

Then he went back to Stalin, this time through the front door.

The decision to write a biography looked, at first, like a retreat from everything Magnetic Mountain had stood for. The early book found power in housing offices and personnel files. Biography returns power to the ruler’s desk. Kotkin resolved the tension by scale. His Stalin project is a history of the world from the 1870s to 1953, organized around the one man whose decisions the machinery of a revolutionary state magnified into the fates of hundreds of millions. The first volume, Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928 (2014), a Pulitzer finalist, runs past nine hundred pages. The second, Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941 (2017), passes eleven hundred. The notes alone constitute a research library.

Volume one demolished two comfortable stories. The first was psychological: the beaten Georgian boy who grew into a monster. Kotkin pointed out that poverty and a violent father were common in the Russian Empire and mass murderers were not. What made Stalin (1878-1953) possible was Bolshevism, an ideology that treated class war, dictatorship, and the destruction of private property as instruments of human liberation. Stalin believed it. His conviction defined what he considered necessary and what he considered permitted. The second story was Trotsky’s: Stalin the gray mediocrity who won because brighter men ignored him. Kotkin’s Stalin has a formidable memory, administrative patience, and total command of the machinery of appointments. Leon Trotsky (1879-1940) wrote better and spoke better. Stalin did the repetitive work of accumulating institutional power, and the repetitive work won.

The volume’s most contested claim concerns Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924). Kotkin stressed continuity. Lenin built the one-party state, the political police, the censorship, the practice of hostage-taking and mass violence. Stalin personalized and radicalized instruments he inherited. The reading leaves no room for the humane Lenin betrayed by his successor, and it provoked a fight. Kotkin went further and questioned the authenticity of Lenin’s Testament, the document criticizing Stalin that Lenin supposedly dictated near death, suggesting a hand for Nadezhda Krupskaya (1869-1939) in its composition. Richard Pipes (1923-2018) and Ronald Grigor Suny (b. 1940) answered that his suspicion rested on conjecture, and most specialists still accept the document. The episode shows Kotkin’s appetite for revision at its most aggressive and, his critics say, least supported.

Volume two holds two truths in one frame, and the holding is the achievement. Stalin built the industrial and military state that survived Hitler. Stalin imposed collectivization and famine that killed millions, a terror that devoured his own officer corps and administrative elite, and a diplomatic strategy that ended with the largest invasion in history achieving surprise. The same machine produced the power and the vulnerability. Kotkin’s Stalin reads everything, remembers everything, and misjudges Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) at the one moment when misjudgment could be fatal, in part because his own terror had taught every official the price of bringing him unwelcome evidence. The dictator’s control grew as the reliability of what he was told declined. Kotkin calls the personnel side of this process negative selection. The ruler promotes the unthreatening. The unthreatening cannot correct him. The regime looks stronger and becomes more brittle, and the pattern, once seen in Stalin’s Kremlin, becomes hard to unsee in Putin’s.

The third volume carries the title Stalin: Totalitarian Superpower and covers the war, the postwar decade, the Chinese Revolution, the birth of the Cold War, and the death of the subject in 1953. Kotkin has said the Second World War takes up about half the book, and he gives sustained attention to what he calls the four possible partitions in Asia: China, Korea, Japan, Indochina. Two happened. Two did not. Asia lives with the difference. Retail listings have advertised publication dates for years, and the dates keep moving; in a November 2024 conversation with the economist Tyler Cowen (b. 1962), Kotkin said he stood roughly halfway through and that finishing remained years off. Treat any listed date as a placeholder until Penguin confirms it.

The delay has a medical history. In the same conversation, Kotkin disclosed that three separate, unrelated cancers had put him through about eighteen months of treatment and surveillance. Each was caught early, the second and third detected because doctors were watching for recurrence of the first. He credited luck and his physicians, estimated the cost to the book at eighteen months to two years, and said the experience “teaches you a lot about life.” He said no more than that, in public, about what it taught. The man has spent twenty years reading interrogation protocols, execution lists, and famine reports, and then spent a year and a half in what he called a tunnel of medical care, and the third volume, whenever it comes, will be the book of a writer who did both.

His method has a name he uses: analytical narrative. The historian must tell the story, because the sequence of events carries the causation, and the story must argue, because chronicle explains nothing. Several commitments run through all the books. Ideology causes things; people do not first hold interests and then shop for justifying ideas, because the ideas define what counts as an interest, an enemy, a permissible act. Power lives in institutions; a ruler’s wish becomes history only when offices, files, and personnel can execute it. Individuals and structures shape each other; Stalin inherited the Bolshevik state and remade it, and neither the inheritance nor the remaking explains the outcome alone. Information is a political resource that dictatorships poison at the source; fear breeds concealment, and the ruler drowns in reports he cannot trust. Contingency is real, and counterfactuals are the historian’s instrument for finding it; Russia did not have to go Bolshevik, Stalin did not have to succeed Lenin, and the peaceful end of the union was one outcome among grimmer possibilities. And empathy is a discipline, not a sympathy. The historian reconstructs what the actor knew, feared, and wanted, then judges the act. Kotkin’s Stalin disturbs because his reasoning is recognizable. The monster of caricature threatens no one’s self-understanding. The intelligent ideologue with unlimited authority does.

In 2022 Kotkin took emeritus status at Princeton and moved to Stanford’s Hoover Institution as the Kleinheinz Family Senior Fellow, with a concurrent senior fellowship at the Freeman Spogli Institute. Condoleezza Rice (b. 1954), then Hoover’s director, announced the appointment. He founded the Hoover History Lab, which puts historians in rooms with policymakers and bets that archival depth can improve strategic judgment. He calls the product consequential history and warns against its counterfeit, the junk history of loose analogy, and the warning acknowledges the risk built into his own enterprise. Policy wants compression and usable conclusions. Archives yield ambiguity and conflicting evidence. History written to answer this year’s question can become this year’s instrument. Kotkin knows the danger, names it, and proceeds, and his public commentary runs sharper and more categorical than his books, which is either the necessary price of the audience or the audience collecting its fee.

The public role expanded with the war. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Kotkin’s long interviews with Peter Robinson (b. 1957) on Hoover’s Uncommon Knowledge reached audiences no monograph touches, and his Foreign Affairs and New Yorker conversations circulated through governments. He rejects the claim that NATO enlargement explains the war. Vladimir Putin (b. 1952) inherited real security anxieties and chose dictatorship, chose war, chose the denial of Ukrainian nationhood, and the system around him, built on loyalty and negative selection, reproduced the information pathology Kotkin had mapped in Stalin’s Kremlin. He told Robinson in 2023 that Putin kept the invasion so close that “the third-ranking official in Russia’s defense ministry knew less than the CIA.” Inside such regimes, he argues, even the ruling circle practices Kremlinology on its own ruler.

On China he issues a different warning. The Chinese party-state commands industrial capacity, commercial networks, and administrative sophistication that Russia lacks, and it studied the Soviet collapse the way generals study a lost war. Yet the dilemma stands: the party wants dynamism without surrendering monopoly, and surveillance technology does not repeal the conflict between centralized control and decentralized creativity. Under Xi Jinping (b. 1953), power has personalized, collective constraints have weakened, and the correction problem returns. Kotkin declines the lazy analogy. China is not the Soviet Union and Xi is not Stalin. The comparison that counts concerns process. Can the system move unwelcome information upward, reverse a leader’s error, and manage succession without breaking?

On the United States he is a defender without sentimentality. Democracies look weak because their conflicts are visible; authoritarian states look strong because their conflicts are hidden; the appearance and the resilience run in opposite directions. But elections do not compensate forever for governments that fail to deliver security, housing, schools, and competent administration, and he argues that America’s chief strategic risk is domestic, the squandering of unmatched economic, technological, and alliance advantages through political dysfunction and attacks on the country’s own institutional foundations.

His marriage joins political power to porcelain. Soyoung Lee, an art historian born in Jakarta to a Korean diplomat, spent fifteen years at the Metropolitan Museum of Art as its first curator of Korean art, served as chief curator of the Harvard Art Museums, and in April 2025 became the Barbara Bass Bakar Director and CEO of San Francisco’s Asian Art Museum. They met during his time in Japan. Kotkin credits her with opening Korean art to him, the ceramics and furniture and folk painting, and the marriage has produced a home where the study of how states break people shares shelf space with the study of what civilizations make. He keeps the rest private. The historian who reads other men’s interrogation files discloses almost nothing of his own interior, and the reserve is consistent: he is expansive on method and geopolitics, closed on himself, the cancer disclosure standing as the exception that measures the rule.

Beyond Stalin waits Siberia. Kotkin is writing a multi-century history of the Ob River Valley, under the working title Lost in Siberia, that reads the region as a palimpsest: Indigenous societies, Buddhist networks, Qing expansion, Russian settlement, Soviet industry, scientific cities, ruined landscapes. Water anchors the argument. The world imagines Siberia through oil, gas, and cold. Kotkin argues that its rivers may become the strategic resource as climate change strains Asian water supplies. The project also answers, in advance, the critics who say the Stalin volumes returned him to kings and battles. A river valley is not a ruler. The book promises the ground-level method of Magnetic Mountain stretched across four centuries.

The criticisms of his work deserve their own accounting, because their pattern reveals the shape of the achievement. Historians on the left argue that he compresses the socialist tradition into Bolshevik anti-capitalism and reads the revolution through the dictatorship that followed, making Stalinism look like socialism’s meaning rather than one of its outcomes. Suny argues that he slights the interior intellectual worlds of Lenin and Stalin, rendering party disputes as power struggles when they were also arguments among revolutionaries about history and justice. Others detect a Russian pattern, autocracy plus militarization plus imperial ambition plus economic weakness, that explains so much it risks explaining everything, flattening the ruptures and experiments; his archival writing guards against this with contingency and counterfactuals, and his compressed public commentary sometimes does not. And the move to Hoover placed him inside an institution with a mission and a reputation, which shapes questions asked and lessons drawn even when it corrupts nothing. Each criticism attacks a strength pushed past its warrant: the seriousness about ideology, the institutional focus, the pattern recognition, the policy ambition. Nobody accuses him of small claims.

The achievement, at this point, admits summary. Magnetic Mountain gave the study of authoritarianism its most portable concept, the insight that subjects reproduce a regime by using its language for their own purposes, belief optional. The collapse books relocated the death of communism from the streets to the establishments, teaching that systems survive cynicism and die of elite defection. The Stalin volumes restored the individual to history without surrendering the structures, showing a man whose choices became world-historical because an ideology, a party, and an empire stood ready to execute them. And across all of it runs a single paradox, pursued from the file cabinets of Magnitogorsk to the situation rooms of the present: rulers concentrate power to abolish uncertainty, and the concentration manufactures uncertainty, because it destroys the honest report, the independent check, the subordinate who says no. States mobilize to become secure and brutalize the society they claim to protect. Ideologies promise liberation and authorize limitless coercion in its name.

Kotkin, who watched the world’s largest experiment in concentrated power lose its voice from a cottage built by engineers from Indiana, has spent forty years documenting that paradox. The third Stalin volume will close the trilogy. The Siberia book will open the rivers. The historian, past his own tunnel, keeps working.

Notes

Scene one, Magnitogorsk 1987, first American in five decades, American colony cottages modeled on Gary, Indiana: Kotkin‘s November 2024 conversation with Tyler Cowen, also the source for the three cancers, the eighteen-month tunnel, “teaches you a lot about life,” the Japanese tenure risk, his wife opening Korean folk art to him, and the halfway-through status of volume three.

Family background, father Jay Kotkin, factory worker, Vitebsk Jewish family; mother Joanne Korolewicz, cook and art teacher; third son; Rochester English degree 1981; Berkeley MA 1983, PhD 1988; Zelnik and Malia; Foucault encounter; Lenin’s Testament and Krupskaya claim; Pulitzer finalist status; program directorships: Wikipedia, Stephen Kotkin.

Hoover appointment, Kleinheinz fellowship, Rice quote context, September 1, 2022, effective date, History Lab launch: Hoover Institution announcement and his Hoover profile.

The Kremlinology and CIA-versus-defense-ministry material: February 14, 2023, Uncommon Knowledge transcript.

Consequential history, junk history, disciplined empathy, the craft discussion: the July 22, 2025, Dan Wang conversation, “How Historians Work: A History Lab Discussion with Dan Wang and Stephen Kotkin”.

Soyoung Lee appointment, January 14, 2025 announcement, April 2025 start, Met and Harvard history, Jakarta birth, diplomat father: Asian Art Museum announcement and Wikipedia, Soyoung Lee.

The Exchange Rate: Stephen Kotkin and the Conversion of Capital

In September 2022, Stephen Kotkin left the Princeton history department after thirty-three years and moved to the Hoover Institution at Stanford. Announcements of this kind read as retirement news. A senior scholar takes emeritus status, accepts a fellowship at a policy institute, and begins the long diminuendo of the honored elder. Nothing of the sort happened. Kotkin’s public presence grew. His interviews multiplied. His judgments on Russia, China, and American power began circulating through governments. The move was a conversion, in the sense Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) gave the word: the exchange of one species of capital for another, executed at a moment when the holder judged the rate favorable.

Bourdieu spent his career mapping such transactions. In “The Forms of Capital” and Homo Academicus, he argued that societies contain multiple fields, each with its own stakes, its own currency, and its own rules for who may hold authority. The academic field pays in a currency it mints for its own use: peer recognition, chairs, prizes, the citation, the trained student. The political and policy fields pay in a different currency: access, influence, audience, the ear of power. The currencies trade against each other, but the exchange carries risk, because each field officially disdains the other’s money. The scholar who cashes out into punditry can find that his academic capital has been devalued by the act of spending it. The pundit who cites his archive can find that the policy field has no use for footnotes. Every crossing is a wager on the rate.

Kotkin’s career, read through this frame, is a forty-year sequence of well-timed trades, beginning with the position he took on entry and ending, for now, in an office in Hoover Tower. The frame does not exhaust the man. It illuminates the career.

Consider first the field he entered. Soviet history in the early 1980s was divided between two camps, and the division was a war. The totalitarian school, whose senior figures included Kotkin’s own teacher Martin Malia and, at Harvard, Richard Pipes, held that the Soviet Union was an ideological project, that terror flowed from doctrine, and that the state was the proper object of study. The revisionists, led by Sheila Fitzpatrick (b. 1941) and a cohort of social historians, held that the totalitarian model was Cold War artifact, that Soviet society had its own life, and that support, mobility, and participation from below explained more than doctrine from above. Each camp controlled journals, placements, and the consecrating power of the field. A graduate student had to choose, and the choice determined who reviewed him, who hired him, and who cited him.

Bourdieu observed in Homo Academicus that newcomers to a field face a strategic decision between succession and subversion: inherit the positions of the established, or attack them. He noted a third path, available to the unusually placed: occupy the position the existing structure has left empty. Magnetic Mountain did this. The book took ideology as seriously as Malia could wish. Stalinism appears in it as a civilization with an eschatology, and the regime’s language does real causal work. The book also delivered everything the revisionists demanded: housing queues, personnel files, workers’ autobiographies, the texture of daily life in a steel city, agency from below on every page. Speaking Bolshevik, the book’s portable concept, fused the two programs into a single instrument. The regime’s ideology mattered because ordinary people used it, and ordinary people’s agency mattered because they exercised it in the regime’s language. Neither camp could claim the book. Neither camp could dismiss it. Both camps had to read it.

The position paid twice. It collected readers across the field’s central divide, and it positioned Kotkin as the man who had ended the war, which is a form of consecration the field reserves for very few. The great disputes of a discipline are its principal stakes, and the scholar credited with resolving one inherits the accumulated investment of every combatant. By the late 1990s, graduate students who had never chosen between Malia and Fitzpatrick were choosing Kotkin, which meant the field’s reproduction now ran through him.

Habitus prepared the position. Bourdieu used the word for the durable dispositions a person carries from his origins into the field, the accent and posture and instinct that mark him and equip him. Kotkin came from a factory worker’s home, took his first degree in English, and learned Russia’s history at a public university’s price. The English degree shows in every book: the scene-setting, the pacing, the chapters that end on reversals. In a field that treats fine prose with suspicion, as if style were evidence of insufficient rigor, writing well is a distinction strategy, in Bourdieu’s sense of distinction: a marker that separates its holder from the mass of competent producers and that cannot be acquired late or faked. The factory background shows elsewhere. Kotkin’s histories concentrate on how organizations actually run, on personnel, supply, reporting, and the gap between the order issued and the order executed, the knowledge of institutions that a worker’s son absorbs at the dinner table and a professor’s son does not.

He then did something Bourdieu’s model predicts almost no one will do. In the middle of the tenure clock, when the field’s incentives demand maximum production in the currency the tenure committee counts, Kotkin spent scarce time learning Japanese. He has described the choice as a risk to his case, and it was. Read as investment, the move was a long position in a currency the field did not yet trade: Asia. The Soviet field of the 1980s faced Europe. Kotkin bet that Russia’s future historian might need Japan, Korea, and China, and the bet took decades to pay. When it paid, it paid in a monopoly. By the 2010s he stood nearly alone as a historian of Russia who could operate across Eurasia, and the third Stalin volume’s treatment of the Asian settlements, the partitions made and unmade in China, Korea, Japan, and Indochina, draws on that position. Bourdieu wrote about the time structure of capital, the way early sacrifices compound. The Japanese gamble is the cleanest example in Kotkin’s portfolio.

The accumulation phase ran through Princeton and requires little narration because the honors narrate themselves: the Birkelund chair, the teaching award, the mentorship award, the Pulitzer shortlist, thirteen years directing the Russia program, the institute directorship, the co-founded programs in global history and diplomacy. Note what the list contains besides scholarship. Kotkin ran things. He built programs, placed students, and worked appointments, the unglamorous machinery through which a field reproduces itself and through which, Bourdieu insisted, its real power flows. Homo Academicus scandalized French academia by demonstrating that prestige within the university tracked administrative and patronage position at least as closely as intellectual production. Kotkin never needed the demonstration. He operated on the finding.

Here the analysis arrives at its richest seam of evidence, which is Kotkin’s own writing. The first Stalin volume stages a contest between two Bolsheviks. Trotsky holds the field’s glamour capital: the finest pen in the party, the great orator, the theorist, the commander of the Red Army, the man every foreign observer identified as Lenin’s heir. Stalin holds the administrative capital: the personnel files, the appointment power, the committee assignments no one else wanted, the memory for who owed what to whom. The field of Bolshevik politics, as Kotkin reconstructs it, set an exchange rate between these currencies, and the rate favored Stalin, because the stakes of that field were institutional control and not persuasion. Trotsky kept producing brilliance in a currency the field had ceased to honor. Stalin accumulated in the currency that counted, and by 1928 the accumulation was absolute.

This is field analysis, executed without the vocabulary, and it is written from the winner’s side of an equivalent contest. Kotkin the program director, the builder of institutes, the master of the appointment, reconstructed the victory of organizational capital over charismatic capital with an insider’s understanding of why the dull work wins. Historians bring their habitus to their subjects. The revisionists, marginal to power, found Soviet society’s margins. Malia, the intellectual historian, found an idea. Kotkin, who ran the machinery of an elite department for three decades, found the machinery, and found it decisive. This observation subtracts nothing from the finding, which the documents support. It explains why this historian, of all the historians who read the same documents, saw the appointment files as the plot.

The same reading extends to his account of Soviet collapse. Uncivil Society locates the death of communism in the establishments, in the officials who kept their offices while losing their faith, and strips causal credit from the dissidents whom the standard account had made heroes. Translate into field terms: the regimes fell when their own elites stopped investing in the stakes, when the illusio failed. Bourdieu used illusio for the shared belief that a field’s game is worth playing, the investment that precedes any particular move. A field can survive cynicism about outcomes. It cannot survive its players’ withdrawal from the game. Kotkin’s communist officials in 1989 are players who have left the table while still seated at it, and his insight that such regimes look intact until the moment they vanish is an insight about what happens when illusio dies faster than institutions. No historian without a builder’s feel for institutional belief writes that book.

Then came the conversion. Bourdieu distinguished, within any field of cultural production, an autonomous pole and a heteronomous pole. At the autonomous pole, producers answer only to peers, and the field’s own currency is the sole tender: the mathematician valued by mathematicians, the poet’s poet. At the heteronomous pole, producers answer to external demand, to markets, patrons, and power, and the field’s currency trades openly against money and influence. Princeton’s history department sits near the autonomous pole. The Hoover Institution sits near the heteronomous pole by design and mission: an institution with overseers, a policy agenda, and a stated purpose of applying scholarship to national problems. Rice, a former secretary of state, announced Kotkin’s appointment. The signature on the announcement is itself a datum about which field was doing the hiring.

The timing of the trade rewards attention. Kotkin moved in 2022, within months of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, at the precise moment when the policy field’s demand for his expertise reached its maximum and when his academic capital stood at its peak: two volumes published to consecration, the third in progress, no rival in sight. He sold at the top. An earlier move might have discounted his holdings; the field punishes those who leave before consecration as opportunists. A later move might have missed the demand. Bourdieu wrote of the feel for the game, the practical mastery that lets a player act at the right moment without calculation, and whether or not Kotkin calculated, his habitus timed the market.

What did he buy, and what did he pay? He bought a new audience and a new authority. The Hoover platform, the long interviews, the war’s urgency, and his oral gifts combined to give him a reach no monograph delivers, and reach in the policy field converts to influence, the field’s specific stake. He bought institutional power of a new kind: the History Lab, his own creation, funded and staffed, a machine for placing historians in rooms with policymakers and for training successors, which is to say a machine for reproducing his position. The builder built again, in the new field, immediately.

He paid in the old currency. The academic field discounts Hoover holdings. The institution’s ideological reputation, its overseers, and its policy mission mark its fellows, in the eyes of the autonomous pole, as producers who have accepted external masters, and the mark attaches regardless of what any fellow writes. Reviews of the third volume, when it comes, will be written partly by scholars for whom the Hoover address is evidence, and Kotkin knows it. His repeated public insistence on the distinction between consequential history and junk history reads, in this light, as boundary work in defense of his own exchange rate. His policy authority is backed, he maintains, by archival gold: thirty years in the documents, the notes, the discipline of contradictory evidence. The claim must be maintained, loudly and often, because the moment the backing is doubted, his currency floats, and a floating currency in the policy field is just opinion, of which the field has an infinite supply. Every warning he issues against loose analogy is also a certification of his own reserves.

The new field also changed his register, and the change is measurable in his sentences. The books qualify. They weigh counterfactuals, sit with contradictory evidence, and let ambiguity stand. The interviews rank, predict, and pronounce. Russia will do this; China cannot do that; America retains these advantages and squanders them thus. Critics hear coarsening. Bourdieu’s frame hears the stakes of a different game. The policy field pays for the categorical, because policymakers must act under uncertainty and reward those who compress it, and long-form interviews are contests in which the qualified answer reads as weakness. A player who accepts a field’s stakes accepts its forms. The Kotkin of the Robinson interviews is playing the game he moved to play, in the style the game requires, and the archival Kotkin persists underneath, on a delay measured in the years between volumes. Hysteresis, Bourdieu called it, when a habitus formed in one field operates in another: the lag produces the friction, and the friction is visible in a man who cites document collections on camera to an audience that wants the bottom line.

Speaking Bolshevik, the concept that made Kotkin’s name, is a theory of practical mastery within a field. Soviet citizens learned which self-presentations the institution rewarded, which explanations it accepted, which currency their claims had to be denominated in, and they achieved this mastery without believing, or while believing, or without the question of belief arising. The worker who framed his apartment request in the language of production targets was converting his need into the field’s tender at the going rate. Kotkin arrived at this account after sitting in Foucault’s Berkeley seminars, and Foucault and Bourdieu, rivals in the Parisian field, worked adjacent veins. The historian who built his career on well-timed position-takings and capital conversions made his first fortune with a theory of how people position themselves inside an institution’s economy of language. He has been a field theorist from the start. The field he analyzed first was Stalinism. The field he has played best is his own.

Bourdieu’s economy of practices explains position, timing, and register. It does not explain why a man who had already banked every honor his field could issue spent his sixties, and then his convalescence from three cancers, on a third volume that can raise his standing by little and that only years in the archive can finish. Interest, in Bourdieu’s expanded sense, covers much, and covers this badly. Somewhere beneath the portfolio sits an investment the model cannot price: the belief, held past the point of profit, that getting Stalin right is worth a life. Bourdieu conceded that fields run on such belief; his word for it, illusio, carries a shrug the phenomenon does not deserve. Kotkin’s career is a study in capital conversion. The trilogy is what the capital was for, and on that question the ledger goes silent.

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